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Procedural Autonomy: Frontiers in the Customization of Dispute Resolution Procedures 
Henry Allen Blair 
 
  Commercial parties author the substantive terms of their contracts.  Of course, they do not 
and cannot think of everything.  Epistemic limits, differentials in bargaining power, and escalating 
costs prevent them from addressing all possible contingencies and details.  So, contract law helps 
out by offering a set of default terms, which fill in many gaps.  Conventional contract theory says 
that parties will change these defaults and select transaction-specific provisions whenever doing so 
will increase their contractual surplus.   
More and more commentators have been asking whether similar autonomy extends to 
procedure: can, do, and should parties also be free to author the processes used to determine 
their substantive rights?  The existing rules of procedure could be seen as defaults that apply to 
the extent that parties do not opt out or stickiness does not prevent them from doing so.  The 
articles that comprise this dissertation address these questions, with emphasis on the first two: 
can and do parties engage in procedural contracting.   
Chapter 1 focuses on whether parties have the power, under existing law, to contract for 
their own procedural regimes.  It does so in a narrow context: opting into enhanced review of 
arbitral awards.  This narrow context matters to the larger project because the only Supreme Court 
decision in the past sixty years to arguably curtail party autonomy over procedure was Hall Street 
Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., which eliminated the authority of parties to opt into greater 
judicial scrutiny of their arbitral awards in federal courts.  Chapter 1 investigates whether Hall 
Street’s limitation threatens the freedom of contract in arbitration.  Analyzing not only the case but 
the historic trajectory of Supreme Court jurisprudence on procedural contracting, Chapter 1 
 
 
concludes that Hall Street was a poorly decided opinion, but it does not undermine party authority 
over procedure in arbitration.  To the contrary, it purports to bolster that freedom by encouraging 
parties to look to state arbitration law for enforcement of awards.  That outcome might jeopardize 
the harmonious function of arbitration law, but it does not signal any reticence by the Court about 
procedural contracting.  
 Chapter 2 picks up on a similar but broader approach.  It begins by outlining the many 
theoretical benefits that parties could achieve through contractually selected dispute resolution 
procedures.  Those benefits are significant.  It then conducts a high-level survey of existing 
empirical literature.  This literature concludes that parties do precious little procedural 
customization in their contracts.  Chapter 2 recognizes the puzzling tension between these two 
conclusions: if procedural customization offers significant opportunity for contractual gains, why 
are parties shy about making such customizations?  Chapter 2 posits that one important answer 
could be that existing doctrine prevents or dissuades procedural customization.  Accordingly, 
Chapter 2 revisits and broadens the doctrinal analysis conducted in Chapter 1, evaluating a wider 
range of precedents, including lower federal court cases and state court cases.  It concludes that 
courts are abandoning their historic skepticism over the devolution of judicial authority and 
recognizing the advantages of seeing dispute resolution procedures, both outside of courts and 
within them, as defaults rather than immutable or mandatory rules.  Although not all forms of 
procedural autonomy are expressly welcomed by courts, the overwhelming trend of precedent 
suggests that courts would validate most procedural contracts. 
 Chapter 3 then confronts the unsolved puzzle: why do parties seem to avoid procedural 
customization when such customization could provide significant contractual gains?  It begins with 
a more thorough meta-analysis of existing empirical studies looking at procedural contracting.  
Many existing studies focus on only a small subset of all possible procedural innovations, so 
 
 
Chapter 3 weaves the studies together to paint a broader and more comprehensive picture.  It 
finds that, contrary to some early commentator’s estimates, some parties, some of the time, 
engage in a diverse range of procedural customization.  In other words, the general conclusions 
reached by many commentators about the lack of procedural contracting are imprecise.  
Procedural contracting does take place.  The challenge has been identifying and explaining the 
patterns of procedural contracting. 
Chapter 3 argues that the first step towards understanding the ways that transactional 
designers harness the potential of procedural autonomy is to recognize that procedural 
customization functions best to offset litigation opportunism.  Such opportunism is inherent in 
formal dispute resolution, but it presents particular problems in the context of contract dispute 
resolution.  After a dispute arises, parties can strategically exploit the mismatch between their ex 
ante intentions and a decision maker’s ability to discern those intentions.  This sort of opportunism 
can sap the value of the contract to the parties.  Chapter 3 systematically considers the way that 
various forms of procedural customization function to limit or eliminate litigation opportunism.   
The Chapter then concludes with a typology of procedural innovation that considers 
underlying key attributes of a transaction, namely the degree of environmental and behavioral 
uncertainty present and the frequency with which other similar parties contract in the same 
domain.  This typology offers a compelling explanation for the patterns of procedural contracting 
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 The three chapters of this dissertation were written as independent articles related by a 
common theme: procedural autonomy.  I have presented them in the order that I wrote them.  
Though they do not build on one another in a linear way, though they do evolve. 
 The first (Chapter 1) started as an exploration of a puzzling United States Supreme Court 
decision, Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.  The case confounded me for several 
reasons, not the least of which was that it seemed to buck against an otherwise unified and 
unfettered line of more than forty previous pro-arbitration Supreme Court decisions.  As I explored 
the case and its history, I came across a foundational article in this area of scholarship, Jaime 
Dodge’s outstanding 2011 article, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering.  Professor Dodge 
described Hall Street as the sole case invalidating a procedural contracting term in decades.  That, 
in turn, set me on my path towards understanding the power and limits of procedural contracting. 
 I decided to write the first article focused narrowly on Hall Street because I wanted to 
understand if, as Professor Dodge suggested, the case really stood as a limit on procedural 
autonomy.  If it did, then I wanted to understand what the limit or limits were.  If it did not, I wanted 
to understand what the case was, in fact, doing.  Ultimately, I conclude that Hall Street creates 
something of a mess for arbitration law, undercutting much of the harmony that the Court has tried 
to create through its expansive interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act as preemptive.  But the 
case does not signal any sort of hesitation by the Court over procedural contracting more 
generally. 
 The second article (Chapter 2) picks up where the first left off.  I wanted, initially, to 
understand more broadly when and how parties customized procedure in and out of arbitration.  I 
initially thought that this would be a relatively straight forward question.  It turned out to be a thorny 
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thicket.  Most existing empirical studies are limited in scope, focusing on only specific 
customizations rather than the overall phenomena of procedural contracting.  But these studies 
share a common set of conclusions: parties do not engage in robust procedural customization.   
This conclusion seemed to chaff against my intuition about the potential benefits of 
procedural autonomy.  To better understand the puzzle, I turned to articulating the potential gains 
offered by procedural innovations.  After detailing those gains, Chapter 2 considers one possible 
reason parties might avoid procedural contracting—existing doctrine does not authorize the 
practice.  Accordingly, Chapter 2 turns to a more comprehensive analysis of the doctrinal 
landscape for procedural contracting.  Chapter 1 had been focused narrowly on parties’ ability to 
contract for enhanced juridical review of arbitral awards.  Chapter 2 analyzes precedent to 
determine if any other limits to party autonomy over procedure exist.  It concludes that, with a few 
minor possible exceptions, they do not.  
 The third and most recent article (Chapter 3) represents a culmination of my work in this 
area of law to date.  It makes three advances on the prior chapters.  First, it recognizes that the 
primary potential benefits of procedural customization aim at ameliorating one particular sort of 
transactional risk: the risk of litigation opportunism.  Second, it conducts a meta-analysis of 
existing empirical studies of procedural contracting, weaving together various studies in order to 
paint a more comprehensive picture of the practice.  It concludes that the evidence is more 
nuanced than many previous commentators have appreciated, showing that parties do sometimes 
engage in significant customizations of procedure.  The third part of the article develops a typology 
that explains when and how parties are likely to customize procedure.  It concludes that this 




 There are several strands of work that I have not yet completed related to this subject area.  
Perhaps most obviously, the next step in the progression is a novel empirical study that seeks to 
test more rigorously the typology developed in Chapter 3.  This, in fact, is a project that is already 
underway.   
Additionally, as a branch of freedom of contract, procedural autonomy invites consideration 
of normative issues.  Even assuming that doctrine permits procedural innovation, and even 
assuming that parties want to engage in the practice, at least some of the time, important 
questions about the propriety of the practice exist.  Particularly in the context of disparate party 
transactions, procedural contracting may constitute a worrying form of oppression.  Procedure is 
opaque, even to trained professionals, but its impact on substantive matters cannot be 
underestimated.  Accordingly, there may be sound reasons to regulate procedural innovation, at 





Chapter 1: Is Less Really More?1 
You’re flying on a trapeze without a safety net.2 
 
Arbitration can be a risky business.  The lack of judicial oversight combined with wide-
sweeping arbitrator power to grant relief sometimes leaves parties feeling vulnerable to excessive 
or flatly wrong judgments.  In “bet the farm” cases, parties, or one of them, might crave the safety 
of a second set of eyes reviewing their awards.3  Accordingly, parties occasionally incorporate 
provisions for expanded judicial review into their arbitral agreements.   
But a fear of finality chafes, in the Supreme Court’s view, against an important feature of 
arbitration, the ease of judicial enforcement paired with highly constrained grounds for the vacatur 
of awards.4  Indeed, according to the Court in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., the 
 
1 Henry Allen Blair, Is Less Really More? Hall Street Associates, Private Procedural Ordering and Expanded Review of 
Arbitral Awards in State Courts, 5 Y.B. Arb. & Mediation 74 (2013). 
2 Joanna Lin, $4 Billion Award May Be Record in Arbitration Case, L.A. DAILY J., June 5, 2009 (Verdicts and Settlements), 
at 2 (quoting Jay McCauley, a corporate lawyer, who went on to add that “[w]e still like the benefits of arbitration . . . but 
boy, maybe we should think twice about having no safety net at all, no chance when things go wayward”). 
3 See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at 40, Hall St. Assoc., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (No. 06-989) (arguing 
that the concern is that many business managers may lose their appetite for arbitration by requiring them to “bet the 
company” on a process with no prospect of meaningful review); see also, e.g., Stephen P. Younger, Agreements to 
Expand the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 63 ALB. L. REV. 241, 241 (1999) (recognizing “a growing 
concern over the ‘Russian Roulette’ nature of arbitration”); Carroll E. Neesemann, Contracting for Judicial Review: Party-
chosen Arbitral Review Standards Can Inspire Confidence in the Process, and is Good for Arbitration, 5 DISP. RESOL. 
MAG. 18, 18 (1998) (expressing concern over “knucklehead awards”).  In Part III, I discuss some recent evidence that 
suggests that many commercial parties are growing more hesitant about using arbitration to resolve at least their biggest 
disputes precisely because they are concerned about limited review.  See infra Part IV(B).  
4 As the Tenth Circuit said in Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 
We would reach an illogical result if we concluded that the FAA’s policy of ensuring judicial 
enforcement of arbitration agreements is well served by allowing for expansive judicial review after the 
matter is arbitrated. The FAA’s limited review ensures judicial respect for the arbitration process and 
prevents courts from enforcing parties’ agreements to arbitrate only to refuse to respect the results of 
the arbitration. These limited standards manifest a legislative intent to further the federal policy favoring 
arbitration by preserving the independence of the arbitration process. 
254 F.3d 925, 935 (10th Cir. 2001); see also, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice: Taking Charge of the 
“New Litigation,” 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 383, 425 (2009) (describing the “spare legal framework” for the judicial 
enforcement of arbitral awards as resting on a “keystone” of “rigorously restrained . . . judicial confirmation, modification, 
or vacatur of arbitration awards”) (citing Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's Finality through 
Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 189-90 (2002)). 
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efficiency of finality trumps even contractual freedom.  Parties cannot choose in their contracts to 
expand review of arbitral awards under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).5   
The oddity of Hall Street’s holding might not be evident if the case is examined only in the 
context of arbitration law.  Although the Court paternalistically substituted its own view of what was 
best for the parties in the face of clearly expressed language to the contrary,6 thereby tacking away 
from the course set by its previous cases,7 the decision purported to be strongly pro-arbitration.  It 
recited much the same supportive language of other Supreme Court cases and proclaimed itself to 
be “substantiating a national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to 
maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.”8  Moreover, using 
wholesome doctrines like ejusdem generis and the Whole Act Rule, the Court’s conclusions rested 
on straightforward statutory analysis of the FAA.9  Accordingly, although courts and commentators 
debated the propriety of contractually expanding judicial review of arbitral awards prior to Hall 
 
5 Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 592. 
6 At issue in the case was a contract provision providing that:  
[t]he United States District Court for the District of Oregon may enter judgment upon any award, either 
by confirming the award or by vacating, modifying or correcting the award. The Court shall vacate, 
modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator’s findings of facts are not supported by 
substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator's conclusions of law are erroneous.  Hall Street, 128 S. 
Ct. 1396, 1401-02 (2008). 
7 See infra Part I(E). 
8 Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 577. 
9 See Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN STATE L. REV. 1103, 1120-21 
(2010).  It is worth pointing out that the Court’s strong focus on simple statutory construction might itself seem odd.  
Over the past twenty-five years, the Court has effectively rewritten the FAA, very often paying almost no heed to the 
statute’s language or history.  See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“[O]ver the past decade, the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with 
respect to the [FAA], building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation....”); Thomas Carbonneau, Symposium 
Introduction: Building the Civilization of Arbitration, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 983, 986 (2009) (“In its decisional law, the Court 
systematically rewrote the U.S. or Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).”); Margaret L. Moses, Arbitration Law: Who’s in Charge?, 
40 SETON HALL L. REV. 147, 147 (2010) (“The Supreme Court’s construction of the statute, especially in the last twenty-five 
years, amounts to a judicially created legislative program, imposed without congressional input, that has vastly expanded 
the reach and focus of the original statute.”). 
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Street,10 comparatively little critical attention has been paid to the issue in the four years since the 
case was decided.11  
Hall Street, however, is part of a bigger story and its place in that story is puzzling.  In 
addition to countering the principle of party choice in the context of arbitration,12 Hall Street also 
 
10 Hall Street resolved a Circuit split.  The Ninth and Tenth Circuits had found that parties could not, through a private 
agreement, either expand or contract the powers of a court presiding over their dispute.  See Kyocera Corp. v. 
Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. dism'd, 540 U.S. 1098 (2004) 
(finding that any contractual provision purporting to expand grounds on which court can vacate arbitral award is 
ineffectual, regardless of its wording; FAA defines judicial scope of review by statute, which private parties have “no 
power to alter or expand”); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 934-37 (10th Cir. 2001) (same).  The First, 
Third, and Fifth Circuits, in contrast, had found that parties had the power to define, through their contract, the 
underlying arbitral award itself and thus could contract for expanded judicial review.  See Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI 
Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that “a contractual modification [of judicial review] is 
acceptable because, as the Supreme Court has emphasized, arbitration is a creature of contract and the FAA’s pro-
arbitration policy does not operate without regard to the wishes of the contracting parties”); Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. U.S. 
Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2005) (adopting the Gateway rule); Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. 
Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 292-97 (3d Cir. 2001) (same); see also Prescott v. Northlake Christian Sch., 369 F.3d 491, 494-
498 (5th Cir. 2004) (reaffirming the Gateway rule). 
Not surprisingly, given this clear divide in the case law, a number of commentators weighed in as well.  For several 
particularly good scholarly treatments of the subject, see, e.g., Eric Chafetz, The Propriety of Expanded Judicial Review 
Under the FAA: Achieving a Balance Between Enforcing Parties’ Agreements According to Their Terms and Maintaining 
Arbitral Efficiency, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1 (2006); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the FAA to Permit Expanded 
Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 NEV. L.J. 214 (2007); Ilya Enkishev, Above the Law: Practical and Philosophical 
Implications of Contracting for Expanded Judicial Review, 3 J. AM. ARB. 61 (2004); Lee Goldman, Contractually Expanded 
Review of Arbitration Awards, HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 171 (2003); Ann C. Hodges, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on 
Public Policy Grounds: Lessons from the Case Law, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 91 (2000); Paul F. Kirgis, Judicial 
Review and the Limits of Arbitration Authority: Lessons from the Law of Contract, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 99 (2007); 
Margaret M. Maggio & Richard A. Bales, Contracting Around the FAA: The Enforceability of Private Agreements to 
Expand Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 151 (2002); Margaret Moses, Can Parties 
Tell Courts What to Do? Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 429 (2004); Bret F. Randall, The 
History, Application, and Policy of the Judicially Created Standards of Review for Arbitration Awards, 1992 BYU L. REV. 
759 (1992); Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's Finality Through Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. 
REV. 123 (2002); Kevin A. Sullivan, The Problems of Permitting Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under the 
Federal Arbitration Act, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 509 (2002); Stephen P. Younger, Agreements to Expand the Scope of 
Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 63 ALB. L. REV. 241 (1999). 
11 For excellent post-Hall Street commentary, however, see, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Around Hall 
Street, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 905, 914 (2010); Maureen A. Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall Street and Prospects 
for Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 929 (2010); Stephen K. Huber, State Regulation of 
Arbitration Proceedings: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards by State Courts, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 509, 535-
36 (2009); David K. Kessler, Why Arbitrate? The Questionable Quest for Efficiency in Arbitration After Hall Street 
Associates, 8 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 77 (2009); Stanley A. Leasure, Arbitration After Hall Street v. Mattel: What Happens 
Next?, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 273 (2009); Alan Scott Rau, Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc.: Fear of Freedom, 
17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 469 (2006); Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 1103 (2009); Timothy Tyler & Archis A. Parasharami, Finality over Choice: Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, 
Inc. (U.S. Supreme Court), 25 J. INT’L ARB. 613 (2008). 
12 See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1103, 1105 
(2010) (recognizing that Hall Street “constitutes arguably the most significant constraint on party autonomy in arbitration 
that the Court has imposed”). 
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bucked a more general precedential trend embracing private procedural ordering.13 In recent 
decades, the Court has permitted parties to customize more and more dispute resolution 
procedures and processes.  The Court has, in short, recognized the advantages of seeing 
procedures and processes as defaults rather than immutable or mandatory rules.14  The expanding 
regime of private procedural ordering offers parties additional means of calibrating accuracy and 
efficiency to meet their ex ante preferences.15  The extreme outlying character of Hall Street 
becomes clear when one considers that it is one of the only decisions in the last thirty years by the 
Supreme Court invalidating a procedural contract.16 
 
13 Private procedural ordering allows parties to bargain over the procedural rules that will govern the resolution of any 
disputes that might arise between them in the future.  See, e.g., Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 
97 VA. L. REV. 723, 724-25 (2011) (describing the process of modifying by contract the “spectrum of procedure” as 
private procedural ordering).  Following the lead of other commentators who have described this form of private ordering, 
I will use the terms “private procedural ordering” and “procedural contracting” interchangeably.  See, e.g., Judith Resnik, 
Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 598 (2005) (recognizing a movement from “Due Process Procedure 
to Contract Procedure”).  Unlike some commentators, however, I am using these terms in the broadest possible sense, 
to include all party agreements regarding resolution of their disputes, including procedures that may be used in courts 
and extra-judicial procedures and processes such as arbitration, mediation, med-arb and settlement.  Compare Kevin E. 
Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure,  53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 511 (2011) (describing contract 
procedure as “the practice of setting out procedures in contracts to govern disputes . . . that will be adjudicated in the 
public courts”). 
14 The “rules versus standards” debate has occupied the attentions of scholars for many years.  See, e.g., David L. 
Faigman, Constitutional Adventures in Wonderland: Exploring the Debate Between Rules and Standards Through the 
Looking Glass of the First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 830 (1993) (“The amount of ink spilled over debating the 
virtues of rules versus standards would lead the reasonable observer to believe that something momentous was at 
stake.”).  For good contemporary discussions of the distinction, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An 
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 557-68 (1992) (viewing rules and standards for their economic efficiency); Jason 
Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256, 258 (1995) (examining relative 
efficiency of two-party bargaining under rules and standards); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: 
Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 25 (2000) (“Rules establish legal boundaries based on the presence or 
absence of well-specified triggering facts.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 22, 58 (1992) (“Rules aim to confine the decisionmaker to facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary and subjective value 
choices to be worked out elsewhere.”); Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules: A New Way of 
Understanding the Differences in Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and Foreign Lawyers, 32 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1117, 1124-42 (1999); FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 13-29 (2009) (discussing the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of legal norms being articulated as rules or standards). 
15 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUDIES 307, 314 
(1994) (arguing that heightened accuracy in adjudication can only be obtained at higher costs so an efficient balance has 
to be struck on a case-by-case basis). 




Seen in this light, Hall Street represents a distinct break in the Court’s otherwise relatively 
unfettered march to internalize contract norms and abandon its historic skepticism over the 
devolution of judicial authority.17  It might be tempting to read the case as a cautionary break, 
halting the march in order to consider some of the many and concerning repercussions of 
converting public and standardized procedure into private and individualized procedure.18  But 
such a reading does not fit.  The holding strives to limit rather than expand a judicial role in an 
otherwise private proceeding.  Besides, the case does not even hint that its rejection of private 
procedural ordering springs from any concerns over party control of judicial processes.  
The better explanation, I contend, is that the Court was not rejecting private procedural 
ordering at all.19  Rather, its somewhat tepid reference to alternative means of enforcing contracts 
for expanded judicial review of arbitral awards -- “[t]he FAA is not the only way into court for parties 
wanting review of arbitration awards: they may contemplate enforcement under state statutory or 
common law, for example, where judicial review of different scope is arguable”20 – suggests that 
the Court was instead trying to funnel innovation, at least with respect to arbitral award 
enforcement and review, back to the States.  Less judicial review under the FAA could result in 
more use of state arbitration laws, which might allow for greater party autonomy.   
 
17 See Judith Resnik, supra note 13, at 598--99 (describing how changes in adjudicatory practice are shifting the focus of 
civil procedure from “due process procedure” to “contract procedure”). 
18 See infra Part II(D). 
19 Professor Jamie Dodge, in her seminal article on private procedural ordering makes this point as well.  In her view,  
[A]lthough the Court narrowly held in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc. that the Federal Arbitration 
Act specifically preempted the modification of the standard of review in the courts, the Court expressly 
noted that under state law or common law parties may be able to modify the standard of judicial 
review. 
Jamie Dodge, supra note 13, at 738.  This “express notation” suggests, in her view, that the Court does not 
fundamentally think parties should be barred from contracting for expanded judicial review or similar procedural 
modifications.  See id. 
20 Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008). 
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In this Article, I examine the implications of this reading.  I argue that barring expanded 
judicial review under the FAA but inviting parties to turn to state law to achieve their objectives 
erodes the value of arbitration and threatens its continued relevance, at least to domestic 
commercial disputes.21  Hall Street is the worst of all possible worlds: it undermines party 
autonomy while simultaneously threatening the very virtue – finality –  that it was crafted to protect. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part 1.1 begins by tracing the evolution and current 
status of private procedural ordering.  Additionally, it evaluates some of the ways in which private 
procedural ordering generally, and expanded judicial review of arbitral awards in particular, offers 
the potential for significant efficiency gains.  Set against the potential gains from customized 
procedure and process, however, are several possible externalities, which Part 1.1 also surveys.   
Part 1.1 concludes that Hall Street is best understood not as a decision opposing private 
procedural ordering but rather as pressing for state court innovations, at least with respect to 
agreements for expanded judicial review of arbitral awards.   
Part 1.2 turns to a survey of state law.  It observes that, although a majority of jurisdictions 
have arbitration laws providing for essentially identical enforcement and review to the FAA, there 
are signs that states have started to accept Hall Street’s invitation.  Five states allow parties to 
 
21 Of course, arbitration is also under attack in the consumer and, to a somewhat lesser degree, the employment 
context.  Although the 2009 Arbitration Fairness Act has, to date, failed to pass in Congress, the Act’s spirit has 
persisted and shows signs that it might erode at least some of the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration precedent.  
Congress has, in fact, enacted several “mini” versions of the Act applying to parties with weaker bargaining power.  See, 
e.g., Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116(a), 123 Stat. 3409, 3454 (2009) 
(banning in certain defense contractors’ employment agreements pre-dispute provisions to arbitrate sexual harassment 
claims); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 748(n)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 
1739 (2010) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2)); id. §§ 922(b), (c), 124 Stat. at 1841 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1514A(e)(1), (2)) (prohibiting pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate claims under whistleblower provisions of the Dodd-Frank 
Consumer Protection Act).  Perhaps more significantly, in April 2012, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau began 
soliciting comments relevant to its upcoming investigation of mandatory arbitration provisions in agreements for financial 
products and services.  See, e.g., Ann Carrns, Consumer Agency Looking Into Mandatory Arbitration, NEW YORK TIMES 
(April 25, 2012), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/consumer-agency-looking-into-mandatory-arbitration/. 
Congress specifically required such an investigation in Section 1028(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act.    
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contract for expanded judicial review.  A handful of additional states have laws allowing for more 
searching judicial review of arbitral awards. 
Part 1.3 considers the problems with Hall Street’s holding paired with its invitation for more 
reliance on state laws.  It argues that a greater role for state arbitration laws in the enforcement and 
review of awards sits awkwardly with extant Supreme Court cases that have, with very few 
exceptions, federalized and standardized arbitration law.  Indeed, the prospect of a greater role for 
state law opens the back door for states to thwart the purposes of the FAA by enacting more 
intrusive and disparate review standards, which, as Part II suggests, seems already to be 
happening.  Given current state law, it is not clear that the Supreme Court, when pushed, will 
actually stick by its dicta in Hall Street.  Even if it does, parties will be faced with an increasingly 
confusing and overlapping matrix of competing state laws as well as the FAA.  Accordingly, parties 
who could benefit most from arbitration will be stymied by legal uncertainty and high transaction 
costs, which potentially reduce or eliminate any efficiency gains.  Given that arbitration is no longer 
the only game around for commercial parties who wish to contain costs and exercise control over 
the course of their disputes with one another – they can, instead, use other procedural contracting 
options to shape the course of future litigation – Hall Street threatens the continued relevance of 
arbitration, at least to domestic commercial disputes. 
 
1.1 The Rise of Procedural Ordering 




22 PHILLIP G. HENERSON, THE PRESIDENCY THEN AND NOW 25 (2000) (quoting Thomas Jefferson writing to William Charles 
Jarvis, 28 September 1820). 
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Historically, courts were skeptical of any private procedural choices, seeing such party-
driven rulemaking as supplanting the public function of courts.23 In the nineteenth and much of the 
early twentieth centuries, courts were not only reluctant to enforce non-judicial modes of dispute 
resolution like arbitration, but they also effectively prevented private parties from altering or opting 
out of almost all procedural rules in judicial proceedings.24  As one commentator has colorfully 
suggested, courts followed Henry Ford’s view of choice: “Any customer can have a car painted 
any colour that he wants so long as it is black.”25 
Eventually, however, starting with a somewhat grudging acceptance of arbitration and the 
passage of the FAA but really gaining momentum under Chief Justices Warren and Burger, judicial 
tides began to shift.  Through an expanding menu of private procedural ordering options, courts 
have allowed parties the freedom to tailor process and procedure in order to increase certainty 
while efficiently adjusting accuracy to fit with their ex ante preferences.26   
The following sections briefly trace the evolution of the current law governing private 
procedural ordering and discuss the potential gains from such ordering.  This Part then highlights 
some of the normative implications of party choice over procedural rules.  The last section in this 
Part concludes that whatever legitimate concerns may exist with respect to private procedural 
ordering, the trend of precedent has been clear: the Supreme Court favors parties’ ability to 
 
23 Several scholars have suggested that at least some of this hostility towards private procedural ordering might have 
been less high-minded.  Professor Alan Scott Rau, for instance, has suggested that courts’ traditional hostility to 
arbitration may have “originated in considerations of competition for business, at a time when judges’ salaries still 
depended on fees paid by litigants.”  ALAN SCOTT RAU, ARBITRATION 57 (2d ed. 2002); see also JULIUS HENRY COHEN, 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 83 (1918) (recognizing the judicial competition with private tribunals and the fear 
that arbitration threatened a significant source of judicial business, as well as judicial jobs linked to the courts’ caseloads). 
24 See, e.g., Michael Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in International and Interstate Commercial Agreements, 1982 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 133, 139 n.17 (1982) (citing Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874)) (discussing how the 
ouster doctrine resulted in courts refusing to enforce forum selection clauses). 
25 Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 
462 (2007) (arguing that “[o]ur judiciary has unfortunately embraced Henry Ford’s sense of consumer choice” with 
respect to litigation procedural rules). 
26 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, supra note 15, at 310 (arguing that heightened accuracy in adjudication can only be obtained 
at higher costs so an efficient balance has to be struck on a case-by-case basis). 
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structure their own procedural rules.  Hall Street is then best understood not as a departure from 
this trend but rather as an effort to direct a particular type of innovation in private procedural 
ordering back to state courts. 
1.1.1 Procedure as Public Law: Historic Skeptic ism of Private Procedural Ordering 
Until the early twentieth century, courts protected their turf.  They tended to see efforts by 
parties to provide for private procedural rules or most non-court dispute resolution processes as 
infringements on the proper public role of the court system.27  There existed “a taboo against party 
autonomy in procedural matters.”28   Courts primarily relied on two interlacing doctrines – the 
revocability and ouster doctrines – to prevent procedural contracting.  Perhaps not surprisingly, 
both doctrines arose out of a judicial skepticism of arbitration, though at least the ouster doctrine 
expanded to bar other forms of private procedural ordering as well. 
The revocability doctrine sprung into existence, near full gown, from dicta in Lord Edward Coke’s 
1609 opinion in Vynior’s Case.29  There, the parties had entered into a contract for repair work on 
several buildings.30  They agreed to submit any disputes about the work to arbitration, and, as was 
customary at the time, a performance bond secured this agreement.31  The plaintiff brought a court 
action, seeking to recover on the bond as well as to recover damages.  The plaintiff claimed that 
 
27 See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 
1947 (1996) (recognizing that prior to the early twentieth century, the traditional view was that if courts were to function 
as the national source of justice, there was no room for “makeshift, party-confected modes of dispute resolution”); 
Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 577, 
599–600 (1997) (noting that judges were either wary of quality of justice available in arbitration or—because they were 
paid on per case basis—protective of their own pocketbooks); but see Michael H. LeRoy, Crowning the New King: The 
Statutory Arbitrator and the Demise of Judicial Review, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 20 (2009) (surveying treatises and 
concluding that “English and American colonial courts were neither hostile nor blindly deferential to arbitration”). 
28 Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal 
Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 294 (1988). 
29 Vynior v. Wilde, (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 595, 598-600 (K.B.).  
30 See id. 
31 See id.  The common law of contract was just beginning to form at the time, so bonds often secured contractual 
promises.  See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul Y. Castle, The Revocability of Contract Provisions Controlling Resolution 
of Future Disputes Between the Parties, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 207, 208 (2004) (noting that “the common law of 
contract was in its infancy” at the time that Vynior v. Wilde was decided). 
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the defendant had failed to comply with the arbitration agreement.32 Lord Coke ruled that when 
there was a suit on a bond given for a submission to arbitration, the submission itself was 
revocable although the price of revoking was forfeiture of the bond: 
Although . . . the defendant, was bound in a bond to stand to, abide, observe, etc., 
the rule, etc., of arbitration, etc., yet he might countermand it, for one cannot by his 
act make such authority, power, or warrant not countermandable which is by the 
law or of its own nature countermandable.33 
 
 Whatever Lord Coke’s original intent,34 Vynoir’s became a leading case “establishing the 
revocability doctrine.”35  Pursuant to this doctrine, a party to an arbitration agreement could revoke 
an arbitrator’s authority at any time before the arbitrator rendered an award, even if the parties had 
agreed the delegation was irrevocable.36  Although U.S. courts would usually enforce arbitration 
awards once issued,37 following the practice of their English counterparts, they would not generally 
enforce executory contracts to arbitrate.38  Practically, this meant that a party to an arbitration 
 
32 See Vynior, 77 Eng. Rep. at 597. 
33 Id. at 601-02 (emphasis added). 
34 Some commentators have suggested that Lord Coke was effectively relying on agency principles.  See, e.g., Paul L. 
Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 598-99 (1928).  Professors Paul Carrington and 
Paul Castle have compellingly, pointed out, however, that the concept of agency had not developed at the time that 
Vynoir’s was decided.  See Carrington & Castle, supra note 32, at 210.  They contend, instead, that Lord Coke was likely 
motivated by a desire to “insure the disinterest of arbitrators” at a time when there were no real substantive constraints 
on arbitrator authority.  Id.   
35 Harry Baum & Leon Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts, 8 
N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 238, 240 (1930); see also, e.g., Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE 
L.J. 595, 602 (1928). 
36 See, e.g., Tobey v. County of Bristol et al., 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (citing Vynior as authority for 
the proposition that arbitration submissions are revocable regardless of a stipulation to the contrary because one “cannot 
alter the judgment of law, to make that irrevocable, which is of its own nature revocable”). 
 
37 See, e.g, Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854). 
38 See, e.g., Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 121-22 (1924) (“The federal courts--like those of the 
states and of England--have, both in equity and at law, denied in large measure, the aid of their processes to those 
seeking to en force (sic) executory agreements to arbitrate disputes.”); Jeffery W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The 
Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 259, 272 (1990).  This rule was incorporated in the First Restatement 
of Contracts as well.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 550, cmt. A (1932) (“A bargain to arbitrate, though it is not 
illegal, is practically unenforceable. . . .”).  Of course, even at the height of its power, the revocability doctrine had 
exceptions.  See, e.g., Red Cross Line, 264 U.S. at 122-25 (finding that New York courts could equitably enforce 
arbitration agreements in their own courts under New York’s arbitration statute). 
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agreement faced continual risk that her counterparty would renege on his promise and exercise his 
right to demand that a court hear any disputes. 
 Still, the revocability doctrine alone did not necessarily create an insuperable barrier to 
arbitration or other forms of procedural contracting.  The doctrine mutated, however, over time into 
the so-called ouster doctrine.  The mutation can be traced to an eighteenth century English 
decision, Kill v. Hollister.39  There, while interpreting the revocability doctrine, the court allowed a 
judicial action over an insurance policy to proceed despite an arbitration clause on the grounds 
that “the agreement of the parties cannot oust this court [of jurisdiction].”40  As with the dicta giving 
rise to the revocability doctrine itself, no authority was given for this “ouster” rule.41  Nevertheless, 
by 1856, the rule had become justified as legitimate “judicial jealousy” over jurisdiction, and this 
explanation for it stuck.42     
 Although the ouster doctrine began as anti-arbitration rule, it quickly expanded into a more 
general principle precluding courts from enforcing various contractual provisions limiting redress in 
courts.  In Home Insurance Co. v. Morse, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an 
agreement by which an insurance company waived its right to remove state cases to federal courts 
was not enforceable.43  The Court analogized the matter to a jury trial waiver and an arbitration 
agreement, concluding that: 
A man may not barter away his life or his freedom, [sic] or his substantial rights . . . . 
He cannot . . . bind himself in advance by an agreement, which may be specifically 
 
39 Kill v. Hollister, (1746) 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B.). 
40 Id. 
41 See id. 
42 See Scott v. Avery, (1856) 10 Eng. Rep. 1121, 1138 (H.L.) (speculating that judicial hostility to arbitration “probably 
originated in the contests of the different courts in ancient times for extent of jurisdiction, all of them being opposed to 
anything that would deprive one of them of jurisdiction”); Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874) (citing Scott v. 
Avery as one of “numerous cases” showing that parties cannot by contract oust a court of jurisdiction). 
43 Home Ins. Co., 87 U.S. at 451-52. 
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enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all times and on all occasions, whenever the 
case may be presented.44 
 
In the Court’s view, privately negotiated contract provisions could not trump the role of the public 
adjudicatory system.  If such contract provisions were enforced, the “regular administration of 
justice might be greatly impeded . . . .”45  Soon, courts went on to find that anti-suit covenants, 
pre-dispute waivers of liability, and forum selection clauses were similarly barred by the ouster 
doctrine.46  Only courts, the prevailing opinion went, possessed the ability to “protect rights and to 
redress wrongs” because private tribunals or other private customizations of procedure were prone 
to “become . . . instrument[s] of injustice, or to deprive parties of rights which they are otherwise 
fairly entitled to have protected.”47 
1.1.2 More than Mere Contract Law: Autonomy and Private Procedural Ordering 
By the late Eighteen-century, although both the revocability and ouster doctrines were still 
in use in American courts, notions of party autonomy were starting to play a greater role in not only 
the public conscience but also in the judicial mind.48  At the height of the revocability and ouster 
 
44 Id. at 451. 
45 Id. at 451-52. 
46 See, e.g., Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass’n v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 82 F. 508, 510 (6th Cir. 1897) (finding that a 
contract stipulating that suits could only be brought in federal court was void because it “intended to oust the jurisdiction 
of all state courts”); Knorr v. Bates et al., 35 N.Y.S. 1060, 1062 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1895) (holding that a contractual 
limitation on the right to sue underwriters on an insurance policy was unenforceable because “a provision in a contract 
that the party breaking it shall not be answerable in an action is a stipulation for ousting the courts of jurisdiction, and as 
such, is void, upon grounds of public policy”); Meacham v. Jamestown Franklin & Clearfield R.R. Co., 105 N.E. 653, 656 
(1914) (Cardozo, J. concurring) (finding that an arbitration contract is an invalid attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the 
courts because its purpose is the same as agreements requiring litigants to submit their case to a foreign court, but 
noting that there may be exceptional circumstances warranting enforcement of such forum selection clauses). 
 
47 Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320-21 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845).  Thus, it is fair to say that the ouster 
doctrine was justified both based on concerns over individual rights, such as those set out in Morse, and concerns about 
extra-individual matters such as “administrative efficiency, separation of powers, and public faith in the legitimacy of the 
judiciary.”  David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection Clauses in the Federal 
Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973, 995 (2008)  (citing and discussing Nute v. Hamilton Mutual Ins. Co., 72 Mass. 174 (1856) as 
articulating this extrajudicial concern). 
48 See, e.g., Walter F. Pratt, Jr., American Contract Law at the Turn of the Century, 39 S.C. L. REV. 415, 415 (1988) 
(“During the past century, contract law, along with most of American society, has undergone a ‘major transformation.’”); 
John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 630 (1995) (“Contract has become 
the dominant doctrinal current in modern American law.”). 
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doctrines, contract law was in its infancy, and most contracts were discrete and simple.49  That 
began to change with rapid economic transformations in the American economy.  As American 
courts routinely decided increasingly complex contract disputes based on the intentions of the 
parties,50 the same principles of autonomy began gaining traction in the context of private 
procedural ordering.51  The trend towards acceptance of procedural contracts, in fact, follows the 
path charted by G. Richard Shell twenty years ago in his study of contracts and the Supreme 
Court: the steady demise of the public policy exception to contract enforcement and, in particular, 
of an exception to contractual autonomy that draws from the special attributes of judicial 
process.52 
Arguably, the first steps towards unlocking the potential of private procedural ordering 
started with increasing demand for arbitration.53  Businesses saw the potential efficiency gains from 
 
49 In his article on the history of commercial law in the United States, Professor Walter F. Pratt, Jr. explains that: 
Contracting, like conversation, had in earlier times been rooted in the past. People who knew one another and 
who knew the local market, insulated as it was from dramatic shifts in the economy, faced little likelihood of 
changes in circumstances that would require elaborate agreements or provoke complex disputes. Railroads 
and cities, however, seemed to disrupt that past by bringing economic uncertainty into the local markets. 
Parties thus faced the tiring prospect of writing detail upon detail into each agreement if they were to account 
for every potential event. 
Walter F. Pratt, Jr., American Contract Law at the Turn of the Century, 39 S.C. L. REV. 415, 428-29 (1988); see also 
Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration on the Development of Arbitration in the United 
States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 489 (1995) (explaining that the doctrine of revocability set forth by Lord Coke in Vynior 
occurred before the common law of contracts was fully formed). 
50 Instead of being localized and discrete as they had been prior to the turn of the century, commercial transactions 
tended to be more complex and regional as well as national.  See Allen Blair, “You Don’t Have to be Ludwig 
Wittgenstein”: How Llwellyn’s Concept of Agreement Should Change the Law of Open-Quantity Contracts, 37 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 67, 77 (2006).   
51 Contra David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection Clauses in the Federal 
Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973, 1014 (2008)  (arguing that, although “[i]ncreased appreciation for freedom of contract and 
individual autonomy and consent may have influenced the development of [forum selection clauses,] . . . these 
considerations played a small part, at best, especially when compared to the degree to which extraindividual concerns 
shaped the design of clause enforcement doctrine”). 
52 G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 431, 452-56 (1993) (detailing Supreme 
Court treatment of judicial access clauses and documenting judicial acceptance of ex ante forum selection clauses). 
53 See, e.g., William C. Jones, An Inquiry Into the History of the Adjudication of Mercantile Disputes in Great Britain and 
the United States, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 461-62 (1958) (“Statistics are not available and it is doubtful that they ever will 
be, but it is probable that in the nineteenth century arbitration in one form or another became the most important form of 
mercantile dispute settlement ... in the United States ... although courts continued, of course, to be used.”); Jeffery W. 
Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 259, 275 (1990) (“Despite an 
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arbitration, but they were frustrated with court refusal to enforce arbitration agreements.54  
Responding to the interests of the business community, in 1920, New York broke from traditional 
English arbitration law by enacting a statute that enforced pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate, 
ended the practice of courts hearing questions of law during the course of arbitration, and 
provided for only limited judicial review of the final award.55  In 1925, the U.S. Congress followed 
New York’s lead by enacting the United States Arbitration Act, later renamed the Federal 
Arbitration Act.  Accordingly, as the Supreme Court explained, the FAA was a “response to the 
refusal of courts to enforce commercial arbitration agreements,”56 but it also represented a more 
general step towards recognizing the value of autonomy in procedural choices.   
That progression continued and, as due process became recognized as a waivable right, 
the Warren and Burger Courts tentatively embraced more and more forms of procedural private 
ordering.57  The current era customizable procedure, however, was not ushered in until 1972 in 
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,58 when the Supreme Court addressed enforcement of a 
forum selection clause for the first time since it had endorsed the ouster doctrine in Morse almost 
 
essentially unchanging judicial hostility toward arbitration, it grew in popularity as the commercial affairs of the United 
States became increasingly far flung and complex.”). 
54 See, e.g., Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 F. 319, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (recognizing the general displeasure in 
the business community with courts' unwillingness to enforce arbitration agreements in the early twentieth century). 
55 Michael A. Scodro, Arbitrating Novel Legal Questions: A Recommendation for Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1927, 1941 
(1996). 
56 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 125 (2001); Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1984) (“[T]he 
need for the law arises from ... the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction . . . This jealousy survived for so 
long a period that the principle became firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it by the 
American courts.”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 68-96 (1924)). The statute’s purpose was to ensure that “written provisions or 
agreements for arbitration of disputes arising out of contracts, maritime transactions, or commerce among the States or 
Territories or with foreign nations” would be “valid and enforceable.” United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §1 (2006). 
For excellent accounts of the FAA’s legislative history, see James E. Berger & Charlene Sun, The Evolution of Judicial 
Review Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 745 (2009); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Judicial Approbation 
in Building the Civilization of Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1343, 1348 (2009) (providing a brief history of the passage 
of the FAA). 
57 Dodge, supra note 13, at 735 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378–79 (1971); Nat’l Equip. Rental v. 
Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315–16 (1964); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975); D.H. 
Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187–88 (1972)). 
58 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 2 (1972). 
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one hundred years earlier.59  Bremen revolutionized private procedural ordering by doing two 
things.  First, it boldly and decisively discarded the ouster doctrine, relegating it to mere 
anachronism: “[the ouster doctrine] is hardly more than a vestigial legal fiction.”60  Perhaps more 
significantly, it shifted focus to party autonomy, making the touchstone for enforcement of forum 
selection clauses the quality of the bargaining process.61   
Following Bremen, the Court broke down one of the few remaining barriers standing in the 
way of contract procedure by abandoning any effort to distinguish between commercial and 
consumer contracts in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute.62  There, extending its pro-autonomy 
decision in Bremen, the Court brushed past a common law rule that forum-selection clauses in 
“form contracts” were presumptively unenforceable and reasoned that such clauses should, 
instead, be enforced because consumers “benefit in the form of reduced [prices] reflecting the 
savings that the [firm] enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued.”63 
Since Bremen and Shute, party autonomy regarding pre-dispute procedural determinations 
flourishes in an increasingly wider range of commercial and non-commercial settings.64  To the 
 
59 See, e.g., David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of Private Contract 
and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1095 (2002) (describing the case as “a 
sea-change in the way private agreement is viewed in relation to procedure”); William J. Woodward, Jr., Finding the 
Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum and Arbitration, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 15 (2006) (observing that the law “changed 
dramatically” in The Bremen); Linda S. Mullenix, supra note 29, at 307 (“The current doctrine of consensual adjudicatory 
procedure . . . is based on Supreme Court pronouncements in The Bremen.”). 
60 Bremen, 407 at 12. 
61 See id. at 15 (finding that forum selection clauses should be enforced unless the resisting party can “clearly show that 
enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid”); see also, e.g., Henry S. Noyes, If You 
(Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts To Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 579, 597 (2007) (describing the Court as elevating the concept of freedom of contract, thereby allowing parties to 
bargain about how a dispute will be decided); Linda S. Mullenix et al., Case One: Choice of Forum Clauses, 29 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 541, 543 (1995) (arguing that the Court in The Bremen adopted a “strongly stated federal policy favoring 
enforceability, subject to usual contract principles”); KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE: TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND 
VENUE 85 n.60 (1999) (stating that The Bremen “shift[ed] from a jurisdictional to a contractual paradigm”).  
62 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587–88 (1991). 
63 Id. at 594 (“[I]t stands to reason that passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum clause like that at issue in 
this case benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which 
it may be sued.”). 
64 Mullenix, supra note 29, at 302-03. 
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extent that parties want to customize procedural rules, “almost limitless” methods of modification 
are available to them.65  For instance, in addition to entering into arbitration agreements, of course, 
parties can (and regularly do) include forum selection clauses,66 choice of law clauses,67 clauses 
dealing with appointment of service agents or waiver of notice,68 and limitation period clauses69 in 
their contracts.  Parties can even waive the right to notice and a hearing by using cognovits 
notes.70  Additionally, parties commonly waive the right to a trial by jury,71 they modify the rules of 
discovery,72 enter into provisions modifying burdens of proof,73 and waive class action rights.74  
 
65 Moffitt, supra note 26, at 465. 
66 See, e.g., Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 118 (2009) (observing that parties “commonly” contract over choice of forum “in merger agreements 
and other highly negotiated corporate and commercial contracts”); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante 
Choices of Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1987 tbl.2 
(2006) (finding that about 53-percent of a sample of mergers clauses included forum selection provisions). 
67 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L. REV. 363, 403 (2003) 
(discussing why most such clauses are enforced by courts). 
68 Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964) (“[I]t is settled . . . that parties to a contract may 
agree in advance . . . to waive notice altogether.”). 
69 See, e.g., 7 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 15:12, at 264-67 (4th ed. 1997) (discussing the enforceability 
of such clauses); Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of Internet Retail Contracting, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 984, 990 (2008) (discussing the frequency of use of such clauses in consumer contracts). 
70 See, e.g., Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972). The 
enforcement of contractual confession of judgments does not violate the defendant's right to due process provided that 
there is clear and convincing evidence that the waiver of notice and hearing was voluntary, knowing, and intelligently 
made. Id. at 185-87. 
71 Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1595 (2005) (“Most 
courts will enforce contractual jury waivers.”); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Do Juries Add Value? Evidence 
from an Empirical Study of Jury Trial Waiver Clauses in Large Corporate Contracts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 539, 539 
(2007) (finding that about 20-percent of a sample of merger and acquisition agreements contained a jury trial waiver 
provision).  Significantly, even though the Court has said that the standard for evaluating jury trial waivers is constitutional 
rather than contractual, see D.H. Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 185, lower courts seem to focus on the propriety of the 
bargaining process to the exclusion of any other concerns, see, e.g., IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit 
Union, 512 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 2008) (reversing the district court’s refusal to enforce a jury waiver embedded in a 
sales contract on the view that “[a]s long as the price is negotiable and the customer may shop elsewhere, consumer 
protection comes from competition rather than judicial intervention”). 
72 See, e.g., Noyes, supra note 62, at 607 (“It is generally acknowledged that ex ante contracts to alter the rules of 
evidence are enforceable.”); Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 60, at 1086 (discussing pre-litigation agreements, in which parties 
to a contract “designate what evidence may or may not be presented as proof”). 
73 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & George E. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L. J. 814, 857-58 
(2006) (noting that it is likely that courts would enforce reasonable allocations of burdens of proof and that good empirical 
evidence exists that parties contract for such allocations). 
74 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study 
of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Non- consumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 884–86 (2008) (finding 
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Even procedural requirements that might seem “immutable,” such as jurisdictional requirements, 
have, in recent years been subject to some contractual modification.75   
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically endorsed the use of all of these – and the 
many other potential – forms of private procedural ordering, with almost no exceptions other than 
Hall Street, the Court’s precedent “treats procedural contracts as a method for generating 
procedural efficiencies and increased certainty of process, resulting in broad enforcement of 
procedural terms.”76  The trend of precedent, in short, seems unequivocally to favor party 
autonomy and private procedural ordering. 
1.1.3 The Case for Party Control: Efficiency Gains from Customized Procedure 
The doctrinal reality, as the previous section shows, is that public procedure is primarily 
comprised of default rather than mandatory rules. Even though most courts do not bother to 
articulate them, there are sound normative reasons rooted primarily in efficiency, to accept this 
reality.  The potential benefits from private procedural ordering77 are really just extensions of the 
benefits conferred by existing public procedural rules.  In adversarial systems of adjudication, 
public procedural rules are designed to strike a balance between the interests of the plaintiff and 
 
that eighty percent of consumer contracts with arbitration provisions included a class-action waiver while no consumer 
contract subject to litigation included such a term). 
75 Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 13, at 514 (noting that recent cases arguably allow for parties to enlarge the subject 
matter jurisdiction of federal courts and contract around some constitutional standing barriers).  
76 Jamie Dodge, supra note 13, at 739.  In fact, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Shute, the Court has not found 
that “a procedural contract violates fundamental fairness.”  Id. at 735-36. 
77 Contracting parties, I assume, are rational in the sense that they only enter into contracts that they believe will make 
them better off. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Law and Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 2 ANNU. REV. L. & SOC. 
279, 281 (2006) (assuming that contracting parties “act rationally, within the constraints of their environment, in the sense 
that they wish to contract if they believe the arrangement will make them better off and not otherwise”); Robert E. Scott, 
A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 602 (1990) (“If we assume 
rationality, then it follows that, regardless of the risk attitudes of particular parties, the dominant strategy for contractual 
risk allocation is to maximize the expected value of the contract for both parties.  Only by allocating risks in order to 




the defendant in order to provide efficiency and fairness in the resolution of disputes.78  Indeed, the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and similar state rules of procedure, were crafted to meet both 
needs.79   
To that end, public procedural rules provide uniformity and so-called transsubstantivity – 
the rules are applied and interpreted in the same manner in all cases, irrespective of the subject 
matter in dispute.80  Uniformity and transsubstantivity aim to standardize procedure and achieve, in 
the aggregate, that compromise between efficiency and fairness in the widest swathe of cases 
possible.   
Like all pre-fabricated solutions, however, the rules cannot account for the individual 
nuances of every actual case.  In fact, the rules themselves suggest as much, recognizing that their 
one-size-fits-all template may not be optimal in all situations.  Procedural rules, at least in the 
United States, leave litigants with broad discretion to conduct their affairs throughout the litigation 
process.81  Litigants have the responsibility and freedom, for instance, to discover, gather, and 
 
78 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1.21[1][a] (3d ed. 2008) (“The application of orderly rules of 
procedure does not require the sacrifice of fundamental justice, but rather the Rules must be construed to promote 
justice for both parties, not to defeat it. This mandate is met if substantial justice is accomplished between the parties.”); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[The Rules] should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding.”). 
79 See Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 318-19 (1938). Professor and later judge Clark 
was perhaps the “dominant intellectual and operational force” behind the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Jay S. 
Goodman, On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: What did the Drafters Intend?, 21 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 351, 356 (1987).  In Clark’s view, there were “two basic principles behind” the procedural reform: “all cases 
should be decided on their merits rather than on procedural maneuverings and that a basic goal in litigation should be 
economy of time and resources.”  Id. 
80 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district 
courts, except as stated in Rule 81.”); Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: 
An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2079 (1989) 
(“[P]rocedural rules should have general applicability.”); but see, e.g., Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the 
“War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1018 (2008) (arguing that many procedural rules do not seem to be 
transsubstantive but are “driven by particular substantive concerns”). 
81 Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1330 (2012) 
(“In the American adversary system, litigants enjoy broad freedom to make their own litigation choices.”); see also 
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 138 (7th ed. 2008) (“One of the hallmarks of the U.S. law is the extent to which the 
rules of procedure are ‘default’ rules, rules that govern if the parties have not agreed to something else.”). 
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present facts to an essentially passive court.82  In so doing, parties can and do make a variety of 
strategic choices. There is a simple justification for the almost self-evidently obvious fact that 
parties exercise control over many of their litigation decisions: the twin goals of efficiency and 
justice can be best realized by giving them control over the development of their case.83  Of 
course, parties enjoy tremendous flexibility in tailoring discovery processes to meet their needs, 
including deciding how much to invest in evidence production.84  But parties can control the post-
dispute contours of procedure in a variety of other ways as well.85  For example, litigants may enter 
stipulations,86 consent to waiver of service of process,87 amend pleadings,88 waive the right to a 
jury trial,89 substitute a magistrate judge for an Article III District Judge,90 or even waive their right to 
appeal.91  By making such post-dispute procedural choices, litigants can calibrate their litigation 
 
82 See, e.g., Scott & Triantis, supra note 74, at 826 (“In the adversarial litigation system, the court chooses between the 
self-interested evidence presented by the parties.”). 
83 See, e.g., Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L. J. 301, 316-19 
(1989) (discussing the two justifications for the adversarial system: truth-finding and preservation of individual dignity). 
84 See FED. R. CIV. P. 29 (providing that “[u]nless the court orders otherwise, the parties may stipulate” that certain 
aspects of depositions will be conducted in particular ways and that “other procedures governing or limiting discovery be 
modified”); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery, in 6 JAMES WM. MOORE, 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.04[1], at 26-35 (3d ed. 2008) (“Parties may mutually stipulate to use procedures for 
discovery that vary from the rules....”); 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2091-2092 (3d ed. 2012) (delineating the parameters of the ability of litigants to stipulate 
discovery procedure). 
85 For a thorough discussion of post-dispute procedural stipulations, see generally Michael L. Moffitt, Customized 
Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461 (2007). 
86 See, e.g., 73 AM. JUR. 2d Stipulations §15. 
87 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d) (allowing parties to waive service of process in order to save money and effort); 4A CHARLES 
ALLEN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §1092.1 (3d. ed. 2012) (discussing the process for 
procuring waiver). 
88 See FED. R. CIV. P. 15 (both before and during trial). 
89 See FED. R. CIV. P. 39(a)(1). 
90 See FED. R. CIV. P. 73. 
91 See e.g., Acton v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc., No. 97-56269, 163 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table 
decision) (dismissing appeal base don a post-dispute agreement); see also 15A CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER 
& EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS §3901 (noting that “the most 
likely occasion for waiver arises from a settlement agreement that calls for resolution of some disputed matter by the 




expenditures to their individual tolerances for accuracy and risk and thus maximize efficiency as 
well as fairness. 
But as the last section demonstrated, party control of litigation is not limited to post-dispute 
modifications.  Rather, parties regularly enter into, and courts seem very willing to enforce, ex ante 
procedural contracts.92  The justification for such ex ante procedural ordering rests on the same 
underlying premise that parties are in the best position to maximize the “incentive bang for the 
enforcement buck.”93 Ex ante procedural contracting simply extends the logic and the range of 
potential efficiency gains from customizable procedure. 
To see how, it is worth recapping the path-breaking article Anticipating Litigation in 
Contract Design in which Professors Scott and Triantis suggest that contracting parties can 
structure procedural rules in ways that will increase their joint surplus.94 According to Professors 
Scott and Triantis, parties vary the precision of contract provisions in order to shift costs between 
the time of contracting and the time of dispute in order to enhance their overall welfare.95  When 
parties choose a relatively precise or specific rule, they are increasing their ex ante investment.96  In 
other words, parties spend more money at the front end of the contracting process contemplating 
future contingencies and negotiating over terms specifying precise obligations in light of those 
contingencies.  By investing more at the front end of the process, parties are hoping to leverage 
the information that they have about their shared contracting goals and incentives to maximize 
gains from trade in order to reduce ex post enforcement costs.97  On the other hand, when parties 
 
92 See supra at Part II(B). 
93 Robert E. Scott & George E. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L. J. 814, 856 (2006). 
94 Id. at 856-60. 
95 See Allen Blair, Hard Cases Under the Convention on the International Sale of Goods: A Proposed Taxonomy of 
Interpretive Challenges, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 269, 301-02 (2011). 
96 See Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U L. REV. 1023, 
1071 (2009). 
97 Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U L. REV. 1023, 1071 
(2009) (noting that parties “are exploiting their informational advantage (they know their contractual ends and have the 
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choose a relatively open-textured standard, they are decreasing their ex ante investment and 
increasing their expected ex post enforcement costs.98  Rather than spending time and money 
worrying about future contingencies and terms specifying precise obligations in light of those 
contingencies at the front end of the contracting process, parties are choosing to delegate to a 
future tribunal the task of specifying precise obligations.  Such ex post or back-end specification is 
efficient, Professors Scott and Triantis argue, where the value to the parties of a decision maker’s 
hindsight outweighs the value that the parties would gain by specifying ex ante a more precise rule 
to govern their contract.99  In short:  
By reaching the optimal combination of front-end and back-end costs, parties can 
minimize the aggregate contracting costs of achieving a particular gain in 
contractual incentives. Conversely, for any given expenditure of contracting costs, 
the parties can reach the highest possible incentive gains by optimizing the 
allocation of their investment between the front and back ends.100 
 
This insight reveals the potential of procedural contracting.101  In fact, Professors Scott and Triantis 
point out that parties often choose to opt out of the public adjudicatory system entirely in favor of 
arbitration because “the parties’ ex ante agreement as to procedure improves the cost-
effectiveness of their prospective enforcement mechanism.”102  They proceed to identify other 
 
right incentives to choose the best means to achieve them), but they are sacrificing the hindsight advantage that a court 
might have”). 
98 See id. 
99 Scott & Triantis, supra note 74 at 819, 842 (“The parties choose between front- and back-end proxy determination by 
comparing the informational advantage the parties may have at the time of contracting against the hindsight advantage 
of determining proxies in later litigation”) (“The parties may view the court’s hindsight as an advantage or disadvantage 
depending on how much uncertainty has been resolved by the time contract performance is due”).   
100 Id. at 817. 
101 See also, e.g., Albert Choi and George Triantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification, 37 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 503 (2008) (demonstrating that increasing litigation costs may induce better incentives to perform 
contractual obligations); Alan Schwartz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, 13 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 127 (1997), (discussing the 
advantages of contracting over preferred Bankruptcy procedures). 
102 Scott & Triantis, supra note 74, at 856, n. 123 (citing Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of 
Litigation and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 558 (2003) (Part of the reason 
that arbitration might be desirable is because it permits vague contractual terms to be interpreted and enforced by 
industry experts rather than generalist judges). 
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possible procedural contracting mechanisms and apply their insights to one example, ex ante 
modifications of burdens of proof.103   
With respect to burdens of proof, as Professors Scott and Triantis argue, even if the default 
allocation can be rationalized,104 “it is highly unlikely that it yields the efficient . . . allocation for every 
contract.”105  They also show how these different customized allocations might benefit parties.106  
The same, certainly, can be said of most procedural rules.  Even to the extent that existing public 
procedural rules can be rationalized,107 it is unlikely that they optimally balance efficiency and 
accuracy in all cases.  Fine-tuning procedure can benefit parties in at least two significant ways: by 
curbing post-dispute opportunism and by reinforcing substantive obligations and optimizing pre-
dispute behavior. 
1.1.3.1 Curbing Post-Dispute Opportunism 
Private procedural ordering can help maximize the joint surplus from contracting by 
reducing the expected costs of future disputes.  Customized procedural rules might achieve this 
gain by limiting or eliminating certain kinds of costly post-dispute behavior, such as escalating the 
costs of discovery or engaging in abusive motion practice.108    
 
103 Id. at 857-71. 
104 They argue that they are “hard pressed,” along with most other commentators, to rationalize the default allocation.  Id. 
at 866. 
105 Id.  
106 See id. at 867-78. 
107 I presume that most such rules are soundly underpinned by a desire to replicate what parties would have chosen for 
themselves if they had thought about them – they are, in other words, so-called “majoritarian” defaults – or they exist in 
order to protect vulnerable parties or non-parties.  See, e.g., Ian Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the 
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L. J. 541, 596 (2003) (“The justification for a default rule is that it does for parties what 
they would have done for themselves had their contracting costs been lower.”); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps 
in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (explaining penalty defaults). 
108 See generally, e.g., David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 
5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985).  Parties face a collective-action problem during discovery.  In a highly simplified model, 
each party could choose to be abusive or reasonable with its discovery requests.  Jointly, the parties would be best 
served by both employing reasonable discovery requests.  Individually, however, each party would do better if it 
employed abusive discovery techniques while the other was reasonable.  Because both parties know this, they face a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, which results in an equilibrium where both parties are worse off than if they had been reasonable.  
The same basic model applies to abusive motion practice. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing 
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Pre-dispute private procedural ordering, in fact, is far more effective than post-dispute 
ordering in this regard for at least three reasons.  First, before a dispute, parties cannot accurately 
predict what side of what issues they will each take.  This uncertainly affords the parties a degree 
of objectivity that they lack by the time that a dispute foments, allowing them to make less 
emotionally charged choices about procedures and processes that will maximize their joint 
welfare.109  Second, pre-dispute, and particularly at the outset of contracting, transfer payments 
are much more feasible.  Accordingly, even asymmetric procedural advantages can be considered 
so long as the benefited party can purchase such advantages from the other at an agreed upon 
price.110  Finally, before a dispute arises, and again especially during contract negotiations, parties 
enjoy the cooperative benefits of a deal-making ethos. Thus, they are less likely to succumb to 
various cognitive biases that might impede negotiating mutually beneficial procedural terms.111  
By delimiting through contract the range of strategic procedural choices available before a 
dispute arises, the parties can enhance the overall value of their agreements.  This sort of 
customization offers nearly limitless scope and potential for value-maximization. 
 
Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 514-15 (1994); John K. 
Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. 
L. REV. 569, 584-86 (1989). 
109 See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice--Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1828-31 (1997) (describing 
the difference between ex ante and ex post perspectives when information differs); Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” 
Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 743 (2001) (noting that “because no dispute has yet arisen, the parties can 
consider the range of possible disputes that might arise in agreeing on a dispute resolution forum”).  But see Robert G. 
Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 
526-29 (2003) (criticizing some of the assumptions about information access that underlie typical ex ante arguments). 
110 See Drahozal, supra note 110, at 746 (“[P]redispute arbitration agreements provide greater opportunities for making 
transfer payments than do postdispute arbitration agreements.”). 
111 See generally, e.g., Russel Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and Practice, 21 OHIO 




1.1.3.2 Reinforcing Substantive Obligations and Optimizing Pre-Dispute Behavior  
Pre-dispute procedural contracting also provides parties with additional means of 
reinforcing or defining their substantive obligations to and behavior towards one another.112  Parties 
already regularly negotiate over substantive terms that might be difficult to verify in subsequent 
litigation.113  For instance, parties often include terms that are conditioned on vague or difficult to 
prove states like “best efforts.”  The high costs of proving (or disproving) these states in court can 
function as a disincentive for parties to bring a claim and, at the very least, negatively impact the 
expected value of any claim.  Parties might conversely contract for very precise obligations that are 
easily verifiable in court.  Such terms can function to dissuade opportunistic shirking or holdups 
during performance of the contract.  Alternatively, they can deter parties from filing nuisance claims 
or claims that have only marginal factual support.  Such gains can be realized by reducing the 
likelihood of future litigation altogether or by narrowing the range of disputes in any future litigation.   
But procedural contracting offers parties even more options for calibrating their substantive 
obligations to one another and optimizing behavior prior to a dispute arising.  Aware of the rules 
that will govern any future disputes at the time of contracting, and knowing that these rules will 
 
112 The divergence between ex ante and ex post optimal litigation decisions has been extensively analyzed in the law and 
economics literature.  See generally, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the 
Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 392-401 (2004).  Suffice it to say here that procedural rules impact how parties evaluate their post-
dispute payoffs and thus impact when (or if) parties assert their claims and how they make strategic choices during 
litigation. 
113 Information may be said to be unobservable if the other contracting party cannot perceive it. Information may be 
observable but not verifiable if the other party can perceive it but cannot, at a reasonable case, prove that information to 
a court or other third party. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1641, 1642 n.2 (2003); see also Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search 
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1791-95 (1996) (discussing the distinction between observable 
information, which is information that it is both possible and worthwhile for transactors to obtain, and verifiable 
information, which is information that it is worthwhile for transactors to prove to a designated third-party neutral in the 
event of a dispute).  Parties often include in their contracts terms that might be cheap to observe but costly to verify.  See 
Albert Choi & George Triantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2008); 
Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE 
L.J. 848 (2010); see also, e.g., Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 




affect their litigation behavior and the outcome of litigation, parties can tailor their respective pre-
dispute actions.114  For instance, agreeing that expert testimony will be given by a third-party-
appointed neutral rather than through party appointed advocates might incentivize greater 
compliance with performance standards pre-dispute.115 Or, opting into expanded review of arbitral 
awards could be seen as a means of increasing accuracy (and costs) and thus deterring more 
questionable claims.116 
These simple examples do not exhaust the numerous possibilities.117  The fundamental 
point, however, is that parties can use customized procedural devices in combination with carefully 
tailored substantive obligations to reduce opportunities for ex post opportunism and to incentivize 
pre-dispute behaviors that increase their joint surplus.  In addition to benefiting the parties directly, 
customized procedure might also reduce the public costs associated with the court system, at 
least to the degree that private and public costs are correlated.118  Finally, there are potential 
spillover benefits to the public adjudication system, at least with some forms of procedural 
contracting, such as expanded judicial review of arbitral awards.119 
 
114 Procedural contracting can help overcome the “acoustic separation” between the ex ante understanding that parties 
have about how their future disputes will be adjudicated and their ex post understanding.  See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, 
Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984); see also, 
generally, Bruce Hay, Procedural Justice: Ex Ante Vs. Ex Post , 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803 (1997). 
115 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 
1356 (2012) (offering a similar example). 
116 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1995). 
117 See generally, e.g., Daphna Kapeliuk and Alon Klement, Contracting Around Twombly, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2010) 
(discussing possible advantages of modifying the Twombly pleading standard by contract). 
118 See, e.g., Bone, supra note 116, at 1356; Cable Connection, Inc. v. DirectTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 606 (Cal. 2008) 
(discussing among the advantages of allowing parties to contract for expanded judicial review of arbitral awards the 
reduced burdens on the court system). 
119 See Cable Connection, 190 P.3d at 606 (“This procedure better advances the state of the law and facilitates the 
necessary beneficial input from experts in the field.”) (quoting Dan C. Hulea, Contracting to Expand the Scope of Review 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards: An American Perspective, 29 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 313, 355 (2003)).  
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1.1.4 The Line Between Mockery and Efficiency: Limits to Customized Procedure 
Set against the potential benefits of private procedural ordering are very real concerns, of 
course, about the implications of subverting public process to personal autonomy.  Espousing one 
aspect of this concern in his customary charismatic style, Judge Kozinski said that he would have 
qualms about enforcing a procedural contract opting into expanded judicial review of arbitral 
awards “if the agreement provided that the district judge would review the award by flipping a coin 
or studying the entrails of a dead fowl.”120  Provocative as such reductio ad absurdum thought 
experiments can be, the hard work of actually finding the line between mockery and the potential 
efficiency gains discussed in the previous section, however, can be daunting. 121 
In a nutshell, most concerns over private procedural ordering fall into one of four 
categories, the first two of which focus on the immediate parties and the second two of which are 
societal: (1) doubts about consent in the context of consumer or weaker party transactions;122 (2) 
worries that procedural machinations will be used to gain covert substantive advantages, 
particularly in the context of consumer or weaker party transactions;123 (3) concerns that private 
procedural ordering will hinder the structural role of private enforcement in our governmental 
 
120 Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
121 See David H. Taylor and Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of Private Contract and 
Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1090 (2002) (“So where is the line between 
mockery and efficiency? Or, should there be any line at all? That is, should a public dispute resolution system be altered 
by private agreement?”). 
122 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding 
Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 642–43 (1996) (“[I]t is critical to distinguish between commercial arbitration voluntarily 
agreed to by parties of approximately equal bargaining power, and commercial arbitration forced upon unknowing 
consumers, franchisees, employees or others through the use of form contracts.”); Richard C. Reuben, First Options, 
Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration 
Provisions, 56 S.M.U. L. REV. 819, 822 (2003)  (arbitration “has the capacity to reduce, if not altogether eliminate access 
to the courts and to the law.”). 
123 See Dodge, supra note 13 at 734 (expressing the concern that parties might use procedural contracts to 
inappropriately modify substantive rights and incentives to exercise those rights). 
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system;124 and (4) worries that private procedural ordering will impede dissemination of information 
that can be used to public benefit.125  
Though all four concerns pose legitimate challenges to private procedural ordering and 
warrant careful consideration, a full analysis of how they fare against the potential benefits 
discussed in the previous section is beyond the scope of this Article.  Whatever the merits of these 
challenges, as the next section explains, Hall Street was not relying on them.  Nothing in the 
Court’s analysis suggests that it was troubled in the slightest by the principles of autonomy 
underlying private procedural ordering. 
1.1.5 A Rolling Stop: Understanding Hall Street in Light of the Trend Favoring Private Procedural 
Ordering 
The trend of precedent is clear: courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, strongly favor 
private procedural ordering.  Although there was initial reluctance to the notion of party control over 
procedure and processes, that reluctance ultimately gave way to more modern notions of party 
autonomy and contract.  Since Bremen, the Court has, with really only one notable exception, 
continued to advance party autonomy as the new touchstone of process and procedure.126 
The notable exception, of course, is Hall Street.  With little hesitation, the Hall Street Court 
narrowly construed the FAA to limit party freedom and autonomy.  Given that one could fairly view 
arbitration as the apotheosis of private procedural ordering – as it allows parties the freedom to opt 
 
124 See e.g., Nebraska Ass’n of Pub. Emps., 477 N.W.2d 577, 581-83 (1991) (basing refusal to enforce pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements on Nebraska cases decided in the 1800s, and relying on pre-FAA cases in warning that 
arbitration will “open a leak in the dyke of constitutional guarantees which might some day carry all away”) (quoting 
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Zlotky, 92 N.W. 736 (Neb. 1902)); J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement 
Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1167-70 (2012) (noting how procedural contracting can 
negatively impact the role of private enforcement by changing “stakes of litigation and therefore discourage suit in the first 
place”). 
125  1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 7a, at 605 (Peter Tillers ed. 1983) (“It is arguable that 
the proceedings in courts are not there solely for the convenience of the parties and that it is important for social reasons 
to maintain the solemnity and dignity of judicial proceedings regardless of the wishes of the parties.”). 
126 See supra at Part II(B). 
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out of the public set of procedural rules and protections altogether – a closer consideration of the 
case in the context of private procedural ordering is warranted. 
On one level, Hall Street surprisingly countered Supreme Court arbitration precedent, which 
had been at the avant-garde of private procedural ordering.127  The case elevated an advantage – 
finality – to the status of an “essential virtue” while dislodging the cornerstone of the arbitral 
process – freedom of contract.128  Up until Hall Street, the mantra that “arbitration is a creature of 
contract,”129 reflected the decisional history of the Court, which, consistent with other procedural 
contracting cases, had recognized the primacy of party autonomy.130   
 
127 See Rachel S. Portnoy, Comment, Embracing the Alternative: Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. Puts the 
Alternative Back into Alternative Dispute Resolution, Comment, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 991, 998 (2010) (“The Hall Street 
ruling came as a surprise to many.”). 
128 See Hall Street Assocs. LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008) (stating that the ruling was “substantiating a 
national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving 
disputes straightaway”) (emphasis added). 
129 Courts and commentators have recognized the fundamental contractual nature of arbitration, often employing this 
phrase.  See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1960) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“To be 
sure, since arbitration is a creature of contract, a court must always inquire, when a party seeks to invoke its aid to force 
a reluctant party to the arbitration table, whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute.”); Puleo v. 
Chase Bank USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 172, 194 (3d Cir. 2010) (“As we have stressed, ‘[a]rbitration is fundamentally a creature 
of contract, and an arbitrator’s authority is derived from an agreement to arbitrate.”’ (quoting Allstate Settlement Corp. v. 
Rapid Settlements, Ltd., 559 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2009))); Edstrom Indus., Inc. v. Companion Life Ins. Co., 516 F.3d 
546, 552 (7th Cir. 2008) (“But precisely because arbitration is a creature of contract, the arbitrator cannot disregard the 
lawful directions the parties have given them. If they tell him to apply Wisconsin law, he cannot apply New York law.”), 
abrogated by Affymax, Inc. v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharms., Inc., 660 F.3d 281 (7th Cir. 2011); MyLinda K. Sims & 
Richard A. Bales, Much Ado About Nothing: The Future of Manifest Disregard After Hall Street, 62 S.C. L. REV. 407, 410 
(2010) ( “[Section 2] also establishes that arbitration is a creature of contract law and that arbitrational provisions should 
be viewed in this light.”); Scott D. Marrs & Sean P. Milligan, What You Always Wanted to Know About Arbitration: Five 
Arbitration Issues Recently Decided by the Courts, 73 TEX. B. J. 634, 634 (2010) (“Because arbitration is a creature of 
contract, the rights and obligations of the parties and the arbitrators are, to an important extent, borne out of the 
arbitration clause itself.”). 
130 See, e.g., Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984) (“[N]egotiation by experienced and sophisticated businessmen . 
. . absent some compelling and countervailing reason . . . should be honored by the parties and enforced by the courts.”) 
(quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972)); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 
219 (1985) (“[T]he overriding goal of the Arbitration Act was [not] to promote the expeditious resolution of claims . . . but 
merely the enforcement . . . of privately negotiated arbitration agreements.”); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 
U.S. 938, 947 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[T]he basic objective [of the FAA is] not to resolve disputes in 
the quickest manner possible, no matter what the parties’ wishes . . . but to ensure that commercial arbitration 
agreements . . . are enforced according to their terms.”); see also, e.g., Margaret Moses, Can Parties Tell Courts What to 
Do? Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 429, 444 (2004) (“[The] position that the FAA 
permits expanded judicial review appears . . . consistent with both legislative intent and Supreme Court decisions 
emphasizing the importance of enforcing arbitral agreements in accordance with their terms.”); Richard C. Reuben, 
Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN STATE L. REV. 1103, 1106 (2010) (“The Court's ruling was 
surprising to some, especially because the Court had previously held that party autonomy, not efficiency, was the 
touchstone of arbitration under the FAA.”). 
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Though the speed and finality of arbitration can frequently be an important – perhaps even 
decisive – advantage for parties, arbitration offers a number of other advantages as well.131  Prizing 
one advantage as “essential” while undercutting the premise at the core of procedural contracting, 
that parties are in the best position to gauge what combination of processes and procedures will 
best maximize their joint surplus, was shortsighted.  Just because parties might reasonably be 
willing to trade off some speed and finality in exchange for opportunities to correct legal (or factual) 
errors through expanded judicial review, they are not necessarily opting out of the other 
advantages that arbitration can offer.  For instance, parties might well believe that arbitration can 
be a superior way to manage the presentation of complex and industry-specific facts through a 
process that allows for the selection of decision makers with expertise and mature judgment in the 
subject area.  Especially in large transactions, however, in which enormous sums may be tied up 
for many years, legal accuracy might be of paramount concern to contracting parties. 
Read expansively, then, Hall Street’s refusal to allow parties the freedom to make these 
sorts of trade-off choices – the same sorts of trade-off choices that parties make with respect to 
other forms of procedural contracting – could signal the Court’s interest in halting the advance of 
private procedural ordering.  I argue, however, that this reading does not make sense for at least 
two reasons. 
First, the Hall Street Court makes virtually no reference to policy rationales at all, and it 
most certainly does not implicate, in any sense, any of the four categories of concerns over 
procedural contracting referenced in the previous section.  The Court makes no mention of 
disparities in party bargaining power – indeed, it would have been hard pressed to do so given that 
the parties in Hall Street were both sophisticated businesses.  Similarly, the Court does not even 
 
131 THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 11-13 (2009 5th Ed.) (discussing some 
of these advantages). 
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hint that expanded judicial review would somehow sneak substantive advantages in through the 
procedural back door.  And, perhaps more tellingly, the Court makes no reference to expanded 
judicial review somehow undermining the proper functioning of the public adjudicatory system.  
Significantly, the opportunity for the Court to suggest that contractually expanded review 
constituted an improper commandeering of the judicial process existed.  Judge Richard Posner, 
for instance, had argued, albeit in dicta, that parties could not contract for expanded judicial review 
of their arbitral awards because “federal jurisdiction cannot be created by contract.”132  Variants of 
this argument gained traction in the debates over expanded judicial review prior to the Court’s 
ruling in Hall Street.133  Nevertheless, the Court did not engage the argument at all. 
Second, and far more significantly, the Court left open “other avenues” by which parties 
could seek expanded judicial review of their awards.134  Although this portion of the case was 
merely dicta, and arguably included only because of the clumsy presentation of the case on 
appeal,135 the Court’s invitation for a greater state law role is capacious.  In holding that Section 10 
provides the “exclusive regime[]” for review of awards under the FAA, the Court made clear that it 
did “not purport to say that [Section 10] exclude[s] more searching review based on authority 
outside the statute as well.”136  Such an invitation does not indicate that the Court was shying away 
from procedural contracting or party autonomy at all.  Instead, this language suggests only that the 
Court believed that this autonomy should be fostered and developed under state rather than 
 
132 Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991). 
133 See, e.g., Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 225, 227-30 (1997) (describing 
the extent to which this argument had been wielded in the debate to date and famously calling it “the very reddest of red 
herrings”). 
134 Hall Street Assocs. LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008) 
135 The parties never raised the application of the FAA to the agreement as an issue until the case was presented to the 
Supreme Court.  Moreover, save for a fairly spare reference at the Court of Appeals, the parties had not addressed the 
possibility review should be governed not by the FAA but instead by the district court’s Rule 16 case management 




federal law.  As the next section goes on to discuss, the evidence indicates that, for better or 
worse, states are beginning to embrace the freedom that Hall Street offers to them. 
1.2 The Status of State Laws Governing Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards 
Pay attention to where you are going because without meaning you might get nowhere.137 
 
As the last Part concluded, the U.S. Supreme Court in Hall Street “left the door ajar for 
alternate routes to an expanded scope of review.”138  Although Hall Street did so only in dicta, the 
Court’s invitation for a greater state law role in the enforcement and review of arbitral awards has 
to be taken seriously in order to square Hall Street’s holding with the broader trend of precedent 
favoring private procedural ordering.  
Accordingly, this Part briefly surveys the current status of state laws governing judicial 
review.  It observes that, although most states’ arbitration laws closely parallel the FAA and many 
courts thus expressly follow Hall Street or decline to allow contractually expanded judicial review 
for reasons similar to those offered in Hall Street, there are signs that states are starting to 
experiment with more intrusive and different standards for judicial review of arbitral awards.  Five 
states have parted ways with Hall Street and allow for parties to contract into expanded judicial 
review.  A handful of additional states have laws allowing courts to review arbitral awards for at 
least some errors of law or facts or both. 
 
137 A. A. Milne, Winnie-The-Pooh: Unbouncing of Tigger 5 (1928). 
138 Cable Connection, Inc. v. DirectTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 596 (Cal. 2008). 
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1.2.1 The Status Quo: States Following Federal Law and Hall Street 
The history of the development of state laws governing arbitration follows a somewhat 
convoluted path.139  After a failed attempt by the National Conference of Commissioners on State 
Laws (“NCCUSL”) to forward a workable Uniform Arbitration Act (“UAA”) in 1926, the uniform 
drafters took another stab in 1956.140  For the purposes of this Article, the key point is that the 
1956 UAA and the 2000 UAA track the provisions of the FAA, particularly with respect to judicial 
enforcement and review, very closely.141  At present, 39 states have enacted either the 1956 or the 
 
139 See Stephen K. Huber, State Regulation of Arbitration Proceedings: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards by State 
Courts, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFL. RESOL. 509, 520 (2009) (discussing this development and observing that “[t]he adoption of 
state statutory standards for judicial review of arbitration awards [was] more complex” than the adoption of the FAA). 
140 See id.; REV. UNIF. ARB. ACT § 12 (1956) (In 2000, the UAA was revised, though the relevant language regarding 
judicial enforcement and review remained virtually unchanged.).   
141 See Huber, supra note 141 at 520.  Section 10 of the FAA, dealing with vacatur of awards, provides in pertinent part: 
(a) [T]he United States court . . . may make an order vacating the [arbitration] award upon the 
application of any party to the arbitration -- 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; 
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; 
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient 
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the *897 controversy; or of any 
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or 
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, 
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006).   
In comparison, the Section 12 of the 1956 UAA provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where: 
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; 
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of the 
arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party; 
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers; 
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or 
refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary 
to the provisions of Section 5, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or 
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings 
under Section 2 and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the 
objection; but the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of 
law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.   
UNIF. ARB. ACT § 12 (1956); see also REV. UNIF. ARB. ACT § 23 (2000) (adopting substantially similar grounds for vacatur). 
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2000 UAA, and three more states have introduced the 2000 UAA in 2013.142  Of the remaining 
states, only three have arbitration laws that are not either patterned after the UAA or the FAA: 
Alabama, New Hampshire, and West Virginia.143 
Many of these states either expressly follow Hall Street or rely on similar reasoning to 
prevent parties from contracting for expanded judicial review.144  Others have held that the 
statutory grounds for vacatur are exclusive without specifically holding that the grounds may not be 
expanded by contract.145  In short, most states construe their arbitration laws in much the same 
manner as the FAA.146  As the next two sections demonstrate, however, there is reason to believe 
that, in the wake of Hall Street, states are beginning to experiment with different and potentially 
more intrusive review standards. 
 
142 See UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Arbitration%20Act%20%282000%29 (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2013). 
143 See ALA. CODE § 6-6-14 (2013) (providing that an award “cannot be inquired into or impeached for want of form or for 
irregularity . . . unless the arbitrators are guilty of fraud, partiality, or corruption in making it”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 542:8 
(2013) (allowing vacatur for “fraud, corruption, or misconduct by the parties or by the arbitrators, or on the ground that 
the arbitrators have exceeded their powers,” but also allowing review for “plain mistake”); W.VA. CODE § 55-10-4 (2012) 
(dictating that award may not be set aside “except for errors apparent on its face, unless it appears to have been 
procured by corruption or other undue means, or by mistake, or that there was partiality or misbehavior in the arbitrators, 
or any of them, or that the arbitrators so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon 
the subject matter submitted was not made”). 
144 See, e.g., HL 1, LLC v. Riverwalk, LLC, 15 A.3d 725, 735 (Me. 2011) (following Hall Street); Brookfield Country Club, 
Inc. v. St. James-Brookfield, LLC, 696 S.E.2d 663, 666 (Ga. 2010) (same); Pugh’s Lawn Landscape Co., 320 S.W.3d 
252,  259–60, 261 (Tenn. 2010) (same); John T. Jones Constr. Co. v. City of Grand Forks, 665 N.W.2d 698, 704 (N.D. 
2003) (holding that “parties to an arbitration agreement cannot contractually expand the scope of judicial review beyond 
that provided by [the Uniform Arbitration Act as adopted by North Dakota]”); Chicago SouthShore & S. Bend R.R. v. N. 
Ind. Commuter Transp. Dist., 289 Ill.App.3d 533, 224 Ill. Dec. 595, 682 N.E.2d 156, 159 (1997), rev’d on other grounds, 
184 Ill.2d 151, 234 Ill. Dec. 395, 703 N.E.2d 7 (1998) (“The subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court to review an 
arbitration award is limited and circumscribed by statute. The parties may not, by agreement or otherwise, expand that 
limited jurisdiction.”); Brucker v. McKinlay Transp., Inc., 557 N.W.2d 536, 540 (Mich. 1997) (holding that an arbitration 
agreement that provides for judicial confirmation must conform to the statute because parties may not privately create a 
role for public institutions). 
145 See, e.g., Sch. Comm. of Pittsfield v. United Educators of Pittsfield,  784 N.E.2d 11, 16 (Mass. 2003) (stating that 
unless a statutorily enumerated ground for vacatur is established, courts are “strictly bound by the arbitrator's factual 
findings and conclusions of law, even if they are in error,” and that “[a]rbitration would have little value it if were merely an 
intermediate step between a grievance and litigation in the courts”); Schnurmacher Holding, Inc. v. Noriega, 542 So.2d 
1327, 1329-30 (Fla. 1989) (stating that the grounds for judicial review of an arbitration award are extremely limited by 
statute and do not include error of law). 
146 See Stephen Willis Murphy, Note, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under State Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 887, 891 
(2010) (surveying state laws and finding a “majority rule” whereby at least 38 states restrictively read their arbitration laws 
effectively consistent with the FAA). 
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1.2.2 A Nod to Autonomy: States Allowing for Contractually Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitral 
Awards 
Currently, California, Connecticut, Alabama, Texas and New Jersey part ways with Hall 
Street.  These five states offer parties the freedom to contractually expand the grounds for judicial 
review of arbitral awards.  The following subsections briefly recap the law in these jurisdictions and 
the justifications they have given for separating themselves from Hall Street. 
1.2.2.1 California 
Shortly after Hall Street, California seized on the invitation for states to provide an 
alternative to the FAA’s exclusive grounds for vacatur.  In Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 
the California Supreme Court (California Court) concluded that parties were free, under California’s 
arbitration statute, to contract for expanded judicial review of arbitral awards.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the California Court rejected Hall Street’s reasoning and concluded that Hall Street’s 
invitation was consistent with its view that the FAA did not preempt state procedural laws in state 
court proceedings.  Both findings are worth a closer examination, as they provide a model for how 
other states might justify departures from the FAA. 
The California Court was presented with an arbitration agreement governed by state law.147  
According to this agreement, the arbitrators did not have “the power to commit errors of law or 
legal reasoning, and the award [could] be vacated or corrected on appeal to a court of competent 
jurisdiction for any such error.”148  Plaintiffs argued, before the arbitrators, that they were entitled to 
 
147 Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 44 Cal. 4th 1334, 1340-41 (Cal. 2008).  Interestingly, the agreement actually 
provided that “[t]he arbitrators shall apply California substantive law to the proceeding, except to the extent Federal 
substantive law would apply to any claim,” and it directed that the arbitration proceedings were to be governed by 
federal law and the rules of the American Arbitration Association.  Id. at 1340.  The Court, however, concluded, in a 
footnote, that “[b]ecause the parties proceeded in state court under the CAA, . . . judicial review of the award is governed 
by state law, though the arbitration proceedings are governed by federal procedural law and AAA rules under the terms 
of the contract.”  Id at 1341 n. 2. 
148 Id. at 1341 n.3 
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class-wide arbitration under the agreement, and the arbitrators agreed.149  Defendant, DIRECTTV, 
then filed a motion to vacate in state court on several grounds, including most significantly that the 
award was the product of errors of law and thus subject to judicial review.150 
The trial court agreed with DIRECTV and vacated the award, but the Court of Appeals 
reversed, finding that the trial court had exceeded its authority by engaging in a merits review of 
the arbitrator’s decision.151  In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on two previous 
cases that had determined that expanded judicial review provisions were unenforceable.152  
Essentially, these cases advanced the contention that expanded review was impermissible 
because: (1) like the Court in Hall Street, they believed that expanded review “would undermine the 
benefits of arbitration and the goals of the Act to reduce expense and delay in resolving 
disputes”;153 and (2) they believed that judicial review would either be meaningless to or would 
improperly interfere with the arbitral process because arbitrators are not “ordinarily constrained to 
decide according to the rule of law.”154 
Confronted with these lower courts’ decisions and the U.S. Supreme Court’s then-fresh 
ruling in Hall Street, the California Court first clarified that under state law parties can contractually 
agree to judicial review of an arbitration award.155  While admitting the similarities between the 
statutory schemes for enforcement of arbitral awards in the CAA and the FAA,156 the California 
 
149 See id. at 1342. 
150 See id. 
151 See id. at 1343. 
152 See id. (citing Oakland–Alameda Cnty. Coliseum Auth. v. CC Partners, 101 Cal. App. 4th 635, 645 (2002); Crowell v. 
Downey Cmty. Hosp. Found., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810 (2002)). 
153 Crowell, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 815. 
154 Id. at 814. 
155 See Cable Connection Inc., 44 Cal. 4th at 1340. 
156 See id. at 1344 (explaining that both “the CAA and the FAA provide only limited grounds for judicial review of an 
arbitration award,” and noting the similarities between the grounds for vacatur or modification in §§ 1286.2 (a) and 
1286.6 of the CAA and those listed in §§ 10-11 of the FAA). 
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Court cited its 1992 decision in Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasé to bolster the proposition that, in 
drafting the CAA, the legislature “adopt[ed] the position taken in case law . . . ‘that in the absence 
of some limiting clause in the arbitration agreement, the merits of the award, either on questions of 
fact or of law, may not be reviewed except as provided in the statute.”’157  According to the 
California Court, Moncharsh established a California rule “that the parties may obtain judicial review 
of the merits by express agreement” under the CAA.158  Because the language used by the parties 
in the pending case evidenced their unequivocal intent to exclude legal errors from the scope of 
the arbitrators’ powers, such errors fell within the scope of judicial review under California law.159 
The California Court then turned to the pressing question of whether Hall Street preempted 
this construction of the CAA.160  The California Court acknowledged U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent finding that “state laws invalidating arbitration agreements on grounds applicable only to 
arbitration provisions contravene the policy established by Section 2 of the FAA.”161  Nevertheless, 
it found that “the United States Supreme Court does not read the FAA’s procedural provisions to 
apply to state court proceedings.”162  To reach this conclusion, it relied on its previous holding that 
“[t]he language used in [S]ections 3 and 4 and the legislative history of the FAA suggest that the 
sections were intended to apply only in federal court proceedings.”163  Because the same language 
limiting applicability of those sections to a “United States district court” with jurisdiction under Title 
28 of the United States Code exists in Sections 9 through 11, the California Court similarly 
 
157 Id. at 1356 (citing Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasé, 3 Cal. 4th 1, 23 (1992)) (emphasis added). 
158 Id. at 1340. 
159 See id. at 1350. 
160 See id. 
161 Id. at 1351 (citing Cronus Invs., Inc. v. Concierge Svcs., 35 Cal.4th 376, 389 (2005), among other cases). 




characterized the FAA’s enforcement and review provisions as “procedural” and thus only 
applicable to the federal courts.164 
1.2.2.2 Alabama 
In a very brief 2010 ruling, the Alabama Supreme Court (Alabama Court) in Raymond 
James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Honea expressed solidarity with California and found that the FAA’s 
review provisions were “procedural” and thus not necessarily applicable in state court 
proceedings.165  In reaching this conclusion, the Alabama Court had to reevaluate its earlier 
position that “a party desiring judicial review of an arbitration award in a proceeding subject to the 
[FAA] is limited to arguments based on those grounds enumerated in 9 U.S.C. § 10.”166  Finding 
“good and sufficient reasons ‘to retreat from that position,’” the Alabama Court concluded that 
“[u]nder the Alabama common law, courts must rigorously enforce contracts, including arbitration 
agreements, according to their terms in order to give effect to the contractual rights and 
expectations of the parties.”167 
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the decision, however, relates to the fact that the 
parties had expressly agreed that “any unsettled dispute or controversy will be resolved by 
arbitration in accordance with the FAA.”168  Moreover, unlike the situation facing the California 
Court in Cable Connections, there was “no evidence indicating that either [of the parties] ever 
contemplated review under the common law [of Alabama] as opposed to the FAA.”169  Accordingly, 
 
164 Id. at 1352. 
165 Raymond James Fin. Servs. Inc. v. Honea, 55 So.3d 1161, 1168-69 (Ala. 2010) (“§10 represents procedural as 
opposed to substantive law. We are accordingly at liberty to decide whether to apply §10 in state court proceedings on 
motions to vacate or to confirm an arbitration award.”) (citing to Cable Connection in a footnote). 
166 Horton Homes, Inc. v. Shaner, 999 So.2d 462, 467 n. 2 (Ala. 2008) (reiterating Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 901 
So.2d 27, 46 (2004)). 
167 Hornea, 55 So.3d at 1169 (quoting Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 901 So.2d at 46-47). 
168 Id. at 1167. 
169 Id. at 1168.  Although this was the argument of one of the parties, the Court never disagreed with it. 
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the Alabama Court’s determination that the FAA did not govern the review of the award is unusual, 
to put it mildly.  While claiming to be bound by parties’ intentions, the Alabama Court seemed to 
side step them, at least with respect to what law governed. 
1.2.2.3 Connecticut 
Although the matter is not free from doubt, it appears that courts in Connecticut also 
disagree with Hall Street.  In a decision released only two months after Hall Street, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court (Connecticut Court) said in a footnote that “[p]arties to agreements remain, 
however, free to contract for expanded judicial review of an arbitrator’s findings.”170  This dicta 
seemed to reaffirm a position taken earlier by the Connecticut Court in its 2006 Stutz v. Shepard 
decision.171  In Stutz, the Connecticut Court unceremoniously upheld a contractual provision that 
invested a court with the power to review an arbitral award under a “clearly erroneous” standard.172  
Although it provided virtually no analysis, the context suggests that the Connecticut Court simply 
viewed the provision as within the permissible scope of freedom of contract.173  In an unpublished 
case, the Connecticut Superior Court relied on these two decisions to conclude that a provision 
providing for expanded judicial review of an arbitral award for de novo review of law (but not facts) 
was enforceable.174  Again, the court did not engage in any searching analysis but it simply 
concluded that Hall Street limited its holding to the FAA and thus was not applicable to the 
Connecticut arbitration statute.175 
 
170 HH East Parcel, LLC v. Handy & Harman, Inc., 947 A.2d 916, 926 n.16 (Conn. 2008). 
171 See Stutz v. Shepard, 901 A.2d 33 (Conn. 2006). 
172 See id. at 39. 
173 See id.  
174 See East Greyrock, LLC v. OBC Assocs., Inc., No. X08CV044002173S, 2010 WL 3448075 at *4 n.9 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Aug. 2, 2010). 




The most recent departure from Hall Street happened in 2011 when the Texas Supreme 
Court (Texas Court) decided Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn.176  In many respects, the Texas Court’s 
decision parallels the decisions of the California and Alabama Supreme Courts.  There are, 
however, two notable differences in the analysis. 
First, although the Texas Court recognized that the statutory grounds for vacating an award 
under the Texas Arbitration Act (TAA) and FAA are virtually identical, it hooked its conclusion that 
the TAA permits parties to contract for expanded review on “excess of authority.”177  According to 
the Texas Court, the U.S. Supreme Court mistakenly overlooked this ground for review in the FAA, 
which can encompass situations where the “parties have agreed that an arbitrator should not have 
authority to reach a decision based on reversible error--in other words, that an arbitrator should 
have no more power than a judge.”178 In the Texas Court's view, this express statutory ground for 
review coupled with the underlying purposes of the Federal and Texas Acts – “‘to ensur[e] that 
private agreements are enforced according to their terms” – rendered Hall Street’s analysis and 
conclusion flawed.179 
The second notable feature of Nafta has to do with its handling of the preemption question.  
Unlike the agreements at issue in Cable Connections and Raymond James, the agreement in Nafta 
was silent about whether it was to be governed by state or federal law.180  Accordingly, the Court 
had to figure out how and why to apply Texas law to it.  The Court’s solution was to say that, 
effectively, both the FAA and the TAA applied, concurrently.181  Because, in the Court’s analysis, 
 
176 See Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. 2011). 
177 See id. at 92, 95. 
178 Id. at 92. 
179 Id. at 94 (citations omitted). 
180 See id. at 101. 
181 See id. 
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the FAA did not preempt the TAA, and because the TAA allowed for parties to contract into 
expanded judicial review, it did not matter if the parties chose Texas or federal law to apply to the 
agreement.182 
1.2.2.5 New Jersey 
New Jersey is the only state that validates party freedom to contract for expanded judicial 
review by statute: “nothing in this act shall preclude the parties from expanding the scope of 
judicial review of an award by expressly providing for such expansion in a record.”183  This statutory 
provision was passed before Hall Street and was included “to make it clear that parties may 
expand the scope of judicial review by providing for such expansion in a record, following the ruling 
of Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick Associates, Inc., 135 N.J. 349 (1994).”184   
Interestingly, however, the Court in Tretina did not actually hold that parties could contract for 
expanded judicial review, but instead, in a rather convoluted decision, elevated a prior concurring 
opinion to the status of the “current standard” for judicial review of arbitral awards in New Jersey.185  
That concurrence had stated in a rather off-handed way that: 
For those who think the parties are entitled to a greater share of justice, and that 
such justice exists only in the care of the court, I would hold that the parties are free 




182 See id. 
183 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23B-4c (West Supp. 2013). 
184 N.J. S. Comm. Statement, S.B. 514, 210th Leg. (2002). 
185 See Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick Assocs. Inc., 640 A.2d 788, 792-93 (N.J. 1994) (finding that the correct 
standard of judicial review of arbitral awards in New Jersey was stated by the Chief Justice’s concurring opinion in Perini 
Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 610 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1992)). 
186 Id. at 793. 
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Making it clear just how much of a “side” comment this was, the Chief Justice went on to quip that 
he doubted that many would include such expanded review provisions and, if they did, “they 
should abandon arbitration and go directly to the law courts.”187 
 Because its origins are so murky, it is difficult to discern what policies underlie the rule.  
Nonetheless, regardless of its questionable genesis, the statute is clear: parties may contract for 
expanded judicial review of their arbitral awards under New Jersey law. 
1.2.3 A Back Door Sneak Attack?: States with More Intrusive Judicial Standards of Review of 
Arbitral Awards 
While most states continue to interpret their arbitration laws essentially the same as the 
FAA, as the previous section shows, there are signs that this might be changing.  In addition to the 
five states that have parted ways with Hall Street in terms of the permissibility of contractual 
expansions of judicial review, a handful of states have interpreted their arbitration laws in ways that 
provide for more intrusive judicial review than is allowed under the FAA.  
Some states, for instance, have embraced a manifest disregard of the law and fact 
standard of review.188  Others allow for review of either law189 or fact190 but not both.  Accordingly, 
at least a handful of states seem to have embraced the freedom that Hall Street suggests they 
 
187 Id. 
188 See, e.g., Welty v. Brady, 2005 WY 157, ¶¶ 20-25, 123 P.3d 920, 926-28 (Wyo. 2005) (noting that under Wyoming 
law, “manifest mistake of fact or law” is a permissible ground for vacating arbitral award); see also Stephen Willis Murphy, 
Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under State Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 887, 893-94 (2010) (surveying state law and finding 
that seven states allow for review of law and fact). 
189 See, e.g., Sherman v. Graciano, 872 A.2d 1045, 1046 (N.H. 2005) (“An award may be vacated for plain mistake when 
it is determined that an arbitrator misapplied the law to the facts.”); see also Murphy, supra note 190, at 893-94 
(surveying state law and finding that 11 states allow for review law). 
190 See, e.g., Spiska Eng’g v. SPM Thermo-Shield, 730 N.W.2d 638, 643, 647 (S.D. 2007) (concluding that the South 
Dakota arbitration statue allowed for limited factual review in addition to legal review in order to ensure that the arbitrator 
was “arguably construing or applying the contract”); IOWA CODE § 679A.12(f) (2013) (allowing for vacatur if “[s]ubstantial 
evidence on the record as a whole does not support the award”). 
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have to construct standards of judicial review that are different from and in many cases more 
intrusive than the exclusive standards of the FAA. 
1.3 The Problems with Hall Street’s Reliance on States to Advance Private 
Procedural Ordering in the Context of Expanded Judicial Review 
There must have been a moment, at the beginning, were we could have said –  no. But somehow 
we missed it.191  
 
As it stands, parties who wish to contract for expanded judicial review of their arbitral 
awards must do so against a backdrop of interlocking statutory frameworks, state-versus-federal 
conflicts, and a constant deluge of confusing and often confused state and federal court decisions.  
While Hall Street might have opened “other avenues” for parties who want the security of appellate 
review of their arbitral awards, those avenues look an awful lot like a nearly incomprehensible maze 
of winding side streets, dead ends, and one ways.   
This Part considers the problems posed by Hall Street’s invitation for more state law 
involvement in the enforcement and review of arbitral awards.  It begins by surveying some of the 
most significant doctrinal doubts posed by such involvement.  It then considers how parties are 
likely to respond to the doctrinal uncertainty, particularly in light of the fact that many of the benefits 
that used to be available only in arbitration are now obtainable in litigation through other forms of 
procedural contracting.  Ultimately, this Part concludes that the trend of commercial parties leaning 
away from arbitration to resolve their domestic disputes with one another is likely to continue and 
 
191 TOM STOPPARD, ROSENCRANTZ AND GUILDENSTERN ARE DEAD 125 (1994). 
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even accelerate so long as Hall Street’s invitation for greater state law remains good law.192  Hall 
Street neither meaningfully fosters party autonomy nor provides the efficiency of clear-cut finality.  
1.3.1 Doctrinal Problems 
“The idea of states serving as laboratories for testing alternative approaches to perceived 
problems is too well known to require amplification here.”193  But whatever benefits attach to 
federalism generally, Supreme Court precedent in the context of arbitration law has been decidedly 
anti-federalist.194 At least since PrimaPaint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., it has been 
established that the provisions of the FAA preempt inconsistent state laws in cases in federal 
court.195  Eighteen years later, the Court went further, in Southland Corp. v. Keating, and held that 
Section 2 of the FAA also applies in state court and preempts any conflicting state laws.196  But the 
Court has also stated that the FAA does not occupy the field of arbitration law.197 Moreover, it has 
 
192 Importantly, I am not suggesting that arbitration will decrease with respect to trans-border disputes.  To the contrary, 
the ease of enforcement of awards pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, which obligates each nation to enforce arbitral awards regardless of where they are rendered, 
will likely continue to make international arbitration relevant to commercial parties, even in the wake of Hall Street.  See 
United Nations Convention on the Recognition & Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 1, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http:// treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%20330/v330.pdf; see also 
United Nations, Status of Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, United Nations 
Treaty Collection, http:// treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-1&chapter=22&lang=en 
(last visited Aug. 17, 2012) (listing the countries that are participants to the agreement). 
193 Stephen K. Huber, State Regulation of Arbitration Proceedings: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards by State Courts, 
10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 509, 512 (2009) (arguing “that potential improvements in the arbitration process are better 
tried initially at the state rather than the federal level, due to lower degree of risk if a change is deemed not to be 
successful”); see also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (coining the 
phrase). 
194 Ronald G. Aronovsky, The Supreme Court and the Future of Arbitration: Towards a Preemptive Federal Arbitration 
Procedural Paradigm?, 42 SW. U. L. REV. 131, 131 (2012) (“The United States Supreme Court in recent years has 
embraced an increasingly robust view of the FAA's preemptive power in a series of often controversial arbitration law 
decisions reflecting the Court's evolving view about the meaning of the federal “pro-arbitration policy.”); Christopher R. 
Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 101, 102 (2002) (“In Southland, the Court effectively ‘federalized’ United States arbitration law, ‘restrict[ing] state 
legislative rights' so as ‘to guarantee the unobstructed enforcement of arbitration agreements.”’) (quoting THOMAS E. 
CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 162 (2d ed. 2000)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
195 Prima Paint Corp v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1967). 
196 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). 
197 Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989) (“The FAA contains no express preemptive provision, nor does 
it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration.”). 
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at least suggested that other provisions of the FAA, including Sections 3 and 4, which deal with 
stays pending arbitration and actions to compel arbitration, might not apply in state court.198 
The rather confused state of preemption outside of Section 2 renders Hall Street’s invitation 
somewhat questionable.  It seems beyond cavil that in any federal court proceeding, all of the 
terms of the FAA apply, unless, perhaps, the parties have specified that state law will govern.199  It 
is not at all clear, however, that parties can specify that state law will govern if that law permits 
parties to contract for expanded judicial review.   
As Professor Christopher Drahozal has compellingly pointed out, the authority for such 
opting into state law draws most of its force from Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of 
Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University.200  But the Court in Volt did not say that parties 
could opt out of the FAA; instead, it said only that parties could incorporate state law as a term in 
their arbitral contracts.201  By so doing, parties can transmute state laws that would otherwise be 
preempted into an enforceable term of their arbitration contract.  If this “incorporation-by-
reference” reading of Volt is correct, then parties that chose a state law allowing for contractually 
expanded judicial review are really just incorporating such expanded review into their contracts, 
which Hall Street expressly says that they cannot do.202  The only way that the Supreme Court 
could allow parties to successfully resort to state law, at least in federal court, in order to effectuate 
 
198 Id. at 477 n. 6 (“[W]e have never held that §§ 3 and 4 . . . are nonetheless applicable in state court.”); Southland 
Corp., 465 U.S. at 6 n. 10 (“[W]e do not hold that §§ 3 and 4 of the Arbitration Act apply to proceedings in state 
courts.”); see also, e.g., Stephen K. Huber, State Regulation of Arbitration Proceedings: Judicial Review of Arbitration 
Awards by State Courts, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 509, 530 (2009) (arguing that the Court’s treatment of FAA 
preemption is “limited” and that “[o]nly sections 1 and 2 of the FAA preempt state law”). 
199 See 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION ACT § 10.8.2.2, at 10:80 (1995 & Supp. 1999) (“In federal courts, all the sections of the comprehensive FAA 
will govern.”). 
200 Volt, 489 U.S. at 477; see Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Around Hall Street, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 905, 919 
(2010). 
201 See Drahozal, supra note 202, at 919; see Volt, 489 U.S. at 475 (“[B]y incorporating the California rules of arbitration 
into their agreement, the parties had agreed that arbitration would not proceed in situations which fell within the scope of 
CALIF.CODE CIV.PROC.ANN. § 1281.2(c) (West 1982).”). 
202 See Drahozal, supra note 202, at 919. 
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their preference for expanded review would be for it to hold that Volt permits parties to opt out of 
FAA Sections 9 and 10.  Such an extreme reading of Volt, notwithstanding the dicta in Hall Street, 
seems a stretch. 
Of course, many arbitral enforcement proceedings occur in state rather than federal court, 
so perhaps the problems with realizing Hall Street’s invitation in federal courts do not matter all that 
much.  Indeed, at least according to the courts in Cable Connections, Raymond James, and Nafta, 
FAA Section 10 is merely procedural and does not, therefore, preempt state arbitral review laws.203  
The proposition that Section 10 is a procedural provision that should not apply in state court rests 
on the premise that the law of review and vacatur “does not challenge the determination that the 
parties had an enforceable arbitration agreement.”204   
This argument, however, overlooks the fact that review and vacatur rules could easily 
undermine the very goal of finality that the Court in Hall Street held to be the “essential virtue” of 
arbitration.205  Although the current status of state laws, as Part III demonstrated, might not pose a 
significant threat to the finality of arbitral awards, the potential for such a threat exists and some 
states already seem to be moving towards review standards that are much more intrusive than 
those provided by federal law.206  Accordingly, it is far from certain that, if pushed, the Supreme 
Court will stick by its dicta in Hall Street and back away from the sine qua non of the decision: 
limited judicial review ensures the sanctity of the arbitral process. 
 
203 See supra Part III(B)(1); see also, e.g., S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 977 P.2d 769, 773-74 (Ariz. 1999) 
(“Each state is free to apply its own procedural requirements so long as those procedures do not defeat the purposes of 
the act.”); Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., 768 A.2d 620, 627 (Md. 2001) (noting that state “procedural rules govern 
appeals, unless those rules undermine the goals and principles of the FAA”). 
204 Jill I. Gross, Over-Preemption of State Vacatur Law: State Courts and the FAA, 3 J. AM. ARB. 1, 32 (2004). 
205 See supra Part III(C); see also, e.g., Stephen L. Hayford, Federal Preemption and Vacatur: The Bookend Issues Under 
the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 67, 75 (arguing that vacatur laws should be narrow enough to 
avoid providing parties with “a vehicle for easily escaping the arbitration bargain”). 
206 See also generally Stephen K. Huber, State Regulation of Arbitration Proceedings: Judicial Review of Arbitration 
Awards by State Courts, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 509 (2009) (arguing that state law could provide a mechanism 
for broadening the scope of judicial review). 
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In short, even though Hall Street comprehends a greater role for state law in the 
enforcement and review of arbitral awards, and it does so with the goal, I have argued, of 
furthering private procedural ordering, doctrinal complications might well pose an insuperable 
barrier to such a role.  At the very least, these doctrinal complications have to raise the suspicions 
of any parties wanting to take advantage of Hall Street’s invitation. 
1.3.2 Legal Uncertainty and High Transaction Costs 
There are a number of reasons, of course, why parties choose to arbitrate.  At bottom, 
however, arbitration purports to be the ultimate form of representativeness: both the process and 
the content of the dispute are based on negotiation between the parties.  The flexibility of 
arbitration enables parties to define the scope of the dispute and to specify the form and 
substance of the proceedings that will resolve it. Contracting parties may, thus, construct a dispute 
resolution mechanism that optimally aligns their incentives with their preferred contractual norms.  
In this sense, as I have already suggested, arbitration can be seen as the apotheosis of private 
procedural ordering.207   
Given the significant potential benefits of arbitration, the fact that commercial parties are 
leaning away from using it to resolve their domestic disputes with one another might, on first 
glance, be puzzling.208  Recent empirical evidence confirms, however, the trend.209  This evidence 
 
207 See supra Part II(E).. 
208 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration 
Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 335 (2007) (concluding from their findings 
that “sophisticated actors prefer litigation to arbitration”). 
209 See generally David B. Lipsky, How Corporate America Uses Conflict Management: The Evidence From a New 
Survey of the Fortune 1000, 30 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 139 (2012) (summarizing the results of a Cornell 
University survey and noting a decline of 25% in the use of commercial arbitration since a previous survey 14 years 
earlier); Raymond G. Bender Jr., Just and Accurate: Confronting Limited Appeal Rights in Arbitration, 30 ALTERNATIVES TO 




suggests that the principle reason for the trend has to do, in fact, with limited appeal rights.210  
Indeed, when Hall Street was decided, several amici argued that parties would “flee from 
arbitration if expanded review” was not open to them.211  The Court was not sympathetic, saying 
that it could not tell the future,212 but it seems that, four years on, the amici were right. 
Of course, some of the decline in the use of arbitration might stem from more general economic 
factors.  After all, “because the litigation process receives government subsidies, sophisticated 
parties can be expected to agree to arbitrate only when arbitration has a large cost (or other) 
advantage over litigation.”213  In the wake of the financial crisis, businesses might be more sensitive 
to costs, which are not necessarily lower in arbitration.214 
  I suggest, however, that, consistent with the arguments in Part I, parties desire the freedom 
to tailor their dispute resolution processes in ways that optimize their joint welfare.  For a period of 
time, arbitration was the only game in town.  Parties faced a binary choice between accepting the 
public court system and its attendant procedural rules or they could opt out and resolve their 
disputes in arbitration.  Private process, however, “has migrated in surprising ways into the public 
courts: despite public rules of procedure, judicial decisions increasingly are based on private rules 
of procedure drafted by the parties before a dispute has arisen.” 215  Procedural contracting offers 
commercial parties many of the advantages that once seemed the exclusive prerogative of 
arbitration while still providing them with the right to appeal, a right that the empirical evidence 
strongly suggests many commercial parties highly value. 
 
210 See Bender, supra note 211 (noting that in both surveys corporate counsel highlight limited appeal rights as the 
biggest reason for shying away from arbitration). 
211 See Hall Street Associates LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588-89 (2008). 
212 See id. 
213 Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST.  
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 435 (2010). 
214 See id. 
215 Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 510-11 (2011). 
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While arbitration has arguably become more like litigation,216 litigation has become more flexible like 
arbitration.  The comparative advantages that arbitration once offered have become smaller, and, 
at the margins, commercial parties are accordingly not seeing the “large cost (or other)” 
advantages that they once might have.217 
Hall Street’s invitation for parties to turn to state law to give them the flexibility that they 
crave does not help.  In fact, it makes matters much worse.  It does not help because, as the 
previous section argued, a high degree of legal uncertainty shrouds the ultimate enforceability of 
contractually expanded review provisions under state law.  Moreover, the inconsistent and differing 
constructions of state laws – with different limitations and scopes – makes uncovering the right 
state law to apply to an agreement difficult and expensive.  Legal search costs coupled with 
uncertainty mean that parties cannot rely on Hall Street’s dicta to give them the private procedural 
ordering advantages that they want. 
Worse, the possibility that state laws, with differing and potentially more intrusive judicial 
review standards might haunt arbitral awards that parties would prefer to leave settled could well 
chase away commercial parties who would have otherwise stuck with arbitration.  After all, as the 
Court in Hall Street quite rightly recognized, one of the great advantages of arbitration can be its 
finality.  Even in the absence of a right to contract for expanded judicial review, many parties might 
have preferred arbitration, but Hall Street’s inelegant effort to provide for procedural contracting 
 
216 See, e.g., Stephen L. Hayford & Carroll E. Neesemann, A Response to RUAA Critics: Codifying Modern Arbitration 
Law, Without Preemption, 8 NO. 4 DISP. RES. MAG. 15, 17 (Summer 2002) (“Modern arbitration has, to a degree, become 
judicialized, that is, it has come somewhat to resemble litigation in court.”); Thomas E. Carbonneau, National law and the 
Judicialization of Arbitration: Manifest Destiny, Manifest Disregard, or Manifest Error, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 
21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS “JUDICIALIZATION” AND UNIFORMITY? THE 12TH SOKOL COLLOQUIUM 115, 130 (Richard Lillich and 
Charles N. Brower eds. 1994) (suggesting that arbitration might be becoming “an engine of adjudication indistinguishable 
from its judicial counterpart). 
217 See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich and J. Ryan Lamare, Living with ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, 
Arbitration and Conflict Management in Fortune 1,000 Corporations, unpublished draft available on SSRN (March 2013) 
(noting that respondents to a survey in 1997 cited cost savings as a primary driver in the increased use of arbitration 
while respondents to a survey in 2011 cited rising costs as a primary reason for the decline in the use of arbitration).   
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through state laws has the unintended consequence of casting a pall over finality as well as 
practically undermining party autonomy. 
1.4 Conclusion 
Contrary to the holding of the Supreme Court in Hall Street, I have argued that less party freedom 
to contract for expanded review of arbitral awards under the FAA does not equal more stability for 
arbitration.  Although Hall Street is best understood not as a break from but rather a continuation 
of the Court’s strong support for private procedural ordering, the case manages to undermine 
party autonomy while simultaneously threatening its state goal of valuing finality.  By pushing for 
greater state involvement in procedural contracting, at least with respect to judicial review of 
arbitral awards, the Court further unsettled an already fraught area of law – federal preemption in 
the context of arbitration.  Accordingly, even if some states allow for contractually expanded 
judicial review of arbitral awards, parties who want to take advantage of such provisions are 
hampered by uncertainty and high legal search costs.  Perhaps more significantly, if states take on 
a greater role in establishing standards of judicial review for arbitral awards, the possibility exists 
that such standards will actually undermine the finality of awards.   
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Chapter 2: Doctrinally Permissible Options for Calibrating Procedure 
Through Contract1 
Nothing is of more immediate practical importance to a lawyer than the rules that govern 
his own strategies and maneuvers; and nothing is more productive of deep and philosophical 
puzzles than the question of what those rules should be.2 
 
For a long time, arbitration was the only game in town for parties who wanted more 
flexibility in the adjudication of their disputes. They faced a dichotomous choice between accepting 
the public court system and its attendant procedural rules or opting out entirely and resolving their 
disputes in arbitration. Private process, however, “has migrated in surprising ways into the public 
courts: despite public rules of procedure, judicial decisions increasingly are based on rules of 
procedure drafted by the parties . . . .”3 This sort of private procedural ordering gives parties the 
ability to unbundle the off-the-rack procedures applied in public courts and bargain about individual 
rules.4 Customized procedure, in short, offers parties much of the flexibility that once seemed the 
 
1 Henry Allen Blair, Promise and Peril: Doctrinally Permissible Options for Calibrating Procedure Through Contract, 95 
Neb. L. Rev. 787 (2016). 
2 RONALD A. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72 (1985). 
3 Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure,53 WM. & MARY L.  
REV. 507, 510-11 (2011). 
4 Private procedural ordering allows parties to bargain over the procedural rules that will govern the resolution of any 
disputes that might arise between them in the future. See, e.g., Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 
97 VA. L. REV. 723, 724-25 (2011) (describing the process of modifying by contract the “spectrum of procedure” as 
private procedural ordering). Following the lead of other commentators who have described this form of private ordering, 
I will use the terms “private procedural ordering” and “procedural contracting” interchangeably. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, 
Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 598 (2005) (recognizing a movement from “Due Process Procedure 
to Contract Procedure”). Unlike some commentators, however, unless otherwise specified, I use these terms in the 
broadest possible sense, to include all party agreements regarding resolution of their disputes, including procedures that 
may be used in courts and extrajudicial procedures and processes such as arbitration, mediation, med-arb and 
settlement. Cf Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 2 (describing contract procedure as “the practice of setting out procedures 
in contracts to govern disputes . . . that will be adjudicated in the public courts”); Erin A. O'Hara O'Connor & Christopher 
R. Drahozal, Carve-Outs and Contractual Procedure ,in VAND. L. AND ECON. RES. Paper No. 13-16, at 2 (June 14, 2013) 
https:/ssrn.com/abstract=2279520 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2279520 [https://perma.unl.edu/C9GT-ZCYM].  
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prerogative of arbitration while maintaining the advantages of public adjudication, including, most 
significantly, rights to appeal and public subsidization. While arbitration has arguably become more 
like litigation,5 litigation may be becoming more like 
arbitration.6 
The promise of more flexible public adjudication presents parties with significant benefits.7 If 
public procedure is seen as a set of defaults rather than immutable or mandatory rules, then 
parties may negotiate over the contents not only of their substantive obligations but also of their 
preferred enforcement mechanisms.8 A default regime allows parties to design organizational 
frameworks within which the integrity of a contractual relationship is decided and maintained, 
calibrating accuracy and efficiency to meet their preferences.9 Pre-dispute procedural contracting 
 
 
5 See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration,92 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 8 
(1997) (arguing that arbitration has evolved into something of a “civil court of general jurisdiction”); Thomas J. 
Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 52 (calling arbitration  
the “new litigation”). 
6 Douglas Shontz, Fred Kipperman & Vanessa Soma, Business-to-Business Arbitration in the United States, RAND 
(2011), http://www.rand.org/pubs/techni-calreports/TR781.html [https://perma.unl.edu/9L2Y-P6ZG], at i; see also, e.g., 
Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration's Image, 
30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 579, 622 (2007).  
7 Indeed, innovating through contract generally is a pervasive phenomenon. See generally Kevin E. Davis, Contracts as 
Technology, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 85 (2013) (arguing that contractual innovation is a form of technological progress that 
spurs economic growth). 
8 For a particularly good introduction to the subject of default rules, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in 
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (applying game theory to the 
question of how lawmakers should create contract default rules to facilitate efficient contracts); see also, e.g., Ian Ayres, 
Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1391 (1992) (reviewing 
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991)); Randy E. Barnett, The 
Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992) (discussing the default rule 
approach to gap-filling); Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure 
Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 639 (1989) (applying an economic analysis to default rules); Jason 
Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990) 
(employing game theory, but challenging Ayres and Gertner's conclusions); Symposium on Default Rules and Contractual 
Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1993) (featuring seventeen pieces on theoretical perspectives on contract default 
rules).  
9 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 314 
(1994) [hereinafter Kaplow, Accuracy in Adjudication] (showing that heightened accuracy in adjudication can only be 




allows parties to create additional incentives for performance, avoid opportunistic and socially 
wasteful ex post litigation spending, and limit risk by leveraging their collective interests and shared 
ignorance about what the future may hold. Post-dispute procedural contracting allows parties to 
tailor the adjudication process in light of their unique and potentially differing evaluations of a 
dispute in order to constrain litigation expenditures and mitigate risk. 
Given the potential gains from finely tuned procedure, it is puzzling that current empirical 
evidence suggests that few parties explore the full range of customization theoretically available to 
them.10  Indeed, while the evidence we have is far from perfect, it seems to indicate that parties are 
doing precious little fine-tuning, at least ex ante. Although parties routinely engage in a few sorts of 
coarse pre-dispute customizations-choosing to arbitrate or engage in some other form of 
alternative dispute resolution, waiving rights to a jury, picking a law to govern their deals and 
selecting a forum for their disputes-it does not appear that parties regularly attempt more precise 
calibrations of procedure. It is less clear how often and to what extent parties may be engaging in 
fine-tuning of procedure after a dispute has arisen, though commentators have speculated that 
such agreements are similarly rare.11 
One key explanation for the relative dearth of fine-grained procedural customization, and 
the explanation that many commentators rely on, might be that the practice constitutes a radical 
departure from current doctrine.12 It might be that the costs of innovating in the face of doctrinal 
 
10 See infra Part 2.2. 
11 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice, 90 TEX. L REV. 1329, 
1342 (2012) (finding few examples of agreements entered into after filing, other than extensions of time for filing and 
similar modest adjustments to scheduling); David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 
393 (suggesting that procedure-related agreements are not as common as generally imagined). 
12 See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 GEO WASH L. REV. 1, 6-7(2014) (arguing that 
"parties fall at the bottom of the power hierarchy" and parties' attempts "to alter otherwise applicable procedures ... are 
wholly unenforceable absent some legal authorization for judicial enforcement"). 
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norms or trying to change those norms are simply too steep for any single party to bear, especially 
given worries about freeriding.13 
This Article evaluates this doctrinal explanation for the puzzle created by the gap between 
the potential gains of customized procedure and the apparent reality that parties do little of it, at 
least before a dispute arises. It concludes that a close look at the doctrine does not bear this story 
out. To the contrary, while express authorization for many forms of customized procedure does not 
exist, the current trend of doctrine could not be clearer: courts seem ready to enforce parties' 
autonomous procedural choices. Accordingly, there are minimal risks that a court will refuse to 
enforce or abide by a procedural customization so long as it does not suffer from some 
fundamental contract formation flaw, like unconscionability or fraud. 
The conclusion reached in this Article leaves the animating puzzle unsolved. It also leaves 
significant and important normative questions about the desirability of private procedural ordering 
unanswered. I take up these two matters in separate articles.14 But in this Article, by precisely 
articulating the benefits of the practice, surveying the existing empirical evidence about it and 
addressing its doctrinal feasibility in detail, I hope to clear a path to a better understanding of the 
promise and peril of procedural contracting. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. 
 
13 See infra note 131 and accompanying text. Essentially, innovators have a hard time excluding others from taking 
advantage of their work. If the innovation is valuable, others can copy it easily. By itself, this problem might dissuade 
some potential innovators, who have to spend time and money designing the innovation. But the free rider problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that innovators also disproportionately bear the risks that go along with adopting customizations. 
14 I provide an informal model that offers an explanation to the puzzle in Henry Allen Blair, Anticipating Procedural 
Customization, where I evaluate when and the extent to which parties rationally might seek to modify default rules of 
procedure and conclude that in arms’ length deals, parties are unlikely to seek radical departures from the defaults. I 
then evaluate the normative implications of procedural contracting in Henry Allen Blair, The Line Between Mockery and 
Efficiency: The Normative Implications of Private Process, [hereinafter Blair, Normative Implications] where I conclude that 
the most concerning objections to private process map onto general concerns about assent in disparate contracts 




In Part 2.1, I analyze the potential efficiency gains for parties from private procedural 
ordering. I begin by rehearsing the basic economic justifications for procedural rules and then turn 
to sketching the core features of current public procedural rules. Next I outline the benefits that 
parties might realize from seeing public procedural rules as defaults that can be varied. 
In Part 2.2, I present the existing empirical evidence regarding the degree to which parties 
seem to engage in procedural contracting. This evidence, while imperfect, indicates that outside of 
a few traditional and relatively coarse areas of customization, parties seem uninterested in 
exploring the promise of fine-tuned procedure, at least ex ante. The evidence suggests, however, 
that parties may be doing more individualized and tailored procedural contracting ex post. 
In Part 2.3, I evaluate the contention that there are doctrinal limits to private procedural 
ordering. I conclude that, although courts have not expressly sanctioned many specific forms of 
procedural customization, particularly before a dispute arises, the overall trend of doctrine supports 
procedural innovations. 
2.1 The Gains from Customizable Procedure 
Due to these multiple and moving targets, the optimal design of ad- judication may be more 
roundabout than building a road up a treacherous mountain: at least the mountain stands still.15  
 
No two disputes look the same. The path to resolving each dispute, then, is unique. That 
path will vary based on the substantive law implicated-which in a contract dispute depends not 
only on default contract rules but also on the parties' agreement-the procedural rules applied, the 
resources each side has and is willing to invest in dispute resolution, each side's estimation of the 
 
15 Louis Kaplow, Information and the Aim of Adjudication: Truth or Consequences, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1303 (2015) 




merits of the dispute, and each side's sensitivity to risk. The kaleidoscopic number of combinations 
of these interrelated elements defies generalization.16 
Viewing public procedure as primarily comprised of default rather than mandatory rules 
empowers parties to represent their own interests when confronting an infinitely variable future. 
Contractible procedure rests not only the content of a dispute but also the process by which a 
dispute will be resolved on negotiation between the parties. In other words, procedural 
customization puts the parties in control, allowing them to define the scope of the dispute and to 
specify the form and substance of the proceedings that will resolve it. Being closer to the unique 
facts and circumstances surrounding their deal, contracting parties may construct a dispute 
resolution mechanism that optimally aligns their incentives, reduces expected dispute resolution 
costs, and mitigates risk. 
The following sections explore these benefits in more detail. The first sets the stage by briefly 
articulating an economic perspective on procedure generally, showing that procedural rules must 
strike a balance between increased accuracy and increased costs, taking into account the needs 
of the parties to a dispute as well as the broader society. The second then specifically describes 
several core features of the current set of procedural rules in public courts. It argues that the 
default rules of civil procedure achieve this balance, in the main, by relying on standards 
implemented ex post by adjudicators with the benefit of hindsight.  Relying on the first two, the 
third section connects the dots and outlines some of the efficiency gains that might be realized 
through private procedural ordering.  
 
16 See, e.g., Samuel C. Damren & Lisa A. Brown, Every Case is Unique, but Commercial Cases Are More So-Don't Ever 
Forget That, 93 MICH. B.J., Aug. 2014, at 22, https://www.michbar.org/file/journal/pdf/pdf4article2416.pdf [https:// 
perma.unl.edu/58ZT-TWHH] ("There is no single template that adequately describes-and no single strategy for winning-
commercial litigation. Each case is different."); cf David R. Carlisle & Bruce A. Blitman, Tips for Managing the "Mega-
Mediation," 67 DISP. RESOL. J., no. 4, 2013, at 1 ("There is no such thing as a simple or typical mediation. Every case you 





 Brief Primer on the Economic Theory of Procedure in Dispute Resolution 
Adjudication can be costly. So what are parties purchasing when they choose to invest in 
it? Most fundamentally, they are buying a resolution to their dispute. More precisely, they are 
hoping to buy a reasonably accurate resolution to their dispute. This is where procedure factors 
into the mix. In adversarial systems of adjudication, perhaps the primary role of procedure is to 
produce results that optimally enforce the substantive law.17 Optimal enforcement strikes the best 
balance possible in a given case between accurate outcomes and the increased costs of reaching 
such outcomes.18  
Accurate outcomes are valuable not only to the parties-providing fair, equitable, and 
hopefully even dignified closure-but to society as a whole. So long as adjudicators accurately 
enforce substantive law, rational actors expect to face liability to the degree that they behave 
unlawfully. As a result, they conform their behavior to the substantive standard.19 It follows that, to 
the extent that procedure reduces the risk of outcome error, it also reduces the incidence of 
unlawful behavior and corresponding social costs.20  
Still, accurate outcomes are not all that interest parties or society at large. Assuming that 
the goals of adjudication are fostering productive activity, restraining harmful conduct and avoiding 
undue expenses, then the key to assessing the success of adjudication rests on its consequences, 
 
17 See ROBERT G. BOON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 128-48 (2003) (explaining expected error 
costs and the error cost analysis in more detail); Todd J. Zywicki & Anthony B. Sanders, Posner, Hayek, and the 
Economic Analysis of Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 559-602 (2008).  
18 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (balancing the risk of error and the cost of additional procedure in 
determining the due process right to an evidentiary hearing). 
19 RICHARD A. POSNER, REGULATION (AGENCIES) VERSUS LITIGATION (COURTS): AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 11-25 (Daniel P. 
Kessler ed., 2011); Louis Kaplow Steven Shavell, FairnessVersus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1166 (2001) (stating 
that "a primary reason to permit individuals to sue is that the prospect of suit provides an incentive for desirable behavior 
in the first instance" and also noting that in some cases the prospect of suit deters future conduct). 
20 See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1055, 1058 (2015) (describing 
how some organizations use information obtained from litigation to adjust behavior going forward). 
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not accuracy per se.21 Perfectly accurate adjudicative outcomes should, usually, correspond with 
the best consequences. But accuracy is expensive, so there is, in the real world, always a tradeoff. 
Sometimes that tradeoff does not pay. Parties, and society, have to balance their appetite for 
accuracy against its increased costs.22 Procedures designed to reduce outcome error, like extra 
layers of appellate review or more searching discovery, necessarily cost more.23 Moreover, many 
such procedures create opportunities for a mismatch between a socially optimal level of 
investment and private incentives to overinvest in litigation.24 Because individual parties do not 
completely internalize the costs of their litigation choices, and because such choices take place 
incrementally over time, the decision to incur some litigation costs may be individually rational while 
still being socially wasteful.25 To achieve proportionality – an optimal level of litigation investment – 
any system of procedure must strive to balance the sum of both parties' expected process costs 
against the private and social value of enhanced accuracy.26  
 
21 See, e.g., Kaplow, Accuracy in Adjudication, supra note 8 (arguing that the primary goal of adjudication should be to 
incentivize ex ante socially optimal primary behavior not to achieve accurate outcomes); Kaplow, Truth or Consequences, 
supra note 14, at 1306 (explaining that "[t]he value of truth in adjudication depends on its consequences, and valuing 
various outcomes is outside the realm of truth per se"). 
22 Even Professor Solum, who has argued persuasively and passionately that procedural justice requires consideration of 
more than the tradeoff of costs and accuracy acknowledges that this tradeoff is an essential part of procedural justice. 
See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 183 (2004) (noting that procedural justice 
requires, in part, "a reasonable balance between cost and accuracy"). 
23 See, e.g., Kaplow, Truth or Consequences, supra note 14, at 1335; see also, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Feasibility 
of Litigation Markets, 89 IND. L. J. 171, 174 (2014) (noting that procedures designed to enhance accuracy often have the 
opposite of their intended effect, costing too much and accordingly forcing parties to make second-best litigation 
choices). 
24 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1486 (1999) (discussing 
the possibility that parties will either underinvest or overinvest in the search for evidence, relative to the social optimum). 
25 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal 
System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 577-78 (1997) (noting that many litigants consider only the benefits they garner and the 
costs they incur and not the benefits of the lawsuit that they do not capture or the costs that their behavior imposes on 
others). As Professors Grundfest and Huang have demonstrated, parties invest in litigation in increments rather than all at 
once. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1293-98 (2006). This fact results in plaintiffs having a counterintuitive incentive, under some 
conditions, to file suit in cases in which neither they nor society expect a positive return. See id. at 1277, 1299-305 
(explaining that a lawsuit with a negative expected value is equivalent to an out-of-the-money call option that a plaintiff 
will rationally pursue as long as the price of the option is low and the volatility of the claim's value is high). 
26 See Zywicki & Sanders, supra note 16, at 559-602. Although dispute resolution unequivocally implicates the interests 
of society, particularly in some domains like civil rights cases, most commentators and the rules themselves seem to 
prioritize the private interests of the parties. See, e.g., 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET. AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1.21[1] 
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So far as the parties themselves are concerned, at least, optimal resolutions are frequently 
found in full settlements.27 In fact, much of the literature on the law and economics of adjudication 
suggests that a full settlement is usually a first, best solution for parties.28 As the old saw goes, a 
bad settlement is often better than a good trial.29 Assuming that parties are rational and are not 
acting strategically to influence current or future actions of one another or third parties or alter legal 
rules,30 they will calculate a settlement value by multiplying the probability of success on the merits 
in a given case by the value of an anticipated judgment in that case net of transaction costs.31 
 
[a] (3d ed. 2008) ("The application of orderly rules of procedure does not require the sacrifice of fundamental justice, but 
rather the Rules must be construed to promote justice for both parties, not to defeat it. This mandate is met if substantial 
justice is accomplished between the parties."); FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "should 
be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding"). 
27 See, e.g., John Barkai, Elizabeth Kent & Pamela Martin, A Profile of Settlement, 42 CT. REV. 34, 34 (2006) (observing 
that generally less than 3% of filed cases reach trial verdict). Significantly, there is a good deal of debate in the literature 
about the socially optimal level of litigation versus settlement. See generally, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Level of Litigation: 
Private Versus Social Optimality of Suit and of Settlement, 19 INT'L R. L. & ECON. 99 (1999). The trouble is that when 
parties spend on litigation, they do not take into account the costs that such an action will require of others. On the other 
hand, when parties spend on litigation, they also do not take into account the impact that this will have on incentives to 
reduce harm in the future or other positive externalities. See id. Despite the fact that the default rules of procedure seem 
to espouse belief that settlements generally enhance social welfare, see, for example, FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (requiring pretrial 
settlement conferences) and FED. R. CIV. P. 68 (imposing legal costs on a party who refuses a settlement offer that turns 
out to have been more favorable than a trial outcome), several commentators have persuasively argued that, in some 
circumstances, settlement can lower social welfare. See, e.g., Ezra Friedman & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Chilling, 
Settlement, and the Accuracy of the Legal Process, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 144 (2010).  
28 I distinguish here between a full settlement and various sorts of partial settlements, which are actually forms of ex post 
procedural contracting. See infra Part 1.2.3. 
29 See, e.g., In re Warner Commc'ns Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(noting "the familiar axiom that a bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial"). 
30 See, e.g., Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 225, 226 (1982) (noting that problems with figuring out how to divide a settlement surplus may lead to 
strategic bargaining that undermines the settlement). This simple model of settlement also only applies in one-shot 
cases. The equation will necessarily look different if one of the parties is acting to influence third parties or the outcome in 
future similar cases or if one of the parties is trying to change the law. 
31 According to Posner: 
The plaintiffs minimum offer is the expected value of the litigation to him plus his settlement costs, the 
expected value of the litigation being the present value of the judgment if he wins, multiplied by the 
probability (as he estimates it) of his winning, minus the present value of his litigation expenses. The 
defendant's maximum offer is the expected cost of the litigation to him and consists of his litigation 
expenses, plus the cost of an adverse judgment multiplied by the probability as he estimates it of the 
plaintiffs winning (which is equal to one minus the probability of his winning), minus his settlement 
costs.  
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 418 
(1973); see also, e.g., George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learning from Wittman's Mistakes, 14 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 215, 217 (1985). For the sake of simplicity, my textual formulation ignores the time value of money, conflates 
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Adjudication should only happen if the plaintiffs minimum settlement value exceeds the 
defendant's maximum settlement value and there is, accordingly, no surplus over which the parties 
can bargain.32 Generally, such a divide will exist only if the parties have differing estimates of the 
probability of success on the merits or differing estimates of an anticipated judgment.33 Indeed, a 
substantial number of commentators and even courts have implied that adjudication results from 
grave analytical errors.34 With the goal of aligning the parties' respective views of the dispute, many 
of the current default rules of civil procedure, particularly related to discovery and pretrial 
management, work to educate the parties about the likely outcome of any adjudication.35  
Of course, in reality, full settlements are not always reached. Not only do parties make 
analytical errors, but, in the rough and tumble of actual disputes, there are a number of reasons 
why even rational parties might reach different expected judgment values and thus choose to 
 
settlement costs and litigation expenses and characterizes them as transaction costs, and assumes that parties are risk-
neutral. It also does not address the problem of risk versus uncertainty, where risk can be quantified and uncertainty 
cannot be. SEE FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 259 (London Sch. Econ. & Pol. Sci. ed., 7th prtg. 1948) 
(1921) ("When our ignorance of the future is only partial ignorance, incomplete knowledge and imperfect inference, it 
becomes impossible to classify instances objectively.").  
32 Thomas J. Miceli, Settlement Strategies, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 473, 474 (1998) ("In the differing perceptions model, a 
bargaining process is envisioned in which the parties arrive at a settlement amount somewhere between their reservation 
prices. Thus, when a settlement occurs, the parties share the surplus from settlement.").  
33 In a simple model of settlement, this leads to the intuitive conclusion that cases with high transaction costs relative to 
the stakes are more likely to settle while cases with low transaction costs relative to the stakes are more likely to proceed 
to adjudication. See, e.g., Grundfest & Huang, supra note 24, at 1299-305 (showing how a case with a negative 
expected judgment value can still have substantial settlement value); Posner, supra note 2, at 419 n.29 (1973) (asserting 
that empirical evidence exists to show that higher stakes cases are more likely to be litigated).  
34 See, e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) ("In short, settlements rather than litigation will serve the interests of 
plaintiffs as well as defendants."); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 664 (7th Cir. 1989) 
("Settling litigation is valuable, and courts should promote it."); Robert Cooter et al., supra note 29, at 225 (stating that 
trial "represents a bargaining breakdown."); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes 
and Their Resolution,27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067,1074(1989) (noting that trials result from "mistaken prediction[s]" made 
by parties); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 
93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 108 (1994) (noting that most scholars believe "that trials represent mistakes-breakdowns in the 
bargaining process-that leave the litigants and society worse off than they would have been had settlement been 
reached").  
35 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, "To Encourage Settlement": Rule 68, Offers of Judgment, and the History of the Federal 




adjudicate rather than fully settle.36 For the purposes of this Article, at least three of these reasons 
are particularly relevant.  
First, judging is difficult.37 In the adversarial system, courts make factual determinations with 
substantially less than complete confidence, getting information from the self-interested parties. 
Courts are therefore doomed to experience shortages of quality information regarding what the 
relevant facts are.38 As a result, judges, by definition busy generalists, may have a hard time 
discerning the wheat from the chaff.39 The risk of judicial error can be significant and this risk has to 
be rolled into the parties' respective estimate of success on the merits.40 Parties may not estimate 
a common base rate, however, for the probability that a judge will make a mistake, and any 
difference they have will ultimately impact their reasonable estimates of success on the merits. 
Second, the scarcity of high-quality information impedes the parties' ability to estimate 
success on the merits. The ultimate judgment that results from adjudication is the product of the 
parties' interactive strategies in presenting evidence to the court. This presentation occurs 
incrementally over time. At least at the outset, the parties are likely to have asymmetric information 
 
36 See, e.g., Maya Steinitz, How Much Is That Law suit in the Window? Pricing Legal Claims, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1889, 
1893-94 (2013) (arguing that valuation of legal claims is characterized by extreme uncertainty, extreme information 
asymmetry, extreme agency problems, and the problem of effort provision). Of course, parties may also act irrationally. 
Among other things, parties might try to recover sunk costs and thus make poor investment decisions. See Samuel 
Issacharoff George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 113 (1990) ("Although 
economists exhort decision-makers to ignore sunk costs and to attend only to the prospective benefits and costs of 
alternative courses of action, few attain this ideal. Instead, individuals often incur further losses ('throw good money after 
bad') or take great risks in order to recover those losses."). 
37 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 420, 428 (2007) (arguing that judges have three sets of "blinders": 
informational blinders, cognitive blinders, and attitudinal blinders). 
38 See ALEX STIEN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 34-35, 73-106 (2005) (analyzing the sources of uncertainty in fact 
finding); ADRIAN VERMEUELE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 4 (2006) 
(describing judicial ascertainment of the law as "choice under uncertainty" that implicates "limited information and 
bounded rationality"). 
39 See, e.g., Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of How Judges Allocate Time 
Across Cases in the Federal Courts of Ap- peals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 407–13 (2013) (describing how federal 
appellate judges spread their deliberative efforts across cases, thereby economizing on decision making resources).  
40 See Lea Brilmayer, Wobble, or the Death of Error, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 367–69 (1986) (stating that errors in both 
fact finding and applications of the law are inevitable and explaining why).  
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about the salient features of the dispute. In fact, parties may not have complete access to 
information about their own conduct at the outset of a lawsuit. In complex organizations, 
information is decentralized and held by a variety of people at different levels separated 
hierarchically and often geographically from one another.41 Even as the case progresses and more 
information comes to light, each side's strategic maneuvering may undermine the credibility or 
completeness of the information or merely reinforce self-serving optimism.42 This noise can make it 
difficult for parties to arrive at common present forecasts of the value of a future judgment. 
Third, agency problems or frictions related to agency may stymie the parties' ability to 
accurately forecast adjudicative outcomes. Of course, the interests of lawyers and their clients may 
differ. A robust literature discusses the traditional formulation of the principal agent problem in the 
context of lawyers and their clients.43 But subtler, though not necessarily less significant, 
imbalances of information between lawyers and parties, as well as frictions in exchanging 
information, can weaken the accuracy of estimates about the merits of a dispute. Parties 
presumably know more about the facts and circumstances surrounding their dispute. Lawyers 
 
41 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 19 (arguing that lawsuits help produce information for organizations that otherwise 
would not be available to them).  
42 See, e.g., Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1337, 1338 (1995) 
(using the same experiment to find causation); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal 
Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 444–50 (1994) (noting that one cost of discovery is the error in parties’ decision 
making attributable to the discovery of information that makes them unduly optimistic or pessimistic about their likelihood 
of success at trial); George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pre- trial Bargaining, 22 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 135, 139 (1993) (finding a positive correlation between self-serving bias and failure to settle). The strategic 
advantages that can sometimes come with systematic optimism have also been explored. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, The 
Evolution and Persistence of Optimism in Litigation, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 490, 491 (2006) (discussing optimistic lawyers 
who succeed in extracting favorable settlements by credibly threatening to resort to costly litigation); Daniel Klerman & 
Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Inferences from Litigated Cases, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 216–21 (2014) (concluding that a more pro-
plaintiff rule might assign a higher probability of plaintiff success, thus giving a plaintiff a credible threat to go to trial and 
convincing the defendant to settle); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1984) (“Where either the plaintiff or defendant has a ‘powerful’ case, settlement is more likely because 
the parties are less likely to disagree about the outcome.”).  
43 See generally, e.g., James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization “Officer of the Court,” 48 
BUFF L. REV. 349 (2000); Grace M. Giesel, Client Responsibility for Lawyer Conduct: Examining the Agency Nature of the 





presumably know more about the law and processes that will be used to resolve the dispute. An 
accurate forecast of the merits of a dispute depends on a clear picture and balancing of all three: 
facts, substantive law, and procedural law. But lines of communication between parties and their 
lawyers are not always clear and the risk of errors in the exchange of vital information creates 
additional hurdles.  
In short, adjudication constitutes a nontrivial part of dispute resolution and procedural rules 
must account not only for settlement effects but also for the quality of the adjudicatory process 
itself. Procedural rules must strive to balance accuracy and efficiency, particularly in light of the 
reasons why parties might have differing estimates of the value of their respective positions, while 
fairly accounting for the interests of both parties and the larger society. Designing a set of 
procedural rules that accomplishes this difficult balance in the widest swath of cases possible was 
the animating goal of the current rules of civil procedure.  
 The Current Default Rules of Procedure 
Our existing rules of civil procedure were born during a period of renewed faith in 
centralized government as the guardian of social justice.44 Congress passed the Rules Enabling 
Act (REA) in 1934.45 The REA authorized the Supreme Court to create a single procedural regime 
for federal courts. The Court, in turn, delegated its task to an Advisory Committee, which set out to 
draft a procedural code that limited the impact of process itself.46 Because the reformers were 
moved by pragmatic instrumentalism, they saw procedure exclusively as a means of finding facts 
 
44 See Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A. J. 1648, 1651 (1981) (“The federal rules 
[of civil procedure] ultimately were passed as New Deal legislation.”); Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1272–80 (1997) (describing influence of New Deal principles such 
as nationalism, expertise, and social reform on the Rules Enabling Act). Notably, the reform effort that led to the REA 
began nearly thirty years earlier. Roscoe Pound popularized the effort in 1906 in his famous address to the American Bar 
Association, The Causes of Popular Dis- satisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906).  
45 Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)).  
46 Appointment of Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law Rules, 295 U.S. 774, 774–75 (1935).  
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and accurately enforcing substantive law.47 Procedure, in other words, was deemed a value-
neutral means of enforcing substantive rights.48 Procedural rules, the reformers accordingly 
believed, should be general in nature and “trans-substantive,” meaning that a single set of rules 
could apply to all civil cases without regard to essence of the dispute.49 Uniformity and trans-
substantivity aimed to standardize procedure and achieve, in the aggregate, the compromise 
between efficiency and accuracy discussed in the previous section.50  
Practically accommodating the hopeful expansiveness of the ideal of trans-substantivity, 
however, was no easy task. Indeed, designing a set of fixed rules that could optimally balance 
accuracy and costs across an almost infinitely diverse range of future disputes was impossible. 
Instead, the reformers opted to entrust judges with broad discretion to put the rules of procedure 
into action in individual cases.51  
 
47 See Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field 
Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 80–98 (1989); see also, e.g., Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: 
Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 PENN. L. REV. 1791, 1795 (2014) (noting 
that the Rules, “with their functionalist, anti-formalist” underpinnings, committed “to easing barriers to entry through 
trans-substantive, uniform, national provisions that expanded opportunities for information exchange, vested discretion in 
trial judges, and aimed for efficient decision making focused on the merits of claims.”).  
48 Of course, the myth that procedure was value-neutral and independent from sub- stance quickly became a concern 
for many commentators. See generally, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1281 (1976); Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L. J. 
718 (1971).  
49 Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 324 (2008); see also, 
e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. 
EMPIR. L. STUD. 459, 519 (2004) (“Modern procedure has conferred on trial court judges broader unreviewed (and 
perhaps unreviewable) discretion.”).  
50 See Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASJ. U. L.Q. 297, 318–19 (1938). Professor (and later, judge) 
Clark was perhaps the “dominant intellectual and operational force” behind the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Jay S. 
Goodman, On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: What Did the Drafters Intend?, 21 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 351, 357 (1987). In Clark’s view, there were “two basic principles behind” the procedural reform: “all cases 
should be decided on their merits rather than on procedural maneuverings and that a basic goal in litigation should be 
economy of time and resources.” Id.  
51 See, e.g., Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an 
Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181 (2005) (noting how the Rules retrieved equity as a source of 
procedural discretion); Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429 (2003) 
(arguing for broad use of equitable discretion); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Complex Litigation at the Millennium: Ulysses Tied to 
the Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey of Discovery “Reform”, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 197, 232–34 




“[I]t is only a slight exaggeration to say that federal procedure, especially at the pretrial 
stage, is largely the trial judge’s creation subject to minimal appellate review.”52 In economic terms, 
the reformers opted to create a procedural rule set comprised predominately of open- textured 
standards rather than rules.53 Accordingly, public procedural rules in the United States delegate to 
a judge the task of specifying precise obligations in light of the contingencies arising after a dispute 
has fomented.54 This delegation occurs both expressly and through the use of vague language 
inviting flexible interpretation.  
For example, Rule 16 expressly authorizes judges to hold pretrial conferences and “take 
appropriate action” with respect to a diverse range of matters, including pleading, discovery, 
 
52 Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CAR- DOZO L. REV. 1961 (2006); see 
also, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 
1 J. EMPIR. LEG. STUD. 459, 519 (2004) (“Modern procedure has conferred on trial court judges broader unreviewed (and 
perhaps unreviewable) discretion”).  
53 The “rules versus standards” debate has occupied the attentions of scholars for many years. See, e.g., David L. 
Faigman, Constitutional Adventures in Wonderland: Exploring the Debate Between Rules and Standards Through the 
Looking Glass of the First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 830 (1993) (“[T]he amount of ink spilled over debating the 
virtues of rules versus standards would lead the reasonable observer to believe that something momentous was at 
stake.”). For good contemporary discussions of the distinction, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 13–29 
(2009) (discussing the relative advantages and disadvantages of legal norms being articulated as rules or standards); 
Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules: A New Way of Understanding the Differences in 
Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and Foreign Lawyers, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1117, 1124–42 
(1999); Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256, 258 (1995) 
(examining relative efficiency of two-party bargaining under rules and standards); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: 
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 557–68 (1992) (viewing rules and standards for their economic efficiency); 
Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 25 (2000) 
(“Rules establish legal boundaries based on the presence or absence of well-specified triggering facts.”); Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992) (“Rules aim to confine the decision maker 
to facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary and subjective value choices to be worked out elsewhere.”). For purposes of this 
analysis, it is enough to say that rules and standards differ only to the extent to which effort to give substance to a legal 
command gets expended before or after a dispute has arisen. See Kaplow, Truth or Consequences, supra note 14.  
54 Importantly, these standards tend to remain open-textured over time. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 51, at 1970 
(“Moreover, case precedent offers little constraint in this area because balancing tests and discretionary decisions are 
normally too fact-specific to support generalizations.”); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 957 (1987) (noting that usually whether 
precedent about discretionary Rules of Civil Procedure exists does not function to minimize discretion). Precedent, in 
short, does not operate to harden these standards into rules. See, e.g., H. Allen Blair, Hard Cases Under the Convention 
on the International Sale of Goods: A Proposed Taxonomy of Interpretative Challenges, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L 269, 
312 (2011) (recognizing the possibility that the value of open-textured standards could be eroded if they are hardened 
into rules through precedent); Kaplow, Truth or Consequences, supra note 14, at 1313 n.10 (“More broadly, it is useful to 
view the creation of precedent as a particular means ofcollecting information to give content to the law.”). 
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settlement, summary judgment, and trial.55 The Rule envisages a key role of a judge as that of 
settlement facilitator,56 but it provides almost no substantive guidance, leaving it instead up to an 
individual judge to effectuate the goals of “expediting the disposition of the action” and 
“discouraging wasteful pretrial activities.”57  
Rule 19 is example of a provision that contains such vague language as to allow judges 
wide latitude to decide particular cases.58 Rule 19(a), dealing with compulsory joinder, relies on 
open-ended language, such as “interest” and “impair or impede,” to define the circumstances 
under which an absentee should be joined. When applying the Rule to a particular case, a judge 
has discretion to decide whether the absentee’s interest is sufficiently significant and whether that 
interest would be impaired or impeded if the absentee were not joined. In making her decision, the 
judge can consider a range of case-specific management considerations in making those 
decisions.59  
There are many other Rules that either expressly delegate discretion to judges or implicitly 
give judges discretion to put the rules into effect in particular cases.60 Cataloguing them is beyond 
the scope of this Article, but the fundamental point is that “[t]he Federal Rules of the 1930s are 
founded upon judicial discretion.”61  
 
55 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c).  
56 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(2) (regarding management); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5) (regarding settlement); 3 MOORE ET. AL.., 
supra note 25, §§ 16.02, 16.03[1][a] (“Rule 16 is explicitly intended to encourage active judicial management . . . judges 
are encouraged to actively participate in designing case-specific plans to position litigation as efficiently as possible for 
disposition by settlement, motion, or trial.”).  
57 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(1), (3). 
58 FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a). 
59 FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b)(1). 
60 See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 53, at 923 n.76 (1987) (identifying thirty-six provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure that expressly delegate discretion to trial court judges).  
61 Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil 
Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. REV. 133, 201 (1997).  
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 The Potential Benefits of Procedural Customization Through Contract 
Despite the aspirations of the reformers who revolutionized procedure pursuant to the REA, 
no fixed set of rules could possibly account for the individual nuances of every case. Accordingly, 
as the previous section pointed out, many of our public procedural rules delegate to judges the 
task of specifying precise obligations after a dispute has arisen. Perhaps more importantly, 
however, the rules also leave litigants with broad discretion in conducting their affairs throughout 
the litigation process.62  
For instance, after a dispute arises and adjudication has begun, parties enjoy tremendous 
flexibility in tailoring discovery processes to meet their needs, including deciding how much to 
invest in evidence production.63 But parties can control the post-dispute contours of procedure in a 
variety of other ways as well.64 For example, litigants may enter stipulations,65 consent to waiver of 
service of process,66 amend pleadings,67 waive the right to a jury trial,68 substitute a magistrate 
judge for an Article III District Judge,69 or even waive their right to appeal.70 Alternatively, parties 
 
62 Bone, supra note 10, at 1330 (“In the American adversary system, litigants enjoy broad freedom to make their own 
litigation choices.”); see also STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 138 (7th ed. 2008) (“One of the hallmarks of the U.S. 
law is the extent to which the rules of procedure are ‘default’ rules, rules that govern if the parties have not agreed to 
something else.”).  
63 See FED. R. CIV. P. 29 (providing that “[u]nless the court orders otherwise, the parties may stipulate” that certain 
aspects of depositions will be conducted in particular ways and that “other procedures governing or limiting discovery be 
modified”); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery, in 6 MOORE ET. AL., supra 
note 25, § 26.04[1] (“Parties may mutually stipulate to use procedures for discovery that vary from the rules . . . .”); 8A  
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE §§ 2091–92 (3d ed. 2012) (delineating the parameters of the ability of litigants to stipulate discovery 
procedure).  
64 For a thorough discussion of post-dispute procedural stipulations, see generally Michael L. Moffitt, Customized 
Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO WASH. L. REV. 461 (2007) and J.J. Prescott & Kathryn 
E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of Civil Settlement, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 59 (2016).  
65 See, e.g., 73 AM. JUR. 2D Stipulations § 15.  
66 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d) (allowing parties to waive service of process in order to save money and effort); 4A WRIGHT, 
MILLER, & MARCUS, supra note 62, § 1092.1 (discussing the process for procuring waiver).  
67 See FED. R. CIV. P. 15 (allowing amendment both before and during trial).  
68 See FED. R. CIV. P. 39(a)(1).  
69 See FED. R. CIV. P. 73.  
70 See, e.g., Acton v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc., 163 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) 
(dismissing appeal based on a post-dispute agreement); see also 15A CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & 
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might settle on the question of liability, or postpone that question, but continue to litigate the issue 
of damages.71 Or parties might enter into a high-low agreement, which allows a defendant to put a 
cap on the upper end possible liability (the “high”) in exchange for guaranteeing a minimum 
payment (the “low”).72 Of course, finally and most conclusively, parties may resolve their dispute 
altogether through a full settlement, giving up claimed legal rights, on one hand, for some 
consideration on the other. By making any of these post-dispute procedural commitments, litigants 
can calibrate their litigation expenditures to meet their individual tolerances for risk and accuracy.  
Most commentators do not object to party control of litigation after a dispute has arisen. 
Not only is such control expressly allowed by the rules in many instances,73 but the parties agree to 
alterations of the default rules with their “eyes wide open” and with approval of a supervising 
judge.74  
Some commentators contrast this sort of ex post party agreement with an ex ante 
agreement, suggesting that the latter raises more serious due process concerns. But the analytical 
distance between ex post modifications and ex ante modifications of public procedures is 
exaggerated.75 As Professors Kapeliuk and Klement have persuasively argued, any mutual 
commitment to constrain, extend, or substitute the set of permissible actions defined by a 
 
EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3901 (3d ed. 2012) (noting that 
“the most likely occasion for waiver arises from a settlement agreement that calls for resolution of some disputed matter 
by the district court, coupled with an explicit agreement that the district court decision shall be final and that all rights of 
appeal are waived”).  
71 See, e.g., Drury Stevenson, Reverse Bifurcation, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 213, 216 (2006) (explaining “reverse bifurcation” as 
a process in which the parties have a trial on damages first and then settle on remaining liability issues once the stakes of 
the dispute are understood).  
72 High-Low Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  
73 See, for example, FED. R. CIV. P. 26, which requires the parties to confer and results in an agreed upon scheduling 
order under Rule 16.  
74 See Hoffman, supra note 10, at 396.  
75 See generally Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Changing the Litigation Game: An Ex Ante Perspective on 
Contractualized Procedures, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1475 (2013).  
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procedural rule modifies the procedural rule and hence the litigation game.76 This is true no matter 
when the commitment occurs.77 Although in a sense parties ex post might be in a position to 
better value certain trade offs that they are making, this certainty itself comes at its own steep 
price. More information, which leads to the greater certainty, is not free. Parties might well trade 
greater certainty for lower costs ex post. And, although judicial approval of a customized 
procedure might be clearer ex post, a court will always have the opportunity to evaluate, expressly 
or impliedly, an ex ante customized procedure as well, policing customized procedures for due 
process concerns and fundamental contract flaws.  
Indeed, stripped of the superficial appeal of a distinction between ex post and ex ante 
procedural modifications, it becomes evident that the economic justifications for each rest on the 
same underlying pre- mise: parties are in the best position to maximize the “incentive bang for the 
enforcement buck.”78 Ex ante procedural contracting simply extends the logic and the range of 
potential efficiency gains from ex post customizable procedure.  
To see how, it is worth recapping the path-breaking article Anticipating Litigation in 
Contract Design in which Professors Scott and Triantis suggest that contracting parties can 
structure procedural rules in ways that will increase their joint surplus.79 According to Professors 
Scott and Triantis, when dealing with their substantive contractual obligations, parties may 
effectively substitute costly and fact-intensive adjudication for specific rules by varying the precision 
 
76 Technically, as Professors Kapeliuk and Klement point out, a procedural decision is different than a procedural 
commitment. Some of the default rules of procedure authorize parties to make decisions and when a party makes such 
a decision it is not actually changing the litigation game. But, if a party commits itself to a particular decision, the litigation 
game is changed.  
77 See id. at 1482 (“An ex ante or an ex post commitment to constrain, to extend, or to add to the original set of 
permissible actions defined by the rule modifies the rule, and thus changes the litigation game that would have taken 
place absent such commitment.”).  
78 Robert E. Scott & George E. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 856 (2006).  
79 Id. at 856–60.  
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of contract provisions.80 When parties choose a relatively precise or specific rule, they are 
increasing their ex ante investment.81 In other words, parties spend more money at the front end of 
the contracting process contemplating future contingencies and negotiating over terms specifying 
precise obligations in light of those contingencies. More precise rules require less from the 
adjudicatory process. By investing more at the front end of the process, parties are hoping to 
leverage the information that they have about their shared contracting goals and incentives to 
maximize gains from trade in order to reduce ex post enforcement costs.82 If a fight arises in the 
future, a court or adjudicator should be able to resolve that fight relatively easily and cheaply in light 
of the specific rules that the parties have chosen.  
On the other hand, when parties choose a relatively open-textured standard, they are 
decreasing their ex ante investment and increasing their expected ex post enforcement costs.83 
Rather than spending time and money worrying about future contingencies and terms specifying 
precise obligations in light of those contingencies at the front end of the contracting process, 
parties are choosing to delegate to a future tribunal the task of specifying precise obligations. Such 
ex post back-end specification is efficient, Professors Scott and Triantis argue, where the value to 
the parties of a decision maker’s hindsight outweighs the value that the parties would gain by 
specifying ex ante a more precise rule to govern their contract.84  
In short,  
 
80 See Blair, supra note 53, at 301–02.  
81 See Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 
1071 (2009).  
82 Id. (noting that parties “are exploiting their informational advantage (they know their contractual ends and have the right 
incentives to choose the best means to achieve them), but they are sacrificing the hindsight advantage that a court might 
have”).  
83 See id.  
84 Scott & Triantis, supra note 77, at 819 (“The parties choose between front- and back-end proxy determination by 
comparing the informational advantage the parties may have at the time of contracting against the hindsight advantage 
of determining proxies in later litigation.”); id. at 842 (“The parties may view the court’s hindsight as an advantage or 
disadvantage depending on how much un- certainty has been resolved by the time contract performance is due.”).  
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[b]y reaching the optimal combination of front-end and back-end costs, parties can 
minimize the aggregate contracting costs of achieving a particular gain in 
contractual incentives. Conversely, for any given expenditure of contracting costs, 
the parties can reach the highest possible incentive gains by optimizing the 
allocation of their investment between the front and back ends.85  
 
This insight reveals the potential of procedural contracting.86 In fact, Professors Scott and 
Triantis point out that parties often choose to opt out of the public adjudicatory system entirely in 
favor of arbitration because “the parties’ ex ante agreement as to procedure improves the cost 
effectiveness of their prospective enforcement mechanism.”87 They then go on to identify other 
possible procedural contracting mechanisms and apply their insights to one example, ex ante 
modifications of burdens of proof.88  
With respect to burdens of proof, as Professors Scott and Triantis argue, even if the default 
allocation can be rationalized,89 “it is highly unlikely that it yields the efficient . . . allocation for every 
contract.”90 They go on to show how several different customized allocations might benefit 
parties.91 
The same fundamental point holds for other procedural rules. Even to the extent that 
existing public procedural rules can be rationalized, it is unlikely that they optimally balance 
 
85 Id. at 817.  
86 See also Albert Choi & George Triantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 
503 (2008) [hereinafter Choi & Triantis, Completing Contracts] (demonstrating that increasing litigation costs may induce 
better incentives to perform contractual obligations); Alan Schwartz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
127 (1997) (discussing the advantages of contracting over preferred Bankruptcy procedures).  
87 Scott & Triantis, supra note 77, at 856. Part of the reason that arbitration might be desirable is because it permits 
vague contractual terms to be interpreted and enforced by industry experts rather than generalist judges. See id. at 856 
n.123 (citing Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An Application to 
Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 558 (2003) for this proposition).  
88 Id. at 857–71.  
89 They argue that they are “hard pressed,” along with most other commentators, to rationalize the default allocation. Id. 
at 866.  
90 Id.  
91 See id. at 867–78.  
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efficiency and accuracy in all cases.92 Recall that most public procedural rules are open-textured 
standards. While such standards can and do have value to parties in some circumstances, more 
precise rules can also create value. Fine-tuning procedure can benefit parties in at least four 
significant and interrelated ways: (1) curbing post-dispute opportunism; (2) reinforcing substantive 
obligations and optimizing pre-dispute behavior; (3) mitigating risk; and (4) directly reducing the 
costs of adjudication.93  
 Curbing Post-Dispute Opportunism 
Private procedural ordering can help maximize the joint surplus from contracting by 
reducing the expected costs of future disputes.94 Customized procedural rules might achieve this 
gain by limiting or eliminating certain kinds of costly post-dispute behavior, such as escalating the 
costs of discovery or engaging in abusive motion practice or constraining the range of matters over 
which the parties might disagree.95  
With respect to both discovery and abusive motion practice, parties face a collective-action 
problem. In a highly simplified model, each party could choose to be abusive or reasonable with its 
discovery requests or its motion practice. Jointly, the parties would be best served by both acting 
 
92 This is true even though I presume that most such rules are soundly under- pinned by a desire to replicate what parties 
would have chosen for themselves if they had thought about them—they are, in other words, so-called “majoritarian” 
defaults—or they exist in order to protect vulnerable parties or nonparties. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 7, at 91 
(explaining penalty defaults); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE 
L.J. 541, 596 (2003) (“The justification for a default rule is that it does for parties what they would have done for 
themselves had their contracting costs been lower.”).  
93 For purposes of analysis, it is useful to think about these independently, but in reality, they are very closely related. For 
instance, mechanisms that reinforce substantive obligations and thus limit the range of future disputes altogether also 
necessarily function to curb post-dispute opportunism. Curbing post-dispute opportunism functions to reduce overall 
litigation costs. Reducing overall litiga- tion costs mitigates risk. The fundamental point is that these four benefits are 
mutually reinforcing and often positively correlated.  
94 See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.  481, 500–01 (1994) 
(discussing how plaintiffs may use discovery strategically to impose costs on the defendant).  
95 See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in 
Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 514–15 (1994); David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are 
Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985) (providing a formal analysis of the impact of nuisance 
suits); John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery 
Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569, 584–86 (1989).  
76 
 
reasonably. Individually, however, each party would do better if it employed abusive techniques 
while the other was reasonable. Because both parties know this, and thus know that the other is 
likely to defect and employ abusive techniques, they face a Prisoner’s Dilemma. The equilibrium is 
for both parties to defect, acting abusively, even though that leaves them both worse off than if 
they had simply acted reasonably. By binding themselves, in advance of any dispute, to a more 
limited slate of discovery options or more limited motion practice, the parties can reduce the 
opportunity for this Prisoner’s Dilemma to sap individual resources.96  
With respect to the range of matters over which parties might disagree, customized 
procedure might limit the discursive space within which disputes take place, such as by mandating 
the use of joint experts, binding the parties to factual stipulations, or even bifurcating the 
adjudication of liability and damages, allowing parties to gain information about the stakes of a 
dispute before considering the question of liability.97 Each of these mechanisms allows parties to 
short- circuit incentives for one side or the other to engage in jointly wasteful posturing or 
distraction tactics.98 Parties can focus a future fact finder on the issues that are most relevant or 
most likely to be relevant.  
 
96 The same logic could apply to waivers of the right to appeal. Parties might well dispense with a right to appellate 
review, even before a dispute arises, because they believe that the collective value of enhanced accuracy is not worth the 
costs. 
97 See, e.g., Drury Stevenson, Reverse Bifurcation, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 213, 216 (2006) (discussing bifurcation of damages 
and liabilities).  
98 As Gordon Tullock argued years ago, error costs are likely to be higher in more adversarial systems. See Gordon 
Tullock, The Case Against the Common Law, in 9 THE SELECTED WORKS OF GORDON TULLOCK 422 (C.K. Rowley ed. 2005) 
(“[The adversary system] places little or no value on searching for the truth. It is a combat system in which winning is the 
sole objective.”). Professor Tullock’s models analyzed this issue in a binary manner, comparing inquisitorial systems with 
the American adversarial system, but through various issue limiting agreements, parties can reduce the space within 
which the adversarial contest takes place and garner many of the error reduction and perhaps rent-seeking reduction 
benefits that Professor Tullock associated with inquisitorial systems of adjudication. See, e.g., id. at 423 (suggesting that 
there is no reason to believe that self-interested parties competing in the litigation process will bring a social benefit).  
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Other mechanisms are also imaginable,99 but at bottom, procedural contracts can limit or 
raise the expected costs of future disputes by preventing parties from strategically gaming the 
asymmetry between what the parties can observe and what a court can verify.100 By delimiting 
through contract, usually before a dispute arises, the range of strategic procedural choices or the 
space within which a dispute can occur, the parties may be able to enhance the overall value of 
their agreements.  
  Reinforcing Substantive Obligations 
A key ex ante goal of contracting in general is reducing the likelihood of a dispute occurring 
in the first instance. Pre-dispute procedural contracting also provides parties with additional means 
of reinforcing or defining their substantive obligations to and behavior towards one another. The 
divergence between ex ante and ex post optimal litigation decisions has been extensively analyzed 
in the law and economics literature.101 Suffice it to say that procedural rules impact how parties 
evaluate their post-dispute payoffs and thus impact when, or if, parties assert their claims and how 
they make strategic choices during litigation.102  
 
99 For example, fee-shifting agreements and burden-shifting agreements could also raise the price of brining non-
meritorious or speculative claims and thus limit opportunities for extortionate lawsuits, thus actually reducing the overall 
expected costs of dispute resolution.  
100 Information may be said to be observable if the other contracting party can perceive it. Information may be observable 
but not verifiable if the other party can perceive it but cannot, at a reasonable case, prove that information to a court or 
other third party. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 
1642 n.2 (2003); see also Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for 
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1791–95 (1996) (discussing the distinction between observable 
information, which is information that it is both possible and worthwhile for transactors to obtain, and verifiable 
information, which is information that it is worthwhile for transactors to prove to a designated third- party neutral in the 
event of a dispute). Parties often include in their contracts terms that might be cheap to observe but costly to verify. See 
Choi & Triantis, Completing Contracts, supra note 85; Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract 
Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L. J. 848 (2010); see also, e.g., Louis Kaplow, A Model of the 
Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 150, 150–63 (1995); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy 
in the Determination of Liability, 37 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1–15 (1994).  
101 See generally, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 392–401 (2004); Steven Shavell, The 
Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 
(1997).  
102 See, e.g., Kapeliuk, supra note 74, at 1482–83 (noting that just as the prospect of full settlement has an impact on the 




Parties already regularly negotiate over substantive terms that might be difficult to verify in 
subsequent litigation. For example, parties often include terms that condition on vague or difficult 
to prove states like "best efforts." The high costs of proving (or disproving) these states in court 
can function as a disincentive for parties to bring a claim and, at the very least, negatively impact 
the expected value of any claim. Parties might conversely contract for very precise obligations that 
are easily verifiable in court. Such terms can function to dissuade opportunistic shirking or holdups 
during performance of the contract. Alternatively, they can deter parties from filing nuisance claims 
or claims that have only marginal factual support. Such gains can be realized by reducing the 
likelihood of future litigation altogether or by narrowing the range of disputes in any future litigation. 
But pre-dispute procedural contracting offers parties even more options for calibrating their 
substantive obligations to one another and optimizing behavior. Aware of the rules that will govern 
any future disputes at the time of contracting, and knowing that these rules will affect their litigation 
behavior and the outcome of litigation, parties can tailor their respective pre-dispute actions.103 For 
instance, agreeing that expert testimony or an expert opinion will be given by a neutral third party 
rather than through party-appointed advocates could incentivize greater compliance with 
performance standards pre-dispute or, at the least, change the parties' incentives in deciding what 
claims to bring and how much to invest in proving claims once they have been asserted.104 
Agreeing to give a defendant the right to exercise an option making any settlements unenforceable 
could reduce litigation holdup problems, eliminating the incentive for plaintiffs to bring negative 
 
103 Procedural contracting, in other words, can help overcome the “acoustic separation” between the ex ante 
understanding that parties have about how their future disputes will be adjudicated and their ex post understanding. See, 
e.g., Meir Dan- Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 
(1984); see also, generally, Bruce Hay, Procedural Justice: Ex Ante Vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803 (1997).  
104 See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (in a settlement between competitors, 
parties agreed to submit any future dispute involving an advertised claim of data based comparative superiority to a 
neutral third party expert to provide a non-binding opinion); Bone, supra note 10, at 1356 (offering a similar example).  
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expected value lawsuits.105  Or, opting into expanded review of arbitral awards could be seen as a 
means of increasing accuracy (and costs) and thus deterring more questionable claims.106  
Pre-dispute procedural contracting also provides the parties with additional means to signal 
credibly about reliability, propensity for litigation, or other similar matters. For instance, a 
manufacturer could signal confidence in its product by offering to bear the burden of proof in any 
lawsuit for breach.107  Or, to borrow an example from another context, Professors Daphna Kapeliuk 
and Alon Klement suggest that a prospective tenant might signal reliability by agreeing to let the 
landlord quickly obtain provisional relief in the event of a default.108  
These simple examples do not exhaust the numerous possibilities.109  Essentially, 
procedural contracting simply illustrates the "well-appreciated general conclusion that a party may 
benefit by removing future options, since this form of commitment can have advantageous 
incentive effects."110 Parties can use customized procedural devices in combination with carefully 
 
105 See generally, e.g., David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Solution to the Problem of Nuisance Suits: The Option to 
Have the Court Bar Settlement, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 42 (2006).  
106 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1995).  
107 A variety of other customizations to burdens of proof can also be envisaged. A rich literature exists exploring the 
connections between the burden of proof, risk of error, primary behavior, and cost of litigation. See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay & 
Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1997) (analyzing 
burden of proof as an instrument for reducing the cost of litigation); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary 
Effect of Evidence on Primary Behavior, 124 HARV. L. REV. 518 (2010) (explaining people’s primary behavior as motivated 
by the burdens of proof and other evidentiary requirements); Posner, supra note 23, at 1502–07 (using the economic 
analysis of the burden of proof as a tool for reducing the cost of errors and error-avoidance as a total sum); David 
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
849, 861–67 (1984) (carrying out economic analysis of the burden of proof and identifying the limits of the 
“preponderance” standard in tort cases with uncertain causation); Chris W. Sanchirico, Games, Information, and 
Evidence Production: With Application to English Legal History, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 342 (2000) (developing an account 
of proof burdens that uses evidence production as a proxy for determining the harmfulness of primary behavior); Chris 
W. Sanchirico, Relying on the Information of Interested—and Potentially Dishonest—Parties, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 320 
(2001) (analyzing the proof burdens’ effect on primary behavior).  
108 Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contractualizing Procedure 3, 24–25 (Dec. 31, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author) (suggesting that parties can signal private information by agreeing to custom procedural clauses).  
109 See generally, e.g., Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contracting Around Twombly, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2010) 
(discussing possible advantages of modifying the Twombly pleading standard by contract).  
110 Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 104, at 43 (noting that a stock example of this maxim is “that an advancing army 




tailored substantive obligations to incentivize pre-dispute behaviors that increase their joint 
contracting surplus.  
 Mitigating Risk 
Litigation can be risky. Parties often find themselves wedged be- tween climbing costs and 
unpredictable awards. Of course, if the risk premium of pursuing litigation exceeds whatever gains 
a party expects, that party should be willing to fully settle. But, as previously discussed, there are 
many reasons why parties might want to cabin the riskiness of dispute resolution but still continue 
their fight.111 Various forms of procedural contracting can function to hedge against outlier 
outcomes, providing a benefit for both parties.  
For instance, parties might opt to waive a jury. Although use of a judge as a factfinder may 
also reduce the overall costs of adjudication by eliminating the time and effort that goes into 
empaneling a jury and streamlining presentation of evidence, perhaps the most important reason 
parties choose to try a case to a judge is that judges may also be more predictable and 
conservative decision makers.112  
More innovatively, parties might reach some form of award-modification agreement.113 
Most commonly, such modifications take the form of so-called high-low agreements, in which a 
defendant agrees to pay the plaintiff a minimum recovery in return for the plaintiff’s agreement to 
accept a maximum amount regardless of the outcome of the trial.114 Such agreements could be 
simple, with two payoff alternatives, or more complicated, with multiple payoffs contingent on 
 
111 See infra 2.1.1. 
112 A sizeable literature addresses the possibility that juries are less predictable and more extreme in their decisions. See, 
e.g., John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers’ and Executives’ Opinions, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 1, 21, 33–34 (1998) (presenting evidence from interviews and surveys suggesting that juries are less accurate and 
more extreme); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 102–03 (2000) 
(discussing reasons why juries might be more extreme).  
113 See Prescott, supra note 63, at 85–98 (discussing in detail various forms of award modification agreements).  
114 J.J. Prescott et al., Trial and Settlement: A Study of High-Low Agreements, 57 J.L. & ECON. 699, 700 (2014).  
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various outcomes.115 It is even possible to imagine an award modification in which the function is 
continuous and differentiable across outcomes. For example, a defendant might offer to 
compensate a plaintiff with a fixed transfer payment plus 25% of whatever a jury ultimately awards 
in exchange for the plaintiff giving up its opportunity to capture the full amount of a jury award.116  
 Reducing the Direct Costs of Litigation 
Litigation can, of course, be expensive. Avoiding wasteful, offsetting litigation expenditures 
after a dispute has already arisen may be a key goal for parties to procedural contracts. In a sense, 
this goal is an analogue to the first—curbing post-dispute opportunism. In many instances, the 
symmetrical lack of knowledge about the future may make it easier for parties to lash themselves 
to the mast, as it were, and commit before a dispute to avoiding opportunistic exploitation of one 
another. But even after litigation has commenced, the threat of excessive costs may inspire parties 
to come up with ways to reduce their effort and increase efficiency.117  
At the simplest, parties can and do modify procedure by adjusting the timing and other 
pedestrian aspects of litigation. These minor procedure-modification agreements reduce costs by 
allowing the parties to disperse their obligations sensibly, avoiding what can be an expensive 
bunching of deadlines or what can be an inefficient overlap of deadlines. But parties go further than 
this and often simplify or streamline the process by which their dispute will be resolved in additional 
ways, such as waiving rights to present oral testimony and treating a summary judgment 
 
115 See, e.g., Prescott, supra note 63, at 92 (citing Verdict and Settlement Summary, Clemente v. Duran, No. L-003405-
04, 2006 WL 4643243 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Dec. 18, 2006) in which the parties agreed to a three-tiered set of 
payoffs dependent on how much fault a jury attributed to the defendant).  
116 See id. at 94 (offering a similar example).  
117 See Prescott et al., supra note 113, at 728–30 (recognizing further that “parties may not need high-low agreements to 
limit excessive rent seeking when they can do so directly through explicit contractual limitations on [litigation] activities 




proceeding as a trial on the merits, agreeing to a trial on stipulated facts, agreeing to expedited 
trials with a magistrate judge, waiving rights to appeal, and similar agreements.  
These sorts of commitments to procedural modifications, although taking place after a 
dispute has arisen, function in much the same way as pre-contractual modifications do. These 
commitments trade off procedural rights provided by the default rules of civil procedure that one or 
both parties may have for other perceived or real benefits, essentially making those procedural 
rights alienable.  
2.2 The Limited Empirical Evidence 
Several commentators have conducted empirical evaluations of the degree to which parties 
engage in various forms of procedural contracting.118 For the most part, these commentators focus 
their attentions on a limited subset of possible procedural customizations, looking for evidence 
about how frequently parties incorporate specific provisions into their deals. Accordingly, their 
methodologies and conclusions are not precisely the same. Nevertheless, the overall picture 
presented by these empirical studies suggests that even sophisticated commercial parties rarely 
engage in fine-grained procedural customization, at least before a dispute arises.119 To be sure, 
several coarse forms of customization are common—choice of law clauses,120 forum selection 
 
118 See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 
OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 433, 449–67 (2010) (analyzing material contracts filed with the SEC); Christopher R. Drahozal & 
Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure: Carve-Outs from Arbitration Clauses, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1945, 1972 (2014) 
(compiling a sample of a variety of contracts filed with the SEC); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices 
of Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1983–94 (2006) 
(analyzing merger agreements filed with the SEC); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: 
An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335 
(2007) (analyzing material contracts filed with the SEC); Hoffman, supra note 10, at 403–16 (studying CEP employment 
contracts); Erin O’Hara O’Connor et al., Customizing Employment Arbitration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 133, 136–37 (2012) 
(same); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Customized Procedure in Theory and Reality, 72 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1865 (2015) 
(collecting contracts that were exhibits to SEC filings).  
119 See, e.g., Weidemaier, supra note 117, at 1889.  
120 See, e.g., Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 117, at 1987 tbl.2 (all merger agreements in sample designate governing 
law); see also Hoffman, supra note 10, at 410 (finding over 1,000 contracts each year in text-based search of SEC 
material contracts).  
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clauses,121 clauses choosing arbitration,122 clauses choosing arbitration but providing some sort of 
“carve-outs” that allow parties to go court in some subset of disputes,123 jury trial waivers,124 and 
sometimes attorney fee provisions.125 But “[w]hat parties almost never do is write contracts that 
dictate procedure at the granular level of pre-trial and trial practice.”126 The majority of contracts, it 
seems, do not address matters of pleading, discovery, the rules of evidence, burdens of proof, or 
other more innovative forms of procedural customization.  
For a variety of reasons, this empirical evidence may be somewhat suspect. As Christopher 
Drahozal and Erin O’Hara O’Connor have argued, customization commonly occurs through carve-
outs from arbitration protocols.127 These carve-outs are hard to detect in standard searches and 
the databases of commercial contracts containing arbitration carve-outs is limited. Moreover, with 
the exception of the comprehensive survey conducted by Professor Weidemaier, who collected a 
 
121 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of 
Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1504 tbl.11 (2009) (finding that 38.9% 
of a sample of commercial contracts included choice of forum clause); Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 117, at 1987 
(finding that 52.5% of a sample of merger agreements included choice of forum clause); see also Hoffman, supra note 
10, at 407–08 (concluding based on text search of SEC filings that “a plurality of contracts choose forum”). 
122 See, e.g., Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, supra note 117, at 1973 (finding that 47.5% of a sample of technology 
contracts included an arbitration clause, again with substantial variation across contract type); O’Hara O’Connor et al., 
supra note 117, at 161 tbl.1 (2012) (finding that 51.5% of a sample of CEO employment contracts required arbitration of 
some or all disputes).  
123 For example, O’Hara O’Connor et al. found such carve-outs in nearly half of a sample of CEO employment contracts. 
O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 117, at 167–68. Likewise, Drahozal and O’Hara O’Connor found routine use of 
carve-outs in arbitration clauses in samples of joint venture, technology, and franchise agreements. Drahozal & O’Hara 
O’Connor, supra note 117, at 21–31.  
124 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Do Juries Add Value?: Evidence from an Empirical Study of Jury Trial Waiver 
Clauses in Large Corporate Contracts (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06- 
044, 2006), http:// ssrn.com/abstract=946465 [https://perma.unl.edu/NWS7- Z3YM] (finding about 20% of 2,800 
commercial contracts contained jury trial waivers, although also finding substantial variance across contract type, ranging 
from 1.9% to 64.5%).  
125 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical 
Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 350–52 (2013) (finding that 37.1% of the contracts in their 
sample adopted the American rule, while 36.4% adopted the English rule).  
126 Weidemaier, supra note 117, at 1938.  
127 Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, supra note 117, at 1949–50.  
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dataset of over 400 contracts and hand coded them, most of the extant studies rely on text 
searches that may well overlook more nuanced customized terms.128  
Nevertheless, while the empirical evidence we have may not be perfect, it seems to point in 
the same direction—parties do not seem to engage in robust customization of procedure. 
Considering the impressive value-maximizing opportunities presented by procedural customization, 
as discussed in Part II, this empirical evidence is puzzling to say the least. 
2.3 The Doctrinally Permissible Options for Calibrating Procedure Through 
Contract 
Any customer can have a car painted any colour that he wants so long as it is black.129 
 
The question is why parties seem not to engage in procedural customization. One 
important part of the answer is that only parties who have a primary contractual relationship are 
likely to be able to bargain for customized procedures as an ancillary part of their agreement. 
Parties are unlikely to bargain ex ante for procedural contracts in isolation. If this intuition is correct, 
then only a limited subset of all disputes in courts would even have the potential of implicating 
customized procedures.130  
As important as this answer is, however, it does not account for the dearth of procedural 
innovation and fine-tuning within the remaining set of disputes where customization could occur. It 
 
128 See Weidemaier, supra note 117, at 1871.  
129 Moffitt, supra note 63, at 462 (2007) (arguing that “[o]ur judiciary has unfortunately embraced Henry Ford’s sense of 
consumer choice” with respect to litigation procedural rules).  
130 See, e.g., U.S. District Courts—Judicial Business 2014, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2014/us-district-courts.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/DA34-254G] 
(showing that less than 10% of civil cases filed in federal court over the past five years are categorized as contract 
disputes); Examining the Work of State Courts: An Analysis of 2010 State Court Caseloads, CT. STATISTICS PROJECT 
(Dec. 2012) http://www.courtstatistics.org/ other-pages/~/media/microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/csp_dec.ashx 
[https:// perma.unl.edu/LYW4-F6VS] (showing that in seventeen general jurisdiction courts approximately 61% of civil 
cases filed in 2010 were contract disputes).  
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is possible, of course, that parties are stuck using suboptimal defaults for any number of reasons. 
But the first, and perhaps most fundamental as many commentators suggest, is that the practice 
of procedural customization might constitute a radical change to current doctrinal norms.131  
The costs of innovating in the face of those norms or trying to change those norms might 
simply be too steep for any single party to bear, especially given worries about freeriding.132  
Historically, in fact, courts were skeptical of private procedural ordering, preferring to limit parties to 
the off-the-rack set of rules supplied by the sovereign.133 Party-driven rulemaking was seen as a 
dangerous threat the legitimate public function of courts.134 This wary view of nonjudicial, nonpublic 
dispute resolution is perhaps most evident in the way that courts treated arbitration during the 
nineteenth and much of the early twentieth centuries. Essentially, courts refused to enforce 
nonjudicial modes of dispute resolution.135 Using the same logic, they also effectively prevented 
 
131 See generally, e.g., Dodson, supra note 11. Importantly, in this Article, I do not address a related and important 
question: when, if ever, is the practice of procedural customization normatively desirable or permissible. I take up this 
question in a forthcoming article, H. Allen Blair, The Line Between Mockery and Efficiency: The Normative Implications of 
Private Process. See Blair, Normative Implications, supra note 13. 
132 See supra note 11. Essentially, innovators have a hard time excluding others from taking advantage of their work. If 
the innovation is valuable, others can copy it easily. By itself, this problem might dissuade some potential innovators, who 
have to spend time and money designing the innovation. But, the free rider problem is exacerbated by the fact that 
innovators also disproportionately bear the risks that go along with adopting customizations.  
133 See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. 
L. REV. 577, 599–600 (1997) (noting that judges were either wary of quality of justice available in arbitration or—because 
they were paid on per case basis—protective of their own pocketbooks).  
134 Several scholars have suggested that at least some of this hostility towards private procedural ordering might have 
been less high-minded. Professor Alan Scott Rau, for instance, has suggested that courts’ traditional hostility to 
arbitration may have “originated in considerations of competition for business, at a time when judges’ salaries still 
depended on fees paid by litigants.” ALAN SCOTT RAU, ARBITRATION 57 (2d ed. 2002); see also JULIUS HENRY COHEN, 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 83 (1918) (recognizing the judicial competition with private tribunals and the fear 
that arbitration threatened a significant source of judicial business, as well as judicial jobs linked to the courts’ caseloads).  
135 The history of arbitration itself has been difficult to completely uncover. See, e.g., Douglas Yarn, A Cautionary Tale of 
Isomorphism Through Institutionalism, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 929, 937 (2004) (“It is a matter that seems to fall in the gap 
between social and legal historians.”). The fundamental point, however, is that courts were highly skeptical of non-judicial 
forms of dispute resolution. 
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private parties from altering or opting out of almost all procedural rules in public judicial 
proceedings.136  
Eventually, however, beginning with a grudging acceptance of arbitration and the passage 
of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), but really gaining momentum under Chief Justices Warren and 
Burger, judicial tides began to turn. Through an expanding array of private procedural ordering 
options, courts have steadily allowed parties more and more freedom to tailor process and 
procedure in order to increase certainty while efficiently adjusting accuracy to fit with their ex ante 
preferences.137  
The first two subsections below briefly trace the evolution of the law governing private 
procedural ordering, focusing primarily on the U.S. Supreme Court. The third subsection looks at 
trends in lower courts and state courts. In total, these sections demonstrate that good reason 
exists to believe that courts would enforce a wide range of procedural contracts. Although some 
uncertainty persists about the contractibility of specific procedural rules, a clear trend favoring 
parties’ ability to structure their own procedural paths exists.  
 Procedure as Public Law: Historic Skepticism of Private Procedural Ordering 
Until the early twentieth century, courts protected their turf. They tended to see efforts by 
parties to provide for most non-court dispute resolution, as well as other forms of private 
procedural ordering, as infringements on the proper public role of the court system.138 As one 
 
136 But see Michael H. LeRoy, Crowning the New King: The Statutory Arbitrator and the Demise of Judicial Review, 2009 
J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 20 (surveying treatises and concluding that “English and American colonial courts were neither hostile 
nor blindly deferential to arbitration”).  
137 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Accuracy in Adjudication, supra note 8, at 310 (arguing that heightened accuracy in 
adjudication can only be obtained at higher costs so an efficient balance has to be struck on a case-by-case basis).  
138 See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 TUL L. REV. 
1945, 1947 (1996) (recognizing that prior to the early twentieth century, the traditional view was that if courts were to 
function as the national source of justice, there was no room for “makeshift, party-confected modes of dispute 
resolution”); Reuben, supra note 132, at 599–600 (noting that judges were either wary of quality of justice available in 
arbitration or— because they were paid on per case basis—protective of their own pocketbooks). But see LeRoy, supra 
note 135, at 20 (surveying treatises and concluding that “English and American colonial courts were neither hostile nor 
blindly deferential to arbitration”).  
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commentator has observed, there existed “a taboo against party autonomy in procedural 
matters.”139 Courts primarily relied on two interlacing doctrines—the revocability and ouster 
doctrines—to prevent procedural contracting. Perhaps not surprisingly, both doctrines arose out of 
a judicial skepticism of arbitration, though at least the ouster doctrine expanded over time to bar 
other forms of private procedural ordering as well.  
The revocability doctrine sprung into existence, near full gown, from dicta in Lord Edward 
Coke’s 1609 opinion in Vynior’s Case.140 There, the parties had entered into a contract for repair 
work on several buildings.141 They agreed to submit any disputes about the work to arbitration, 
and, as was customary during the period, a performance bond secured this agreement.142 The 
plaintiff brought a court action, seeking to recover on the bond as well as to recover damages. The 
plaintiff claimed that the defendant had failed to comply with the arbitration agreement.143 Lord 
Coke ruled that when there was a suit on a bond securing a submission to arbitration, the 
submission itself was revocable although the price of revoking was forfeiture of the bond:  
[a]lthough . . . the defendant, was bound in a bond to stand to, abide, observe, 
etc., the rule, etc., of arbitration, etc., yet he might countermand it, for one cannot 
by his act make such authority, power, or warrant not countermandable which is by 
the law or of its own nature countermandable.144  
 
 
139 Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal 
Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 294 (1988).  
140 Vynior’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 595, 599–600 (K.B. 1609).  
141 See id. 
142 See id. The common law of contract was just beginning to form at the time, so bonds often secured contractual 
promises. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul Y. Castle, The Revocability of Contract Provisions Controlling Resolution 
of Future Disputes Between the Parties, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 207, 208 (2004) (noting that “the common law of 
contracts was in its infancy” at the time that Vynior’s Case was decided).  
143 See id. 
144 Vynior’s Case, (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 595, 601–02 (K.B.) (emphasis added).  
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Whatever Lord Coke’s original intent,145 Vynoir’s became a leading case “establishing the 
revocability doctrine.”146 Pursuant to this doctrine, a party to an arbitration agreement could revoke 
an arbitrator’s authority at any time before the arbitrator rendered an award, even if the parties had 
agreed the delegation was irrevocable.147 Although U.S. courts would usually enforce arbitration 
awards once issued,148 following the practice of their English counterparts, they would not 
generally enforce executory contracts to arbitrate.149 Practically, this meant that a party to an 
arbitration agreement faced continual risk that her counterparty would renege on his promise and 
exercise his right to demand that a court hear any disputes.  
Although the revocability doctrine alone did not necessarily create an insuperable barrier to 
arbitration or other forms of procedural contracting, it mutated over time into the so-called ouster 
doctrine. The mutation can be traced to an eighteenth century English decision, Kill v. Hollister.150 
 
145 Some commentators have suggested that Lord Coke was effectively relying on agency principles to find that the 
principle could revoke the agent’s authority at any time. See, e.g., Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration 
Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 598–99 (1928). Professors Paul Carrington and Paul Castle have compellingly, pointed out, 
however, that the concept of agency had not developed fully when Vynoir’s Case was decided. See Carrington & Castle, 
supra note 141, at 210. They contend, instead, that Lord Coke was likely motivated by a desire to “insure the disinterest 
of arbitrators” at a time when there were no real substantive constraints on arbitrator authority. Id.  
146 Harry Baum & Leon Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts, 8 
N.Y.U. L.Q. 238, 240 (1930); see also, e.g., Sayre, supra note 144, at 602 (stating that Vynior’s Case has “generally 
been regarded as the original and controlling authority for revocability”).  
147 See, e.g., Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (citing Vynior’s Case as authority for 
the proposition that arbitration submissions are revocable regardless of a stipulation to the contrary because one “cannot 
alter the judgment of law, to make that irrevocable, which is of its own nature revocable”).  
148 See, e.g., Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349 (1854).  
149 See, e.g., Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120–21 (1924) (“The federal courts—like those of the states 
and of England—have, both in equity and at law, denied in large measure, the aid of their processes to those seeking to 
enforce [sic] executory agreement to arbitrate disputes.”); Jeffery W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of 
Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 259, 272 (1990). This rule was incorporated in the First Restatement of 
Contracts as well. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 550 cmt. A (1932) (“A bargain to arbitrate, though it is not illegal, 
is practically unenforceable. . . .”). Of course, even at the height of its power, the revocability doctrine had exceptions. 
See, e.g., Red Cross Line, 264 U.S. at 122–25 (1924) (finding that New York courts could equitably enforce arbitration 
agreements in their own courts under New York’s arbitration statute). 
150 Kill v. Hollister, (1746) 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B.). Notably, some commentators have suggested that the inverse 
historical evolution occurred: the ouster doctrine preceded the revocability doctrine. See, e.g., Julius Henry Cohen & 
Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 283 (1926) (explaining revocability as “rooted 
originally in the jealousy of courts for their jurisdiction”). The order of development is not particularly significant for 
purposes of my argument.  
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There, while interpreting the revocability doctrine, the court allowed a judicial action over an 
insurance policy to proceed despite an arbitration clause on the grounds that “the agreement of 
the parties cannot oust this court [of jurisdiction].”151 The revocability doctrine, then, allowed courts 
to ignore the parties’ delegation of authority to an arbitrator. As with the dicta giving rise to the 
revocability doctrine itself, no authority was given for this “ouster” rule.152 Nevertheless, by 1856, 
the rule had become justified as legitimate “judicial jealousy” over jurisdiction, and this explanation 
for it stuck.153  
The ouster doctrine began as anti-arbitration rule, but it quickly expanded into a more 
general principle precluding courts from enforcing various contractual provisions limiting redress in 
courts. In Home Insurance Co. v. Morse, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an 
agreement by which an insurance company waived its right to remove state cases to federal courts 
was not enforceable.154 The Court analogized the matter to a jury trial waiver and an arbitration 
agreement, concluding that  
[a] man may not barter away his life or his freedom, [sic] or his substantial rights . . . 
. He cannot . . . bind himself in advance by an agreement, which may be specifically 
enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all times and on all occasions, whenever the 
case may be presented.155  
 
In the Court’s view, privately negotiated contract provisions could not trump the role of the public 
adjudicatory system. If such contract pro- visions were enforced, the “regular administration of 
justice might be greatly impeded . . . .”156 Soon, courts went on to find that antisuit covenants, pre-
 
151 Id. 
152 See id. 
153 See Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) (citing Scott v. Avery, (1856) 10 Eng. Rep. 1121 (H.L.) 
as one of “numerous cases” showing that parties cannot by contract oust a court of jurisdiction); Scott, 10 Eng. Rep. 
1121 (speculating that judicial hostility to arbitration “probably originated in the contests of the different courts in ancient 
times for extent of jurisdiction, all of them being opposed to anything that would deprive one of them of jurisdiction”).  
154 Morse, 87 U.S. at 451–52.  
155 Id. at 451.  
156 Id. at 451–52.  
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dispute waivers of liability, and forum selection clauses were similarly barred by the ouster 
doctrine.157 Only courts, the prevailing opinion went, possessed the ability to “protect rights and to 
redress wrongs” because private tribunals or other private customizations of procedure were prone 
to “become . . . instrument[s] of injustice, or to deprive parties of rights which they are otherwise 
fairly entitled to have protected.”158  
 Mere Contract Law No More: Autonomy and Private Procedural Ordering 
By the late eighteenth century, however, although both the revocability and ouster 
doctrines were still in use in American courts, notions of party autonomy were starting to play a 
greater role in not only the public conscience but also in the judicial mind.159 At the height of the 
revocability and ouster doctrines, contract law was in its infancy, and most contracts were discrete 
and simple.160 That began to change with rapid economic transformations in the American 
 
157 See, e.g., Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass’n v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 82 F. 508, 510 (6th Cir. 1897) (finding that a 
contract stipulating that suits could only be brought in federal court was void because it “intended to oust the jurisdiction 
of all state courts”); Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174, 184 (1856) (refusing to enforce a forum 
selection provision because forum choice was fixed by law “upon considerations of general convenience and 
expediency”); Meacham v. Jamestown Franklin & Clearfield R.R. Co., 105 N.E. 653, 656 (1914) (Cardozo, J., concurring) 
(finding that an arbitration contract is an invalid at- tempt to oust the jurisdiction of the courts because its purpose is the 
same as agreements requiring litigants to submit their case to a foreign court, but noting that there may be exceptional 
circumstances warranting enforcement of such forum selection clauses); Knorr v. Bates, 35 N.Y.S. 1060, 1062 (N.Y. 
Gen. Term. 1895) (holding that a contractual limitation on the right to sue underwriters on an insurance policy was 
unenforceable because “a provision in a contract that the party breaking it shall not be answerable in an action is a 
stipulation for ousting the courts of jurisdiction, and, as such, is void, upon grounds of public policy”).  
158 Tobey v. Cty. of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320–21 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845). Thus, it is fair to say that the ouster doctrine 
was justified both based on concerns over individual rights, such as those set out in Morse, 87 U.S. at 451–52 and 
concerns about extra-individual matters such as “administrative efficiency, separation of powers, and public faith in the 
legitimacy of the judiciary.” David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection 
Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973, 995 (2008) (citing and discussing Nute, 72 Mass. 174, as articulating 
this extrajudicial concern).  
159 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 630 (1995) (“Contract 
has become the dominant doctrinal current in modern American law.”); Walter F. Pratt, Jr., American Contract Law at the 
Turn of the Century, 39 S.C. L. REV. 415, 415 (1988) (“During the past century, contract law, along with most of 
American society, has undergone a ‘major transformation.’”).  
160 In his article on the history of commercial law in the United States, Professor Walter F. Pratt, Jr. explains that: 
Contracting, like conversation, had in earlier times been rooted in the past. People who knew one 
another and who knew the local market, insulated as it was from dramatic shifts in the economy, 
faced little likelihood of changes in circumstances that would require elaborate agreements or provoke 
complex disputes. Railroads and cities, however, seemed to disrupt that past by bringing economic 
uncertainty into the local markets. Parties thus faced the tiring prospect of writing detail upon detail 
into each agreement if they were to account for every potential event.  
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economy. As American courts routinely decided increasingly complex contract disputes based on 
the intentions of the parties,161 the same principles of autonomy began gaining traction in the 
context of private procedural ordering.162 G. Richard Shell identified the trend towards acceptance 
of procedural contracts more than twenty years ago in his study of contracts and the Supreme 
Court, where he documented the steady demise of the public policy exception to contract 
enforcement and, in particular, of an exception to contractual autonomy that draws from the 
special attributes of judicial process.163  
Certainly arbitration played a key role in unlocking the potential of private procedural 
ordering.164 Businesses saw the potential efficiency gains from arbitration, but they were frustrated 
with court refusal to enforce arbitration agreements.165 Calls for the legal system to value freedom 
of contract fueled much of the reform effort. As Julius Henry Cohen, the chief draftsman of the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), explained, “everybody today feels very strongly that the right of 
 
 
Pratt, supra note 158, at 428–29; see also Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes 
on the Development of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 489 (1995) (explaining that the doctrine 
of revocability set forth by Lord Coke in Vynior’s Case occurred before the com- mon law of contracts was fully formed).  
161 Instead of being localized and discrete as they had been prior to the turn of the century, commercial transactions 
tended to be more complex and regional as well as national. See Allen Blair, “You Don’t Have to be Ludwig 
Wittgenstein”: How Llewellyn’s Concept of Agreement Should Change the Law of Open-Quantity Con- tracts, 37 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 67, 77–78 (2006).  
162 But see Marcus, supra note 157, at 1014 (arguing that, although “[i]ncreased appreciation for freedom of contract and 
individual autonomy and consent may have influenced the development of [forum selection clauses,] . . . these 
considerations played a small part at best, especially when compared to the degree to which extraindividual 
considerations shaped the design of clause enforcement doctrine”).  
163 G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 431, 452–56 (1993) (detailing the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of judicial access clauses and documenting judicial acceptance of ex ante forum selection clauses).  
164 See, e.g., William C. Jones, An Inquiry Into the History of the Adjudication of Mercantile Disputes in Great Britain and 
the United States, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 461–62 (1958) (“Statistics are not available and it is doubtful that they ever will 
be, but it is probable that in the nineteenth century arbitration in one form or another became the most important form of 
mercantile dispute settlement . . . in the United States . . . although courts continued, of course, to be used.”); Stempel, 
supra note 148, at 275 (“Despite an essentially unchanging judicial hostility toward arbitration, it grew in popularity as the 
commercial affairs of the United States became increasingly far flung and complex.”).  
165 See, e.g., Atl. Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 F. 319, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (recognizing the general displeasure in the 
business community with courts’ unwilling- ness to enforce arbitration agreements in the early twentieth century).  
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freedom of contract which the Constitution guarantees to men, includes the right to dispose of any 
controversy which may arise out of the contract in their own fashion.”166  
Responding to the interests of the business community, in 1920, New York broke from 
traditional English arbitration law by enacting a statute that enforced pre-dispute agreements to 
arbitrate, ended the practice of courts hearing questions of law during the course of arbitration, 
and provided for only limited judicial review of the final award.167 In 1925, the U.S. Congress 
followed New York’s lead by enacting the United States Arbitration Act, later renamed the Federal 
Arbitration Act.  
The Supreme Court would eventually point out that the FAA was a “response to the refusal 
of courts to enforce commercial arbitration agreements.”168 But the Act did far more. It also 
represented a more general step towards recognizing the value of autonomy in procedural 
choices. A House Report on the bill introducing the FAA explained its genesis in concerns about 
freedom of contract:  
Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and the effect of the bill is 
simply to make the contracting party live up to his agreement. . . . An arbitration 
agreement is placed upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs. . . 
. This bill declares simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, 
and provides a procedure in the Federal courts for their enforcement.169  
 
 
166 Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings Before the Sub-comms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary 
on S. 1005 and H.R. 646, 68th Cong. 14 (1924) (statement of Julius Henry Cohen).  
167 Michael A. Scodro, Arbitrating Novel Legal Questions: A Recommendation for Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1927, 1941 
(1996).  
168 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 125 (2001); Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1984) (quoting 
H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924) (“[T]he need for the law arises from . . . the jealousy of the English courts for their 
own jurisdiction. . . . This jealousy survived for so lon[g] a period that the principle became firmly embedded in the English 
common law and was adopted with it by the American courts.”). The statute’s purpose was to ensure that “written 
provisions or agreements for arbitration of disputes arising out of contracts, maritime transactions, or commerce among 
the States or Territories or with foreign nations” would be “valid and enforceable.” United States Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 
883 (1925). For excellent accounts of the FAA’s legislative history, see James E. Berger & Charlene Sun, The Evolution of 
Judicial Review Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 745 (2009); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Judicial 
Approbation in Building the Civilization of Arbitration, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1343, 1348 (2009) (providing a brief history of 
the passage of the FAA).  
169 H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1–2.  
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Numerous commentators as well as Supreme Court decisions have confirmed the central 
importance of freedom of contract to the law of arbitration.170  
That progression continued and, with more and more norms of due process becoming 
waivable rights, the Warren and Burger Courts embraced an expanding range of procedural private 
ordering options.171 Arguably, the current era customizable procedure was ushered by the 
Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.172 There, the Court 
addressed enforcement of a forum selection clause in the context of an international transaction, 
but the key rationales of the Court are hardly limited to that context.173  
The Bremen revolutionized private procedural ordering by doing three things. First, it boldly 
and decisively discarded the ouster doctrine, relegating it to mere anachronism: “[the ouster 
doctrine] is hardly more than a vestigial legal fiction.”174 Notably, this sweeping language by the 
Court, unconstrained in any way, makes it evident that, whatever doctrinal logic animated the 
ouster doctrine, that logic has outlived its usefulness, even outside of forum selection clauses. 
More significantly, and consistent with this expansive revolution in private process, the case honed 
in on party autonomy, making the touchstone for enforcement of forum selection clauses the 
 
170 THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 49 (5th ed. 2014) (noting that freedom of contract is the 
“primary legal concept” in the law of arbitration); see also, e.g., ALAN REDFREN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 265 (4th ed. 2004) (citing UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Art. 19(1)) (“Party autonomy is the guiding 
principle” in arbitration); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 472 (1989) 
(noting that arbitration “is a matter of contract”); Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 299 (2010) 
(same); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 (2010) (“[A]rbitration ‘is a matter of consent, not 
coercion.’” (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479)) 
171 Dodge, supra note 3, at 734–35 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378–79 (1971), Nat’l Equip. Rental v. 
Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315–16 (1964), Aly- eska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975), 
and D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187–88 (1972)).  
172 407 U.S. 1, 2 (1972).  
173 See, e.g., David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of Private Contract 
and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1095 (2002) (describing the case as “a 
sea-change in the way private agreement is viewed in relation to procedure”); William J. Woodward, Jr., Finding the 
Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum and Arbitration, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 15 (2006) (observing that the law “changed 
dramatically” in The Bremen); Linda S. Mullenix, supra note 138, at 306–07 (“The current doctrine of consensual 
adjudicatory procedure . . . is based on Supreme Court pronouncements in The Bremen.”).  
174 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).  
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quality of the bargaining process.175 Finally, “[e]schew[ing] a provincial solicitude for the jurisdiction 
of domestic forums,” the Court linked party autonomy with greater predictability and stability in 
commercial relationships.176 In other words, the Court reconceptualized procedural rights, ceasing 
to look at them from a vertical, individual-government perspective and focusing, instead, on seeing 
them from a horizontal, individual-individual perspective and thus as alienable.177 Parties should be 
free, so long as they are bargaining at arms-length, to trade off procedural rights for other benefits.  
Importantly, not only did The Bremen radically alter the law of more than just forum 
selection clauses in spirit but it also did so in practice. At least tacitly, it endorsed party choice over 
other procedures, since a forum court’s procedural rules will apply.178 By allowing parties to 
contract for the forum in which their future disputes will be heard, the Court was in fact allowing 
parties to shop for bundles of procedural rules that they might prefer.  
Following The Bremen, the Court has not looked back during its march to internalize 
contract norms and abandon its historic skepticism over the devolution of judicial authority.179 
Instead, the Court has taken multiple opportunities to reinforce the instrumental character of 
procedure and its malleability at the hands of parties.180 For instance, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
 
175 See id. at 15 (finding that forum selection clauses should be enforced unless the resisting party can “clearly show that 
enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid”); see also, e.g., Noyes, supra note 5, at 
597 (describing the Court as elevating the concept of freedom of contract, thereby al- lowing parties to bargain about 
how a dispute will be decided); Linda S. Mullenix et al., Case One: Choice of Forum Clauses, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 517, 
541 (1995) (arguing that the Court in The Bremen adopted a “strongly stated federal policy favoring enforceability, 
subject to usual contract principles”); KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE: TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND VENUE 85 n.60 
(1999) (stating that The Bremen “shift[ed] from a jurisdictional to a contractual paradigm”).  
176 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 630 (1985) (construing The Bremen).  
177 See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 931 n.2 
(1985) (listing a number of works that consider the traditional view of property rights and the law).  
178 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 & cmt. a (2013).  
179 See Resnik, supra note 3, at 598–99 (describing how changes in adjudicatory practice are shifting the focus of civil 
procedure from “due process procedure” to “contract procedure”).  
180 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347–49 (1976) (using a balancing approach to resolve the question of 




Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.—one of a number of cases putting the nail in the coffin of subject 
matter inarbitrability—the Court made it clear that it would allow parties to trade off judicial 
procedures for efficiency:  
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive 
rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather 
than a judicial, forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the 
courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.181  
 
Although the Court in Mitsubishi framed up the dispute as one involving unique “international” 
considerations, “[w]ithin a few years, the international aura of the reasoning dissipated and 
eventually vanished.”182 Soon, the arbitrability of statutory disputes was no longer predicated on 
the international character of the transaction, and the Court began recognizing that virtually any 
sort of civil dispute could be arbitrated.183  
Using this same instrumental logic, the Court later broke down one of the few remaining 
barriers inhibiting the continued expansion of private procedural ordering by abandoning any effort 
to distinguish between commercial and consumer contracts in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute.184 
There, extending its pro-autonomy decision in The Bremen, the Court brushed past a common law 
rule that forum selection clauses in “form contracts” were presumptively unenforceable and 
reasoned that such clauses should, instead, be enforced because consumers “benefit in the form 
 
181 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985); see also, e.g., Metro E. Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 294 
F.3d 924, 928–29 (7th Cir. 2002) (“One aspect of personal liberty is the entitlement to exchange statutory rights for 
something valued more highly.”).  
182 THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, TOWARD A NEW FEDERAL LAW ON ARBITRATION 39 (2014); see also, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. 
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 624 (1986) (“We granted certiorari primarily to consider whether an 
American court should enforce an agreement to resolve antitrust claims by arbitration when that agreement arises from 
an international transaction.”).  
183 See CARBONNEAU, supra note 181, at 39–41. Professor J. Maria Glover has argued for a far more restrictive reading of 
Mitsubishi, contending that the case sought to foster “claim-facilitative procedures, both as a descriptive matter and a 
normative one.” J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3063–64 
(2015). Professor Glover’s argument, while innovative, does press against the grain of the decision as a whole. See 
generally Steven W. Feldman, Italian Colors and Freedom of Contract Under the Federal Arbitration Act: Has the 
Supreme Court Enabled Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law?, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 109 (offering 
a compelling rebuttal to Professor Glover’s reading of Mitsubishi).  
184 499 U.S. 585, 587–88 (1991).  
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of reduced [prices] reflecting the savings that the [firm] enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be 
sued.”185  
Even the two Supreme Court cases in the past thirty years arguably suggesting some 
limitation to party autonomy over procedural choices—Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel and 
Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court—do more to vindicate this freedom than 
restrict it.  
Hall Street Associates v. Mattel has been heralded by some as the sole decision to 
invalidate a procedural contract. But a careful read of the case shows that, to the contrary, it 
actually advances the logic of party autonomy and freedom to tailor procedure.186 In Hall Street, the 
Court was faced with a contractual provision expanding the scope of judicial review of arbitral 
awards.187 While the Court did invalidate this provision, holding that the grounds for review of 
arbitral awards under the FAA were complete and exclusive,188 the Court did not even hint that its 
rejection of the customized procedure sprung from any concerns over party control of judicial 
processes.189 Instead, the Court merely funneled innovation with respect to expanded judicial 
review of arbitral awards back to States: “[t]he FAA is not the only way into court for parties 
 
185 Id. at 594 (“[I]t stands to reason that passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum clause like that at issue in 
this case benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which 
it may be sued.”).  
186 Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1408 (2008); see Dodge, supra note 3, at 738 (describing Hall Street 
Associates v. Mattel, Inc. as “[t]he Court’s sole invalidation of a procedural term”).  
187 At issue in the case was a contract provision providing that:  
[t]he United States District Court for the District of Oregon may enter judgment upon any 
award, either by confirming the award or by vacating, modifying or correcting the award. 
The Court shall vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator’s findings of 
facts are not supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator’s conclusions of 
law are erroneous.  
 
Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1401–02.  
188 Id. at 1408.  
189 It is worth noting that several Circuits had relied on the dubious and outmoded notion that contracting for expanded 
judicial review constituted an impermissible attempt to control federal court jurisdiction. 
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wanting review of arbitration awards: they may contemplate enforcement under state statutory or 
common law, for example, where judicial review of different scope is arguable.”190 The Court was 
not rejecting private procedural ordering at all.191 
Atlantic Marine appears at first glance to support party autonomy, as the Court enforced a 
restrictive forum selection clause in the parties’ contract.192 Some commentators have suggested, 
however, that the manner in which the Court enforced the clause indicates a skepticism about 
party autonomy in procedural matters.193 Essentially, the argument is that, although the Court 
enforced the clause, it did so on restrictive grounds. Many lower courts had taken to enforcing 
restrictive forum selection clauses through motions to dismiss for improper venue or through 
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.194 The Supreme Court in Atlantic Marine rejected this 
approach, and instead concluded that the proper enforcement mechanism was a motion to 
transfer venue.195 Still, the fundamental outcome of the case favored party choice and there is little 
reason, as even commentators sympathetic to a restrictive reading of Atlantic Marine concede, to 
believe that the Court intended the decision to signal any sort of concern about party autonomy 
over procedural matters.196  
 
190 Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1406.  
191 Professor Jamie Dodge, in her seminal article on private procedural ordering makes this point as well. In her view,  
although the Court narrowly held in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc. that the Federal Arbitration 
Act specifically preempted the modification of the standard of review in the courts, the Court expressly 
noted that under state law or common law parties may be able to modify the standard of judicial 
review.  
 
Dodge, supra note 3, at 738. This express notation suggests, in her view, that the Court does not fundamentally think 
parties should be barred from contracting for expanded judicial review or similar procedural modifications. See id.  
192 Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013).  
193 See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Atlantic Marine and the Future of Party Preference, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 675, 677 (2015) (“The 
Court’s decision implicitly, though inconsistently, endorses the principle of party subordinance.”).  
194 5B WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 62, § 1352 nn.4–5 (citing cases).  
195 Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 134 S. Ct. at 579.  
196 See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 192, at 684, 691 (describing the case as a “small-triumph” for the principle of party 
subordinance and recognizing that the Court was likely “focused on the particular statutory regime of venue” rather than 
on party autonomy in procedural matters).  
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In short, since The Bremen, virtually every word from the Supreme Court suggests that 
parties have virtually unfettered ability to customize procedure.197 Although the Supreme Court has 
not specifically endorsed many potential forms of private procedural ordering, with no notable 
exceptions the Court’s precedent “treats procedural contracts as a method for generating 
procedural efficiencies and increased certainty of process, resulting in broad enforcement of 
procedural terms.”198 The trend of precedent, in short, seems unequivocally to favor party 
autonomy and private procedural ordering. 
 State Courts, Lower Federal Courts, and Procedural Autonomy 
State courts and lower federal courts also seem to agree that parties are free within broad 
limits to agree on simplified procedures for the decision of their case.199 In a variety of instances, 
parties do, in fact, take advantage of this ability, including when contracting for forum,200 choice of 
law,201 appointment of service agents or waiver of notice,202 and limitation periods.203 Additionally, 
parties regularly waive the right to notice and a hearing by using cognovits notes,204 and waive the 
 
197 Mullenix, supra note 138, at 302–03.  
198 Dodge, supra note 3, at 739. In fact, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 
585 (1991), the Court has not found that “a procedural contract violates fundamental fairness.” Dodge, supra note 3, at 
725, 736.  
199 See, e.g., DDI Seamless Cylinder Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher Corp., 14 F.3d 1163, 1166 (7th Cir. 1994).  
200 See, e.g., Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 117, at 1987 tbl.2 (finding that about 53% of a sample of mergers clauses 
included forum selection provisions); Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake 
in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 118 (2009) (observing that parties “commonly” contract over choice of forum 
“in merger agreements and other highly negotiated corporate and commercial contracts”).  
201 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L. REV. 363, 403 (2003) 
(discussing why most such clauses are enforced by courts).  
202 Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315–16 (1964) (“[I]t is settled . . . that parties to a contract may 
agree in advance . . . to waive notice altogether.”).  
203 See, e.g., 7 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 15:12, at 264–67 (4th ed. 1997) (discussing the enforceability 
of such clauses); Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of Internet Retail Contracting, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 984, 990 (2008) (discussing the frequency of use of such clauses in consumer contracts).  
204 See, e.g., Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972); D.H. Overmyer Co., Inc. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972). The 
enforcement of contractual confession of judgments does not violate the defendant’s right to due process provided that 
there is clear and convincing evidence that the waiver of notice and hearing was voluntary, knowing, and intelligently 
made. D.H. Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 185–87.  
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right to a trial by jury.205 Even procedural requirements that might seem “immutable,” such as 
jurisdictional requirements, have, in recent years arguably been subject to some contractual 
modification.206  
The Texas Supreme Court offered a particularly clear justification for procedural 
customization outside of arbitration in a jury waiver dispute between a lessor and two tenants.207 
Effectively, the court argued that allowing parties room to customize public court litigation was 
better than shunting parties wanting room to customize out of the public system altogether an into 
arbitration.  
In the case, Prudential was the building lessor, and the tenants were Francesco Secchi, a 
native of Italy, and his wife Jane, a native of England. Neither was educated beyond the eighth 
grade. The Secchis argued that jury waivers are contrary to public policy, because they give 
nongovernment actors “the power to alter the fundamental nature of the civil justice system by 
private agreement.”208 The Texas Supreme Court rejected that argument, noting that precedent 
already allows parties to contract for the law that will apply and the forum in which litigation will 
take place, and lets them waive the due-process based requirements for personal jurisdiction. 
“Public policy,” the Court said, “that permits parties to waive trial altogether connected with this 
Lease, or any of its provisions” surely does not forbid waiver of trial by jury.  
 
205 Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1595 (2005) (“Most 
courts will enforce contractual jury waivers.”); Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 123 (finding that about 20% of a sample of 
merger and acquisition agreements contained a jury trial waiver provision). Significantly, even though the Court has said 
that the standard for evaluating jury trial waivers is constitutional rather than contractual, see D.H. Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 
185, lower courts seem to focus on the propriety of the bargaining process to the exclusion of any other concerns, see, 
for example, IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 2008) (reversing the 
district court’s refusal to enforce a jury waiver embedded in a sales contract on the view that “[a]s long as the price is 
negotiable and the customer may shop else- where, consumer protection comes from competition rather than judicial 
intervention”).  
206 Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 2, at 513–14 (noting that recent cases arguably allow for parties to enlarge the subject 
matter jurisdiction of federal courts and contract around some constitutional standing barriers).  
207 In re The Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004).  
208 Id. at 131. 
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[I]f parties are willing to agree to a non-jury trial, we think it preferable to enforce that 
agreement rather than leave them with arbitration as their only enforceable option. 
By agreeing to arbitration, parties waive not only their right to trial by jury but their 
right to appeal, whereas by agreeing to waive only the former right, they take 
advantage of the reduced expense and delay of a bench trial, avoid the expense of 
arbitration, and retain their right to appeal. The parties obtain dispute resolution of 
their own choosing in a manner already afforded to litigants in their courts. Their 
rights, and the orderly development of the law, are further protected by appeal. And 
even if the option appeals only to a few, some of the tide away from the civil justice 
system to alternate dispute resolution is stemmed.209 
  
Like the U.S. Supreme Court, then, state courts and lower federal courts seem to view procedural 
autonomy as a hallmark of contractual freedom, allowing parties the ability to customize 
procedures to fit their particular dispute resolution needs.  
2.4  Conclusion 
I have argued that parties can enjoy significant benefits if procedure is seen as a set of 
defaults rather than immutable or mandatory rules. Allowing parties to unbundle off-the-rack 
procedures in public courts gives them flexibility to trade off accuracy and efficiency to meet their 
ex ante preferences. Parties can optimize their contracts so that, given the particular nature of their 
relationship, they limit opportunities for post-dispute opportunism, enhance incentives to per- form 
their contractual obligations, mitigate risks, and, to the extent that a dispute arises, minimize the 
costs of dispute resolution. Given these theoretical benefits, it is tempting to predict that parties will 
engage in such fine-tuning of procedure regularly. The empirical evidence, however, indicates the 
contrary. Although parties do engage in some coarse forms of procedural customization, they do 
not seem to consistently tailor procedures, at least before a dispute arises. One possible reason for 
this could be that existing doctrine blocks attempts at customization. I have considered this 
argument, however, and rebutted it, showing that doctrine not only seems to allow for party 
 
209 Id. at 130. 
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customization, but fully supports it. Parties are doctrinally free to modify procedure in innovative 
and expansive ways.  
This conclusion leaves the fundamental puzzle unanswered, but it does clarify the promise 
and peril of procedural contracting, offering a clearer path to understanding both the practical and 
normative issues surrounding the practice.
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Chapter 3: Anticipating Procedural Innovation: How and When 
Parties Calibrate Procedure Through Contract1 
A more complete theory of contract design would anticipate all possible back-end 
processes and the interaction among them.2 
 
Commercial parties author the substantive terms of their contracts.3  A growing number of 
commentators have been asking whether similar autonomy extends to procedure: can, do, and 
should parties also be free to author the processes used to determine their substantive rights?4   
The implications of customizable procedure are profound.5  The notion that transacting 
parties can create their own procedural rules governing the back-end of the contracting process 
 
1 Forthcoming, Henry Allen Blair, Anticipating Procedural Innovation: How and When Parties Calibrate Procedure 
Through Contract, 72 OKLA. L. REV. __ (2020). 
2 Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 822 (2006). 
3 In this article, I focus on contracts between sophisticated parties with relatively equal bargaining power.  See, e.g., 
Robert E. Scott, The Law and Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 279, 281 (2006) 
(“Contracts involving individual consumers raise separate issues that challenge the assumption that their commitments 
are voluntary, rational and informed.”); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 
113 YALE L.J. 541, 543-44 (2003) (explaining the problems with considering contract law as applying to the “entire 
continuum from standard form contracts between firms and consumers to commercial contracts among businesses” 
and advancing an argument for focus on “business contracts”).  I do not, however, do this in order to perpetuate a 
Willistonian, unitary approach to contract law.   See HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS 
8 (2017) (explaining how Samuel Williston “elevated commercial transactions to the core of contract, and, as a 
byproduct, substantially obscured the generative role of diverse contract types.”).”).  To the contrary, as I discuss in 
greater detail in a separate forthcoming article, The Line Between Mockery and Efficiency: The Normative Implications of 
Private Process, the most compelling normative objections to private process involve contracts between disparate 
parties, which involve a differing balance of values.  That conclusion compels another: procedural contracts between 
commercial parties and individuals should be subject to closer scrutiny.   
4 The growing literature on private procedural ordering owes a great debt to pioneering work done in a number of 
articles, including  
5 By “customizable” procedure, I mean “procedural contracting” or “private procedural ordering,” all terms which 
encompass mechanisms parties use to control the processes used to resolve disputes.   See, e.g., Jaime Dodge, The 
Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 724-25 (2011) (describing the process of modifying by contract 
the “spectrum of procedure” as private procedural ordering).  In previous work, I have used these terms interchangeably 
and in the broadest possible sense, to include all party agreements about procedure, including but not limited to 
arbitration, mediation, med-arb, and settlement.  See Robin Effron, Ousted: The New Dynamics of Privatized Procedure 
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unlocks an additional dimension of design choices.6  Theory already recognizes many ways that 
parties fine-tune their substantive commitments, keeping in mind the possibility of future 
disagreements.7  By calibrating the completeness of contractual terms, for instance, parties 
regulate when and by whom content will be determined.8  Parties do this by mixing rules and 
standards.  They trade off ex ante investments in drafting precise obligations for ex post 
specification of vague or open-ended obligations by a court or tribunal.9  Procedural fine-tuning 
extends the same logic, giving parties additional governance mechanisms to address exchange 
hazards.10     
 
and Judicial Discretion, 98 B.U. L. REV. 88 (2018) (similarly using the term “private procedural ordering” to refer to both 
pre- and post-dispute customizations of procedure); compare Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for 
Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 511 (2011) (describing contract procedure as “the practice of setting out 
procedures in contracts to govern disputes . . . that will be adjudicated in the public courts”); Erin O’Hara O’Connor & 
Christopher R. Drahozal, Carve Outs and Contractual Procedure, at 2.  In this article, however, I am focusing on ex ante 
procedural contracting. 
6 See, e.g., Scott & Triantis, supra note 2 (recognizing the importance of dispute resolution on contract design and calling 
for “further research into the interaction between contract and litigation, as well as future investigation into the effect of 
other back-end processes, such as arbitration, renegotiation, and settlement.”); Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence 
and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 162 (1994) (recognizing that parties can anticipate 
and adjust for legal errors in their initial contract). 
7 See, e.g., Scwartz & Scott, supra note 3, at 546 (arguing that it is futile “to pursue either distributional goals or 
contractual fairness” in contracts between firms, as “firms will contract away from redistributive or fair legal rules that do 
not maximize joint surplus”); Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 
1583– 84 (2005) (defining the cost of a contract as the ex ante negotiating and drafting costs, plus the probability of 
litigation multiplied by the sum of the parties’ litigation costs, the judiciary’s litigation costs, and judicial error costs); Scott 
& Triantis, supra note 2 (noting that investment in ex ante contract design generally reduces ex post contract 
enforcement costs, and that less investment in ex ante contract design generally increases ex post contract enforcement 
costs); Steven Shavell, On the Writing and the Interpretation of Contracts, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 289 (2006) (discussing 
the role of back-end contract interpretation in influencing how parties design contracts ex ante); Albert Choi & George 
Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 852 (2010) 
(“[D]rawing on the line of scholarship that analyzes the rules-standards dichotomy in the design of legal rules, recent work 
frames the choice between vague and precise contract terms as a tradeoff in information costs: precise contract 
provisions raise contracting costs on the front end, but reduce enforcement costs at the back end.”). 
8 Scott & Triantis, supra note 2, at 818 (“[T]he choice between precise terms and vague terms thus reduces to who 
chooses [obligations] and when they are chosen: the parties at the time of contracting or the court at trial.”). 
9 Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L.  REV. 1023, 
1071 (2009) (noting that parties “are exploiting their informational advantage (they know their contractual ends and have 
the right incentives to choose the best means to achieve them), but they are sacrificing the hindsight advantage that a 
court might have”). 
10 I use the term “exchange hazards” in a broad sense to mean the vulnerabilities that firms face when engaging with 
exchange partners.  See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 12 (1996). 
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Despite these benefits, commentators have suggested that lawyers and potential litigants 
do not think of most of the rules of litigation as defaults.11  At least on cursory inspection, a good 
deal of empirical evidence seems to support the proposition that parties conceptualize procedural 
rules as primarily mandatory or immutable.12  Empirical studies to date have suggested that parties 
commonly agree on where they will litigate and who will decide the dispute, but they rarely enter 
into ex ante agreements about how they will litigate, at least not in any detail.13  Stated differently, 
no one doubts that parties make a handful of coarse, modular customizations by selecting bundles 
of pre-fabricated procedures through choice of forum clauses, including arbitration, and choice of 
law clauses.14  Parties sometimes also opt out of other bundles of procedures by waiving rights to 
a jury, to appeal, or to class actions.15  But most of the existing empirical studies end here, 
concluding that before a dispute arises, in or out of arbitration, parties simply do not do much fine-
tuning of the processes by which their disputes will be adjudicated.16   
A closer and holistic examination of the evidence, however, yields a more nuanced picture.  
First, parties occasionally assign different bundles of procedures to different claims, choosing, for 
instance, to arbitrate one category of dispute and litigate another.17  This claim-by-claim 
customization, while still modular, may refine contract design more profoundly than previously 
 
11 Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration's Image, 
30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 612 (2007).  
12 See, e.g., David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 394 (“[E]ven in circumstances 
where we would expect them to, parties almost never use contract terms to vary their post-dispute procedural 
contests.”); Erin O’Hara O’Connor et al., Customizing Employment Arbitration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 133, 136-37 (2012) 
(finding that parties to CEO employment contracts rarely customized arbitration provisions); infra, Part II. 
13 See infra, Section 3.2. 
14 See infra, Section 3.2. 
15 See infra, Section 3.2. 
16 See Henry Allen Blair, Promise and Peril: Doctrinally Permissible Options for Calibrating Procedure Through Contract, 
95 NEB. L. REV. 787, 813-15 (2017) (reviewing the existing empirical studies); infra Part II.  
17 Christopher R. Drahozal & Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure: Carve-Outs from Arbitration Clauses, 66 FLA. 
L. REV. (2014)  (studying the circumstances in which parties who include arbitration clauses in their contracts carve out 
certain categories of disputes for resolution in courts); Matthew Jennejohn, The Private Order of Innovation Networks, 68 
STAN L. REV. 281, 359 (2016) (same).   
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acknowledged by many commentators.  Additionally, when parties opt for arbitration, they 
sometimes engage in greater adaptation of procedure, for instance, by specifying qualifications for 
an arbitrator, limiting the arbitrator’s authority, or authorizing the arbitrator to use a standard of 
decision other than law.18  Finally, at least some of the time, some parties design robust and highly 
tailored procedural systems that readjust accuracy and efficiency to meet their deal-specific 
preferences.19  These procedural systems distribute dispute resolution at various levels to different 
decision makers, some private and some public.  Often, they create feedback loops that function 
to ratchet up trust and information sharing while narrowing the domains within which conflict can 
fester.   
In short, knitting together various strands of empirical evidence shows that more intentional 
and deal-specific procedural customization takes place than previously thought.  The challenge 
then becomes identifying and explaining the patterns of ex ante procedural contracting.20   
I argue that patterns emerge once we focus on the different risks that parties are trying to 
mitigate or eliminate in variegated types of transactions.  As Professor Matthew Jennejohn has 
persuasively argued, “[p]arties not only have to navigate more than one type of transaction cost [or 
exchange risk], but they must also choose how to combine different types of governance tools into 
a coherent portfolio—the multivalent contract.”21   
This article sketches an initial theoretical framework for thinking about the role procedural 
customization plays in creating such a multivalent contract.  It argues, first, that procedural 
customization functions most effectively to offset one particular transaction risk—litigation 
 
18 See infra, Section 3.2. 
19 See infra, Section 3.2. 
20 See, e.g., W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Customized Procedure in Theory and Reality, 72 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1865, 1873-75 
(2015) (introducing three possible explanations for the gap between theory and practice, concluding that none fare well, 
and concluding that “The“[t]he question remains, however, why parties do not embrace customized procedure more 
fully”); infra Section 3. 
21 Jennejohn, supra note 17. 
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opportunism.  It then argues that the desirability of procedural choice turns, in significant part, on 
underlying key attributes of the transaction, namely the degree of environmental and behavioral 
uncertainty present and the frequency with which other similar parties contract in the same 
domain.  These attributes of the transaction determine the degree of litigation opportunism risk 
present and thus the value of procedural customization in any given circumstance.  The core 
intuition of this article can be seen as an extension of the logic used in a growing literature showing 
that transaction type indicates which interpretation regime should govern contract interpretation.22   
This article advances these arguments in three parts. 
Section 3.1 begins by recounting the benefits of procedural autonomy.  Theory already 
explains how parties author their substantive obligations with an eye toward the possibility of future 
disagreements.  Section 3.1 builds on this premise and demonstrates that procedural 
customization can give contract designers additional tools with which to address litigation 
opportunism and incentivize compliance with substantive terms of the deal.         
Section 3.2 surveys the existing empirical evidence on procedural contracting.  Most 
individual empirical studies conclude that parties rarely craft their own à la carte rules or engage in 
any fine-tuning of the procedures used to resolve their disputes.  Accordingly, many commentators 
have decided that procedural customization is a theoretical phenomenon, interesting only because 
of its absence in practice.  Section 3.2 turns, however, to an integrative appraisal of existing 
empirical work.  In looking across studies, this analysis reveals underappreciated pockets of 
procedural contracting.  By weaving together various threads of existing research, Section 3.2 
paints a more comprehensive, if still contingent, picture of the reality of procedural autonomy. 
 
22 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante 
Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335 (2007) (arguing that preference 
for arbitration depends, in part, on transaction type); Adam Badawi, Interpretive Preferences and the Limits of the New 
Formalism, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1 (2009); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, and & Robert E. Scott, Text and Context: 
Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23 (2014). 
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Section 3.3 anticipates procedural innovation by identifying key features in the transactional 
environment that incline contracting parties to choose particular procedural governance 
mechanisms.  Section 3.3 borrows from recent literature addressing contracts for innovation to 
distinguish between different types of commercial party transactions, which can be usefully 
segregated into four rough domains oriented along two axes—uncertainty and scale.23  In general, 
a positive correlation exists between the degree of uncertainty and the risk of litigation 
opportunism.  In general, as scale increases, parties rely less and less on formal methods of 
contract enforcement, turning instead to industry-provided norms, trade associations, and 
specialized arbitral tribunals.  Accordingly, parties tend to rely less on formal contracts and formal 
enforcement, so worries about litigation risk are diminished.  In short, the quadrants of the 
transactional space for contract design present varying degrees of litigation opportunism risk, and 
contract designers will predictably confront that risk through procedural tailoring in different ways.     
 Benefits of Private Process 
[The contract] creates guardrails for the relationship. It doesn’t solve all things but it shows 
what the[] parties can do and that’s important because there is a lot of uncertainty and a lot of 
chaos.24 
 
Contract design aims to secure incentives for parties in business relationships that require 
commitments over time.  Central to the problem transactional attorneys face, then, is the need to 
adapt to unforeseen (and often unforeseeable) events that arise after contract formation.  The 
greater the uncertainty about the future, the more difficult it becomes for transactional attorneys to 
anticipate and provide for contingencies in a way that courts or tribunals can readily interpret and 
 
23 See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 22. 
24 See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 22. 
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enforce.25  Contract theory has been devoted to understanding how parties adjust contractual 
obligations in light of this uncertainty.  To that end, theorists have attempted to diagnosis exchange 
hazards and make headway on thinking about governance mechanisms available to mitigate or 
eliminate them.  Procedural customization constitutes another set of tools in the contract 
designer’s toolbox.     
The following sections explore the promise of procedural contracting.  The first briefly 
situates procedural contracting in relationship to other recent efforts to appreciate how parties 
address variegated transactional risks.  The remaining sections explore the ways that 
customizations of procedure can be effective at addressing one particular exchange hazard—
litigation opportunism.      
3.1.1  The Design Space for Contracting and the Role of Procedural Autonomy 
More than thirty years ago, Professor Ronald Gilson asked the question “[w]hat do business 
lawyers really do?” 26  In a costless world, contract design would be straight-forward process of 
pinning down efficient obligations in every possible future situation.27  Of course, the world is not 
costless.  Instead, contracts are always incomplete.28  Transaction costs include all of the many 
 
25 See id. at 986. 
26 Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 241 (1984).  
Earlier answers to a similar question – “what good is contract law?” — had not been kind to lawyers.  See, e.g., Stewart 
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 58 (1963) (noting that 
business interviewees complained that lawyers often got in the way of their business dealings, and that they preferred to 
do business by handshake rather than by contract).  Interviews indicated that written contracts were often highly- 
standardized documents that were largely confined to the drawer once drafted by the legal department and then rarely 
consulted to resolve disputes.  Id. at 61.   
27 See Robert E. Scott & George Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 187, 190 (2004) (distinguishing between “obligational” complete contracts and “informationally” complete contracts).  
28 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Default Rule Project, 6 VA. J. 84, 85 (2003) (“As an organizing principle, the 
notion that contract rules are defaults inevitably leads to the conclusion that all contracts are inevitably incomplete.”); 
Scwartz & Scott, supra note 3, at 595 (“There is an infinite number of possible future states and a very large set of 
possible partner types. When the sum of possible states and partner types is infinite and contracting is costly, contracts 
must contain gaps. Parties cannot write contracts about everything.”); Richard Craswell, The "Incomplete Contracts" 
Literature and Efficient Precautions, 56 CASE WES. RES. L. REV. 151, 155 (2005); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete 
Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988); Avery Katz, Contractual Incompleteness: A Transactional 
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expenses associated with addressing contractual incompleteness.29  Accordingly, Professor Gilson 
refocused contract theory by recognizing that deal lawyers are really transaction cost engineers, 
constructing frameworks governing their clients’ relationships while economizing on expenses.30  
Such lawyers confront exchange hazards in a world of incomplete contracting through governance 
mechanisms.31 
Still, despite many advances in contract theory since Professor Gilson’s seminal article, the 
space for contract design remains something of a mystery.32  “[W]e know very little about the 
factors that influence how parties in the real world design their contracts.”33  Early contract theory 
tended to focus on only one type of governance mechanism—vertical integration—as a means of 
 
Perspective, 56 CASE WES. RES. L. REV. 169 (2005); Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signaling, 23 RAND J. 
ECON. 432 (1992). 
29 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONSHIP CONTRACTING 78 n.7 
(1985); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (transaction costs are resources spent “to 
discover who it is that one wishes to deal with . . . and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, 
to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being 
observed, and so on”).   
30 Gilson, supra note 26, at 241, 302; see also, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Essay, Deals: Bringing Corporate Transactions into 
the Law School Classroom, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 475, 478 (describing the Deals course at Columbia Law School 
started by Ronald Gilson, Victor Goldberg, and David Schizer and discussing how it rested on the notion of lawyers 
focusing on deal mechanics in order to minimize transaction costs); See, e.g., VICTOR P. GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT 
LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 2 (2006) (“[T]he basic presumption that there are gains from trade is the economic 
foundation for a facilitative law of contract.”).  Ronald Coase’s two most renowned papers teach that transaction costs 
are a central determinant of legal and organizational boundaries.  See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 
ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (considering the boundaries of firms); Coase, supra note 29, at __ (arguing that in the absence of 
transaction costs parties will bargain to efficient results). As Coase later explained, however, the so-called Coase 
Theorem should be understood as a “stepping stone on the way to an analysis of an economy with positive transaction 
costs.” Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 717 (1992); see also, e.g., 
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, CONTRACT, GOVERNANCE AND TRANSACTION COSTS 5-7 [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, CONTRACT, 
GOVERNANCE AND TRANSACTION COSTS] (Gengxaun Chen, ed., 2017) (“[I]f transaction costs are zero then parties . . . would 
costlessly bargain to an efficient result whichever way the property rights are assigned at the outset.  In that event, the 
emperor really did have no clothes: externalities and frictions would vanish.  That being preposterous, the real message 
was this: ‘study the world of positive transaction costs.’”). 
31 See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, 
36 ADMIN SCI. Q. 269, 277 (1991) (“The discriminating alignment hypothesis to which transaction-cost economics owes 
much of its predictive content holds that transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with governance 
structures, which differ in their costs and competencies, in a discriminating (mainly, transaction-cost-economizing) 
way.”); Jennejohn, supra note 17, at 294 (“Any theory of contract design must have answers for two questions: First, 
what hazards to exchange must transacting parties confront? And second, what governance tools can parties use to 
eliminate, or at least check, those hazards?”); Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 22. 




offsetting one type of exchange risk—hold-ups.34   But governance problems relate to contractual 
externalities of various kinds, of which holds-ups are just one, and hold-up problems manifest in a 
wide range of specific forms.35  As a result, more and more scholars have been investigating 
particularized forms of exchange risks and the mechanisms that parties use to address those risks. 
 For instance, recent work related to the braiding of formal and informal contract 
enforcement has demonstrated how parties use combinations of complementary governance 
mechanisms to address the challenges they face in contexts of high innovation where it would be 
difficult or impossible to prescribe a fixed outcome for a given collaboration.36  This this work 
replaces a binary, either-or approach to formal and informal contract enforcement with an 
understanding of governance mechanisms as a collection of tools that can be combined—mixed 
and matched—to confront alliance hazards.  In at least some innovative contexts, formal and 
informal enforcement mechanisms can be effectively braided together to mutually reinforce one 
another.37 
Similarly, Professors Scott and Triantis’s landmark article Anticipating Litigation in Contract 
Design explores how parties balance ex ante and ex post specification of contract terms to 
“maximize the incentive bang for the contracting buck.”38  By reaching the optimal combination of 
front-end and back-end costs, parties can minimize the aggregate costs of achieving a particular 
 
34 Oliver E. Williamson was at the forefront of this work. Williamson developed this theory in a series of articles that were 
then consolidated and expanded in his seminal book, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 
(1975). See also, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations, 63 AM. ECON. 
REV. 316-25 (1973) (explaining the variables that likely influence a firm's decision to either purchase goods on the spot 
market or produce the goods internally); Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure 
Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112-23 (1971) (same); WILLIAMSON, CONTRACT, GOVERNANCE AND TRANSACTION COSTS, 
supra note 30. 
35 Bengt Holmstrom & John Roberts, The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited, 12 J. OF ECON. PERSP., 73, 86 (1998).   
36 See generally, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Charles Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal 
Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010) [hereinafter Gilson, Sabel & Scott, 
Braiding]; Ronald J. Gilson, Charles Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and 
Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (2009) [hereinafter Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contracting for Innovation].   
37 Professors Bozovic and Hadfield make a similar argument.  See Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 24, at 981. 
38 Scott & Triantis, supra note 2, at 823. 
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gain in contractual incentives.39  Professors Scott and Triantis demonstrate how these tradeoffs 
help parties address particular contracting problems.  For example, vague terms, which reduce 
upfront contracting costs by increasing backend costs, can be valuable when a parties’ inputs 
would be difficult or impossible to verify or even observe ex ante but will become clear by the time 
of performance.  The critical point is that, like the braiding literature, Anticipating Litigation clarified 
thinking about governance problems by dissolving the binary choice between ex ante specification 
and ex post enforcement, showing how a more complicated balancing of design techniques could 
serve the interest of transacting parties.   
 In the same spirit as these efforts, procedural customization gives parties additional 
governance strategies for dealing with various instantiations of opportunism inherent in the ex post 
adjudication of breach of contract claims—“shading.”40  Shading occurs because the legal 
conclusion that a party has breached can only be made after the parties present self-interested 
evidence to a court or tribunal.  Looking at that imperfect evidence, a court has to make a 
comparative, probabilistic assessment of each side’s behavior.  The potential of adjudicatory errors 
drives some parties to exploit the litigation process.41 
Regulating shading through substantive terms in the contract proves difficult because 
exogenous factors determine which party will behave opportunistically, and any effort to design the 
contract to preclude one party from asserting an opportunistic claim inevitably increases the risk of 
strategic behavior by the counterparty.42  Ultimately, using substantive contract terms “to try to 
induce cooperative behavior from an uncooperative actor is like trying to pick up mercury; every 
 
39 Id. at 817. 
40 Scott, supra note 32, at 6; see also, e.g., Juliet P. Kostritsky, Plain Meaning vs. Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of 
Opportunism Defeats a Unitary Default Rule for Interpretation, 96 KY. L.J. 43, 56 (2007–2008).  
41 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial 
Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 317 (1992).  
42 Scott, supra note 32, at 6. 
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provision stipulated or contingency appended just creates another source of contention open to 
various interpretations and is thus subject to manipulation in court.”43  Opportunistic litigation 
behavior can also be difficult to observe and even more difficult to verify.44   
Procedural customizations, however, can make headway on shading problems.  In this regard, 
pre-dispute private procedural ordering can be far more effective than post-dispute private 
ordering for at least three reasons.  First, before a dispute, parties cannot accurately predict how a 
dispute will arise or what side of the issues they will each take.  This uncertainly affords the parties 
a degree of objectivity that they lack by the time that a dispute foments, allowing them to make 
less emotionally charged choices about procedures and process that will maximize their joint 
welfare.45  In contrast, procedural customizations post-dispute can become part of the strategic 
gaming that generates litigation opportunism.   
Second, transfer payments are much more feasible pre-dispute, and particularly at the 
outset of contracting, accordingly, even asymmetric procedural advantages can be considered so 
long as the benefited party can purchase such advantages from the other at an agreed upon 
price.46  In other words, more complex procedural customizations are possible because the parties 
can include such customizations as part of the package of other rights and obligations that they 
are trading. 
 
43 Scott Masten, Equity, Opportunism and the Design of Contractual Relations, 144 J. INST’L & THEORETICAL ECON. 180, 
183 (1988). 
44 Scott, supra note 32, at 6. 
45 See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice--—Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1828-39 (1997) (describing 
the difference between ex ante and ex post perspectives when information differs); Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” 
Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 743 (2001) (noting that “because no dispute has yet arisen, the parties can 
consider the range of possible disputes that might arise in agreeing on a dispute resolution forum”).  But see Robert G. 
Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 
526-29 (2003) (criticizing some of the assumptions about information access that underlie typical ex ante arguments). 
46 See id. (“[P]redispute arbitration agreements provide greater opportunities for making transfer payments than do 
postdispute arbitration agreements.”). 
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  Finally, before a dispute arises and, again, especially during contract negotiations, parties 
enjoy the cooperative benefits of a deal-making ethos.  They are thus less likely to succumb to 
various cognitive biases that might impede negotiating mutually beneficial procedural terms.47  The 
relational norms inherent in pre-dispute bargaining can embolden the parties to make more even-
handed decisions. 
3.1.2 Regulating Litigation Opportunism through Procedural Customization 
 Pre-dispute procedural contracting can address variations on shading in at least four ways: 
(1) eliminating or reducing the possibilities of post-dispute opportunism; (2) reinforcing substantive 
obligations and thus disincentivizing shading; (3) mitigating the risks of litigation generally and 
consequently alleviating the harm of shading; and (4) directly reducing the costs of litigation. 
3.1.2.1 Limiting the Possibilities of Post-Dispute Opportunism 
Contract disputes arise because a party has become disenchanted with the bargain that it 
originally struck.  Whatever events precipitate the regret, if the dispute boils over into formal 
litigation, the parties must argue to an adjudicator about the legal meaning of their actions.48  In 
other words, breach is a legal conclusion that an adjudicator reaches after hearing each side’s 
arguments and reviewing the facts presented.49   
The trouble is that judging whether a breach has occurred or not can be quite 
challenging.50  Proof costs are high, and errors are common.51  Perhaps most significantly, 
 
47 See generally, e.g., Russel Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and Practice, 21 
OH.OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESRESOL. 281 (2006) (discussing a range of cognitive biases that can prevent successful post-
dispute negotiations). 
48 Of course, parties always have the opportunity to settle their dispute, but they will do so in light of predictions about 
how an adjudication would proceed.  See, e.g., Blair, supra note 16, at 793-96 (discussing the economics of settlement 
and the importance of adjudication to settlement). 
49 Scott, supra note 32, at 9. 
50 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 420, 428 (2007) (arguing that judges have three sets of “blinders”: 
informational blinders, cognitive blinders, and attitudinal blinders). 
51 Scott & Triantis, supra note 2, at 816 n.4. 
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adjudicators get their information from self-interested parties.  Adjudicators are therefore doomed 
to experience shortages of quality information regarding the relevant facts.52  Moreover, the parties 
themselves may sincerely believe their own cover stories.  As Professor Scott has explained, “It is 
very difficult for parties engaged in iterative acts of performance to interpret correctly the behaviors 
of their counterparty.”53 Cooperation may be mistaken for defection and defection for cooperation.  
This can lead to retaliations (and counter-retaliations), which can, in turn, result in a tangle of 
allegations.54  Finally, deals that once seemed wise may, in the light of subsequent events or better 
reason, seem foolhardy.  The prospect of suffering large ex post losses can produce a form of 
amnesia in which both parties are convinced that their behavior remains consistent with their 
contractual obligations.55  The earnestness of such after-the-fact justifications can muddle the 
ability of adjudicators to make important credibility determinations. 
In all the noise, the very real possibility of strategic maneuvering arises.  Parties may leverage the 
difficulties with assessing breach in order to extort rents on their counterparties.56  Customized 
procedural rules, however, can directly limit or eliminate certain kinds of costly post-dispute 
 
52 See ALEX STIEN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 34-35, 73-106 (2005) (analyzing the sources of uncertainty in fact 
finding); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 4 (2006) 
(describing judicial ascertainment of the law as “choice under uncertainty” that implicates “limited information and 
bounded rationality”). 
53 Scott, supra note 32, at 13; Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Contracts and Network Governance in 
Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 578 (2015) (“The biggest threat to continued cooperation is the 
possibility that a transactor will misclassify an act of cooperation as an act of defection and thus set off a series of actions 
and reactions that lead to the disintegration of the contracting relationship.”). 
54 Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 24, at 986 (discussing this noise in the context of contracts for innovation); Bernstein, 
supra note 53. 
55 Scott, supra note 32, at 14. 
56 See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 481, 500-01 (1994) 
(discussing how plaintiffs may use discovery strategically to impose costs on the defendant); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert 
H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 
514-15 (1994); David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985) (providing a formal analysis of the impact of nuisance suits); John K. Setear, The Barrister and 




behavior, such as escalating the costs of discovery or engaging in abusive motion practice.57  
Customized procedure can also cabin post-dispute opportunism by constraining the range of 
matters over which the parties might disagree in the first place. 
With respect to both discovery and abusive motion practice, parties face a collective-action 
problem.  In a highly simplified model, each party could choose to be abusive or reasonable with 
its discovery requests or its motion practice.  Jointly, the parties would be best served by both 
acting reasonably.  Individually, however, each party would do better if it employed abusive 
techniques while the other was reasonable. Because both parties know this, and thus know that 
the other is likely to defect and employ abusive techniques, they face a prisoner’s dilemma. The 
equilibrium is for both parties to defect, acting abusively, even though that leaves both parties 
worse off than if they had simply acted reasonably. By binding themselves, in advance of any 
dispute, to a more limited slate of discovery options or more limited motion practice, the parties 
can reduce the opportunity for this prisoner’s dilemma to sap individual resources.58    
  With respect to the range of matters over which parties might disagree, customized 
procedure can limit the discursive space within which disputes take place, such as by mandating 
the use of joint experts, binding the parties to factual stipulations, or even bifurcating the 
adjudication of liability and damages, allowing parties to gain information about the stakes of a 
 
57 Concerns over discovery costs, of course, have motivated various changes to the public rules of procedure.  See, e.g., 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (adopting new heightened plausibility pleading standards because 
“proceeding to . . . discovery can be expensive” and “the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has 
been on the modest side”); Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1839, 1850 (2014) (“Since 1980, the Federal Rules have been amended numerous times: the scope of 
discovery was narrowed; numerical limits restricted the amount of discovery; and new discovery conferences, pre-trial 
conferences, mandatory disclosures, and sanction rules encouraged closer judicial supervision of discovery.”); Jay 
Tidmarsh, The Litigation Budget, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 n.8 (2015) (“Amendments in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
1980, 1983, 1993, 2000, and 2006 were principally designed to accomplish the related aims of limiting discovery and 
enhancing judicial power to manage litigation.”). 
58 The same logic could apply to waivers of the right to appeal. Parties might well dispense with a right to appellate 




dispute before considering the question of liability.59  Each of these mechanisms short-circuits 
incentives for one side or the other to engage in jointly wasteful posturing or distraction tactics. 
Instead, parties can focus a future fact finder on the issues that are most relevant or most likely to 
be relevant. 
Other mechanisms are imaginable.  The fundamental point is that procedural contracts can 
directly prevent parties from strategically gaming the asymmetry between what the parties can 
observe and what an adjudicator can verify.  
3.1.2.2 Reinforcing Substantive Obligations 
In addition to directly eliminating or limiting the possibilities of post-dispute opportunism, 
procedural customizations can work in tandem with other governance mechanisms to reinforce 
substantive obligations.  By reducing the likelihood of a dispute occurring in the first instance, such 
procedural terms can indirectly reduce post-dispute opportunism.  The alteration of procedural 
rules can reinforce substantive commitments in at least three ways: (1) changing the expected 
value of the litigation and thus indirectly influencing when or how a party might shirk its substantive 
obligations; (2) sending credible signals about the likelihood of shirking; and (3) enhancing informal 
cooperation. 
3.1.2.2.1 Altering the Expected Value of Litigation 
Procedure factors into whether a party will engage in conduct constituting a breach or even 
conduct pushing the boundaries of what the substantive terms permit.  This is so because 
procedural rules impact how parties evaluate their post-dispute payoffs and thus influence when, 
 




or if, parties assert their claims and how they make strategic choices during litigation.60  The path 
to a dispute resolution will vary based on the substantive law, the parties’ agreement, the 
procedural rules applied, the resources each side has and is willing to invest in dispute resolution, 
each side’s estimation of the merits of the dispute, and each side’s sensitivity to risk.61  By 
tweaking procedural rules, parties can adjust the expected payoffs of litigation and thus the 
incentives to perform, breach, or shirk.   
Parties commonly calibrate the difficulty of proving (or disproving) compliance with 
contractual terms by varying the precision of their substantive obligations.  When parities include 
vague or difficult-to-prove states like “best efforts,” the high costs associated with evidence 
production to an adjudicator can dissuade parties from fighting.  In contrast, when parties specify 
their obligations in precise terms that are verifiable in a court at low cost, would-be breachers may 
think twice about shirking or engaging in other opportunistic misconduct. 
  Pre-dispute procedural contracting offers parties even more options for incentivizing parties 
to comply with their substantive obligations.  Procedural contracting, in other words, can help 
overcome the “acoustic separation” between the ex ante understanding that parties have about 
how their future disputes will be adjudicated and their ex post understanding.62   For instance, 
agreeing that expert testimony or an expert opinion will be given by a neutral third party rather than 
through party-appointed advocates could incentivize greater compliance with performance 
standards pre- dispute or, at the very least, change the parties’ incentives in deciding what claims 
to bring and how much to invest in proving claims once they have been asserted.  Agreeing to give 
 
60 See generally, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 392-401 (2004) [HEREINAFTER SHAVELL, 
FOUNDATIONS]; Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal 
System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997). 
61 Blair, supra note 16, at 792. 
62 See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 625 (1984); see also, generally, Hay, supra note 45. 
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a defendant the right to exercise an option making any settlements unenforceable could reduce 
litigation holdup problems, eliminating the incentive for plaintiffs to bring negative value lawsuits.63  
Or, opting into expanded review of arbitral awards could be seen as a means of increasing 
accuracy (and costs) and thus deterring more questionable claims.64 Other mechanisms are 
imaginable, such as fee-shifting agreements and burden-shifting agreements, which could also 
raise the price of brining non-meritorious or speculative claims and thus limit opportunities for 
extortionate lawsuits.    
3.1.2.2.2 Sending Credible Signals 
Procedural customization can also provide credible signals regarding the parties’ 
willingness to cooperate or the strength of their respective positions.  Parties already signal their 
type by providing (or disclaiming) warranties.65  But they could go further.  For instance, a 
manufacturer could signal confidence in its product by offering to bear the burden of proof in any 
lawsuit for breach.66  Or it might otherwise disarm itself by trading another litigation right—perhaps 
the right to a chosen forum, to remove a case to federal court, or to obtain certain discovery—in 
order to demonstrate the strength of its position.  Alternatively, a tenant could signal reliability by 
agreeing to let the landlord quickly obtain provisional relief in the event of a default.67  Or, as 
 
63 See generally, e.g., David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Solution to the Problem of Nuisance Suits: The Option to 
Have the Court Bar Settlement, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 42 (2006). 
64 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1995).  Importantly, 
under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), parties cannot opt into enhanced judicial review of arbitral awards.  See all Hall 
Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).  But Section 10 of the FAA, which governs judicial review of 
arbitral awards, may not be preemptive.  See id. at 590.  Accordingly, parties may be able to seek enhanced judicial 
review in state courts.  See Henry Allen Blair, Is Less Really More? Hall Street Associates, Private Procedural Ordering 
and Expanded Review of Arbitral Awards in State Courts, 5 Y.B. ONON ARB. & MEDIATION 74, 97-105 (2013) (discussing 
five states that allow for parties to opt into enhanced judicial review).  
65 See generally, e.g., Esther Gal-Or, Warranties as Signals of Quality, 22 CANADIAN J. ECON. 50 (1989). 
66 A variety of other customizations to burdens of proof can also be envisaged. A rich literature exists exploring the 
connections between the burden of proof, risk of error, primary behavior, and cost of litigation. See, Blair, supra note 16, 
at 810-11 n.106 (citing key articles). 
67 Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contractualizing Procedure 3, 24-25 (Dec. 31, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author) (suggesting that parties can signal private information by agreeing to custom procedural clauses). 
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frequently happens, a borrower could signal her intent to repay by stipulating to a default judgment 
in the case of non-payment through a cognovit clause.68   
The point is that by voluntarily committing to abandon what otherwise could be a useful 
litigation right, parties can convey information to their contracting partners.69  Such signals can 
reinforce substantive commitments and thus minimize the risks of litigation opportunism.    
3.1.2.2.3 Enhancing Informal Cooperation Mechanisms 
Finally, pre-dispute procedural customizations could help clarify the informal norms 
governing the parties’ interactions in a particular context.  Conventionally understood, litigation 
resolves a dispute by empowering a third-party neutral—a judge or an arbitrator—to render a final 
and binding decision on the merits.  The threat of litigation motivates parties to hew closely to their 
contractual obligations because they will be sanctioned when they do not.70  Relational contract 
theory recognizes, however, that parties often perform not because of the threat of legal sanction 
but because of informal and shared norms of behavior.71  But, as Lon Fuller once suggested, the 
threat of sanctions and compliance with some overarching sense of morality do not exhaust the 
 
68 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Richard M. Hynes, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
168, 174-75 (2002). 
69 See generally, e.g., Avraham Tabbach & Shay Lavie, A Theory of Litigation Signals, 58 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (2018).  
Professors Tabbach and Lavie provide a comprehensive theory of litigation signaling, though primarily in the context of 
post-dispute stipulations.  The logic of many of their arguments, however, can usefully be extended to pre-dispute 
customizations.  Although the accuracy of some signals may be more difficult to determine ex ante, as described at the 
outset,     
70 See SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 60 for a comprehensive statement of the existing economics of public law 
enforcement, almost all of which concerns deterrence.  See also, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, REGULATION (AGENCIES) VERSUS 
LITIGATION (COURTS): AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 11-25 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 
Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1166 (2001) (stating that “a primary reason to permit individuals to sue is 
that the prospect of suit provides an incentive for desirable behavior in the first instance” and also noting that in some 
cases the prospect of suit deters future conduct).  
71 See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships, 34 ECON. 
INQUIRY 444, 449–50 (1996); Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogenous Middleman Group: An Institutional 
Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981). 
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possible reasons for why parties comply with law.72  Instead, law and informal norms may work in 
tandem.   
Legal rules may be seen as nudging parties toward compliance with the informal and 
shared norms.73  The growing literature on braiding informal and formal enforcement mechanisms 
rests on this notion.  Rather than being rivalrous, informal and formal governance mechanisms can 
be combined to provide a framework for building and enhancing trust over time.  Formally imposed 
penalties, often focusing on information sharing and constitutive rules, including rights on 
termination, are used to grow relational expectations and norms.  These norms, in turn, allow non-
contractible terms of a deal to be renegotiated or shaped by incentives to avoid informal penalties 
such as the loss of a relationship or reputation. 
It may also be possible to conceive of the parties’ agreement as influencing the mental 
frames, categories, or schema by which individuals understand and construct the social world.74  
For instance, Professors Oliver Hart and John Moore propose a more expressly phycological role 
for contracts.75  In their model, one party is motivated to underperform on non-contractible terms 
of a deal if she is aggrieved by her counterparty’s own exercise of discretion in performance.76  
Contracts can help avoid this outcome by anchoring expectations and feelings of entitlement.  In 
turn, contracts delimit what might be called aggrievement risk—the range of justifiable loss that 
disappointed parties are likely to experience. 
 
72 “Much that is written today seems to assume that our larger society is enabled to function by a combination of the 
individual’s moral sense and social control through the threatened sanctions of state-made law. We need to remind 
ourselves that we constantly orient our actions toward one another by signposts that are set neither by ‘morals,’ in any 
ordinary sense, nor by words in law-books.”  Lon L. Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, 14 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 36 (1969).  
73 See generally Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contracting for Innovation, supra note 36.   
74 See, e.g., Jack Balkin, The Proliferation of Legal Truths, 26 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 5, 5–10 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, 
How Law Constructs Preferences, 86 GeorgetownGEO. L.J. 2637, 2638-44 (1998). 
75 Oliver Hart & John Moore, Contracts as Reference Points, 123 Q.J. ECON. 1, 1–3 (2008). 
76 Id. at 5-7. 
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No matter the precise theoretical underpinnings, recognizing that contracts play critical 
roles in fostering informal norms, contract designers commonly include coordination provisions.  
These provisions mitigate the risk of misunderstanding by structuring the means of efficient 
collaboration and clarifying each party’s roles.77  Contractual coordination provisions reflect a 
behavior-based orientation.  Such provisions specify the mutual goals of both parties and provide 
both concrete as well as more aphoristic ways that they can align their efforts.78  The threat of 
third-party involvement operates to nudge the parties into compliance.   
Procedurally, many forms of alternative dispute resolution rest on the same core intuition: 
parties may need nudges from third parties to reduce the risks of corrosive disputes caused by 
conflicting interests or misunderstandings, but they do not necessarily need formal enforcement.  
However, additional forms of pre-dispute procedural customizations could amplify the effects of 
braiding, coordination provisions, and alternative dispute resolution commitments.   
For instance, in some circumstances, it makes rational sense for parties to condition their 
behavior on some observable, random feature of the world—in other words, to correlate an 
equilibrium. The fundamental insight of correlated equilibria is that if parties have sufficiently rich 
opportunities to communicate, they can sometimes create the possibility of additional stable 
strategies where neither party has an incentive to defect.79  Professors Jennifer Brown and Ian 
Ayres use this idea to explain a function of mediation.80  They demonstrate that a mediator 
 
77 Steven R. Salbu, S. R., Evolving Contract as a Device for Flexible Coordination and Control, AM. BUS. LAW L.J., 34(3), 
329–384 (1997). 
78 Id. 
79 See generally Robert J. Aumann, Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality, 55 ECONOMETRICA 1 
(1987); Robert J. Aumann, Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies, 1 J. MATH.MATHEMATICAL ECON. 67 
(1974); see also, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1050-57 
(2017). 
80 Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 VA. L. REV. 323 (1994).  
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randomly choosing between alternative resolutions of a dispute can produce a solution that 
enhances value for both disputants. 
While Professors Brown and Ayres demonstrate their point by considering a battle of the 
sexes game, the insight applies to other game theoretic impasses, including, perhaps most usefully 
for the purposes of thinking about pre-dispute procedural innovations, hawk/dove games.81  In a 
hawk/dove game, each player selects between an aggressive strategy—“Hawk”—where she 
demands her way—and a passive strategy—“Dove”—where she defers to others. In a two-person 
version, both players rank the four possible outcomes as follows, starting with the best: (1) playing 
Hawk against Dove; (2) playing Dove against Dove; (3) playing Dove against Hawk; and (4) playing 
Hawk against Hawk. The pure strategy equilibria are Hawk/Dove and Dove/Hawk because, 
although Dove against Dove is attractive, each party could fare better by defecting and playing 
Hawk while the other plays Dove.   
While both parties would prefer to play Hawk, the worst outcome by far would be for both 
to do so.  In short, both parties agree on the worst outcome and recognize that they each have an 
incentive to choose a strategy that could lead to that outcome.  But parties cannot necessarily 
coordinate a solution merely between themselves, unless they both commit to never play Hawk.  
Instead, however, parties can commit to give a decision maker, post-dispute, limited authority to 
 
81 Conventionally described, players in a battle of the sexes game choose between Strategy O and Strategy B where 
matching the strategies (OO or BB) produces a higher payoff for both players than failing to match (OB or BO).  The two 
matching outcomes are equilibria.  The players each prefer reaching either equilibrium to either of the two non-equilibrium 
outcomes.  But the gains from each matching equilibrium are not equally shared, so the each party prefers one over the 
other.  If each player selects the strategy necessary to produce her desired outcome (for instance Player 1 picks O and 
Player 2 picks B), the result is one of the non-equilibrium outcomes, which hurts both parties.  Without a means of 
predictably and credibly correlating on strategy, both parties lose either by failing to agree or by misjudging what the 
other party will do.  Professors Brown and Ayres argue that a mediator can help resolve this impasse by randomizing 
recommendations and thus giving each party roughly a fifty-percent likelihood of achieving her preferred outcome.  They 
go on to formally prove that, given payoffs of 1 and 5 for each equilibria outcome, this solution produces more than a 




prevent a disastrous clash of wills—that is, prevent both parties from simultaneously playing 
Hawk—while giving each party roughly an equal chance of reaping the benefits of being a Hawk.   
In short, pre-dispute procedural commitments can help focus parties on solutions to 
coordination problems without significant investment in fact discovery or presentation of evidence.  
Mediation requirements might serve this function as might highly streamlined arbitration 
procedures, like, for example, some simplified baseball arbitrations, where parties are limited to 
little or no presentation of evidence.   
3.1.2.3 Mitigating the Risks of Litigation  
Parties often find themselves wedged between climbing costs and unpredictable 
judgments. Of course, if the risk premium of pursuing litigation exceeds whatever gains a party 
expects, that party should be willing to fully settle.  But, as I have discussed elsewhere, there are 
many reasons why parties might want to rein in the riskiness of dispute resolution but still continue 
their fight.82  Various forms of procedural contracting can function to hedge against outlier 
outcomes, reducing the risks posed by shading and thus opening up possibilities for more useful 
litigation. 
For instance, parties might opt to waive a jury. Although the use of a judge as a factfinder 
may reduce the overall costs of adjudication by eliminating the time and effort that goes into 
empaneling a jury and streamlining presentation of evidence, perhaps the most important reason 
parties choose to try a case to a judge is that judges may also be more predictable and 
conservative decision makers.  A sizeable literature addresses the possibility that juries are less 
predictable and more extreme in their decisions.83  Eliminating a jury, then, can stabilize litigation 
expectations. 
 
82 Blair, supra note 16, at 779-80. 
83 See, e.g., John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers' and Executives' Opinions, 3 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 21, 33-34 (1998) (presenting evidence from interviews and surveys suggesting that juries are less 
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Parties may carry this logic further and opt to waive recourse to public courts and judges in 
favor of being able to choose their own adjudicator in arbitration.  Arbitration may be quicker and 
cheaper than resorting to courts and thus conserve on litigation costs,84 but perhaps more 
importantly, arbitration enables the parties to choose a decision maker with greater expertise in the 
subject matter of the dispute.85  Essentially, opting into arbitration and specifying arbitrator 
expertise can render litigation even more predictable than trying a case to a judge, in certain 
circumstances. 
In addition to selecting a decision maker, parties might reach some form of award-
modification agreement.  So-called baseball arbitration or final offer arbitration provides a good 
example.  In baseball arbitration, parties each submit a “final” offer of judgment.  The arbitrator has 
no power to award anything other than one of the two offers.86  Baseball or final offer arbitration 
functions not only to delimit arbitrator discretion but also to incentivize parties to make more 
reasonable demands.  If one party’s demand is seen as excessive or extreme by an arbitrator, the 
arbitrator will likely opt for the other party’s final offer.  This sort of dispute resolution simultaneously 
curtails risks of adjudicator error and dissuades at least the most extreme forms of opportunistic 
litigation posturing.     
 
accurate and more extreme); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 
102-03 (2000) (discussing reasons why juries might be more extreme).  
84 See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 451 (2010). 
85 See, e.g., Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E. Keer, International Private Commercial Arbitration: Expectations and 
Perceptions of Attorneys and Business People: A Forced-Rank Analysis, 30 INT’L BUS. LAW. 203, 203–04 (2002) 
(identifying arbitrator expertise as a factor in choosing arbitration over other forms of adjudication); DOUGLAS SHOTZ ET. 
AL,., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: PERCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE 
COUNSEL 16 (2011), available at http://www .rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND_TR781.pdf 
(reporting that almost 70% of corporate-counsel survey respondents listed the ability to control the arbitrator’s 
qualifications as an attribute that encourages arbitration). 
86 The process was first proposed by Carl Stevens in 1966. See generally, Carl Stevens, Is Compulsory Arbitration 




Other similar modifications are imaginable.  The key point is that parties can bracket risks 
associated with litigation by stipulating ahead of time to certain procedures.  Doing so allows them 
to prevent extreme outcomes by eliminating risks associated with a decision maker’s discretion or 
risks associated with extortionate demands by a counterparty. 
3.1.2.4 Directly Reducing the Costs of Litigation 
    Perhaps most intuitively, parties can agree on pre-dispute customizations that directly 
reduce the costs of litigation.  Avoiding wasteful, offsetting litigation expenditures can be a critical 
advantage to procedural contracting.      
Parties already modify procedure ex post by adjusting the timing and other pedestrian 
aspects of litigation. These minor post-dispute procedure-modification agreements reduce costs 
by allowing the parties to disperse their obligations sensibly, avoiding what can be an expensive 
bunching or inefficient overlapping of deadlines.  But parties can do more to simplify or streamline 
the process by which their dispute will be resolved ex ante through waivers of rights to present oral 
testimony, waivers of objections to personal jurisdiction, agreements to treat a summary judgment 
proceeding as a trial on the merits, agreements to expedited trials with a magistrate judge or to 
expedited arbitration processes, agreeing to sets of stipulated facts, waiving rights to appeal, 
setting limits on discovery, and other similar mechanisms.   
More innovatively, parties could cap their expenditures through litigation budgets, which 
could be absolute or scaled to the amount in controversy.87  Essentially, each party could present a 
proposed litigation budget.  A court or tribunal would examine the proposed budgets, in light of the 
needs of the case, and lock in the amount that each party can spend on the litigation.  A variation 
of this system has been used by British courts since 2013.88 
 
87 Tidmarsh, supra note 47, at 4 n.8. 
88 These are called Precedent H Cost Budgets.  CPR 3.12–.18 (effective Apr. 1, 2013). 
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As with other sorts of procedural alteration, the point is that parties can directly reduce the 
costs of litigation.  By reducing costs, parties can eliminate or at least reduce the harm caused by 
any post-dispute opportunism. 
3.1.3 Summary 
Contract enforcement has long been underappreciated in contract design.  For years, 
contract theory treated judicial competence as a binary proposition: either courts could verify 
compliance with a contract variable or they could not.89  But verifiability of contractual performance 
by a court or tribunal is a matter of degree, not dichotomy.90  In circumstances where adjudicators 
are more prone to errors, parties have greater room to engage in costly post-dispute opportunism 
or shading.  
Pre-dispute procedural customization can offer parties a variety of mechanisms for 
confronting this sort of litigation opportunism.  Individually or in combination, these mechanisms 
can work with substantive contract design to maximize the incentive gains from trade.  We might 
then expect to see parties engaging in regular and robust procedural customization.  As the next 
Part discusses, however, the story is more complicated.   
 Current Empirical Evidence Regarding Party Procedural Customization 
Given the potential benefits of procedural customization to address litigation opportunism, it 
would be easy to predict that parties have a lot to gain from routinely fine-tuning procedure in their 
contracts.  Much of the existing empirical evidence, however, does not support this prediction.  
Instead, public procedural rules seem to exert a strong gravitational pull.  As a result, a number of 
 




empirical studies have attempted, expressly or implicitly, to gain insight into what Professor David 
Hoffman has dubbed “the procedural dog that hasn’t barked.”91   
It is important to note, up front, the limitations of existing evidence.  Only two studies, to 
date, purport to paint a comprehensive picture of pre-dispute procedural customization.92  Other 
studies tend to focus on isolated procedural modification provisions or groups of provisions.  Few 
studies differentiate data sets based on transaction type.  Accordingly, the extant empirical 
evidence remains tentative and incomplete.   
This Part, however, reviews the existing evidence holistically and reveals a general, though 
still nascent, picture of procedural contracting.  That picture turns out to be more complicated and 
nuanced than early analyses suggested.  As early studies showed, parties routinely customize 
procedure through the selection or omission of coarse bundles of rules.  But contrary to what has 
sometimes been assumed, this does not exhaust the range of customization we see in practice.  
Instead, parties occasionally make more granular, albeit modular, customizations, such as applying 
different bundles of procedures on a claim-by-claim basis and thus enhancing the resolution of 
contract procedure.  Moreover, if parties opt out of the public dispute resolution system and into 
arbitration, they commonly engage in more à la carte tailoring, particularly when it comes to details 
about arbitrators and the standards of decision they use.  Perhaps most intriguingly, some parties, 
some of the time, fashion extensive and detailed procedural frameworks that distribute dispute 
resolution work among various entities, provide for informal and formal enforcement, and offer 
 
91 Hoffman, supra note 12.    
92 Some limited empirical work has been conducted to evaluate the extent to which parties engage in post-dispute 
customization.  Some commentators have speculated, however, that post-dispute customization is also rare.  See, e.g., 
Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1342 (2012) 
(finding few examples of agreements entered into after filing, other than extensions of time for filing and similar modest 
adjustments to scheduling); Hoffman, supra note 12, at 393 (suggesting that procedure-related agreements are not as 
common as generally imagined).   
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intricate opportunities for information sharing and trust building while reducing the space within 
which conflict can fester.    
This section reviews the evidence, starting with the two comprehensive studies.  It then 
turns to a brief overview of what more specialized studies can tell us generally about procedural 
contracting.  It next summarizes recent work demonstrating that parties do, from time to time, 
engage in more robust and extensive procedural contracting, creating a bespoke framework within 
which the integrity and meaning of their contracts is tested and refined.  This Part concludes by 
tying all the threads together to provide a mosaic of procedural contracting. 
3.2.1 Two Comprehensive Studies of Procedural Contracting   
The first study to examine the waterfront of procedural contracting was by Professor 
Hoffman in 2014.93  While extremely useful as a starting point, this study ultimately caries only 
limited empirical weight, as Professor Hoffman himself acknowledged.  Professor Hoffman 
conducted broad key-word searches of material contracts filed with the SEC.94  Accordingly, his 
research is unable to provide precision about the frequency with which customizations occur or 
any consistent patterns of customization.  Instead, his work allows for general inferences about the 
relative prevalence of particular procedural terms, but the results are necessarily impressionistic.95  
While he provides some of his text searches, he does not give enough information to allow 
subsequent researchers to entirely replicate his findings.  Nevertheless, because he was the first 
person to systematically evaluate a wide range of procedural customizations, the conclusion he 
 
93 Professor Hoffman’s review is extensive, but it excludes analysis of arbitration clauses. As a result, his conclusions 
omit consideration of an important facet of procedural contracting.  Hoffman, supra note 12, at 395.  His justification for 
omitting arbitration is that the more informal nature of arbitration allows for easier ex post tailoring of procedural rules and 
thus makes it cheaper to forgo negotiations about procedural modifications ex ante.  See id. at 405.  This argument, 
however, overlooks other frictions that might impede post-dispute customizations and minimizes the importance of pre-
dispute customization on the performance incentives of the parties.  
94 Id. at 13.  Professor Hoffman also conducted a hand-coded analysis of 1200 credit card agreements, but my interest 
in this paper is on procedural autonomy between commercial parties. 
95 Id. at 22. 
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reaches is foundational: “[E]ven in circumstances where we’d expect them to, parties almost never 
use [ex ante] contract terms to vary their post-dispute procedural contests.”96  
Still, it is worth nothing that Professor Hoffman’s own findings may caution against reading 
his conclusion for all it is worth.  Indeed, despite his conclusion, he references a number of 
examples of particularized customizations including:   
• Approximately a dozen contracts requiring particular claims to be pled as affirmative 
defenses.97   
• A “handful” of examples of parties seeking to control court jurisdiction by waving 
the right to remove or stipulating to personal jurisdiction.98  
• Instances of parties limiting their counterparties’ ability to produce documents in 
suits with third parties—typically, in indemnification agreements.99  
• Dozens of examples of contracts where parties are provided inspection rights for 
particular classes of documents, whether or not in formal litigation.100  
• Examples of parties contracting over evidence preservation obligations.101   
• Hundreds of contracts varying burdens of proof, particularly in indemnification 
agreements.102 
• And dozens of examples of contracts modifying evidentiary rules in court 
proceedings.103 
 
96 Id. at 28. 
97 Id. at 22 n. 115. 
98 Id. at 20 n. 111-12. 
99 Id. at 125 n.131. 
100 Id. at 126 n. 132. 
101 Id. at 126 n. 133. 
102 Id. at 127 n. 139-40 (citing Scott & Triantis, supra note 2, at 867 n. 165.). 
103 Id. at 30-31. 
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Perhaps most significantly, Professor Hoffman recognizes that parties to arbitration agreements 
tend to engage in more individualized customization.104  For instance, he finds that “in many 
arbitration agreements, the parties specified the particulars of discovery.”105  Additionally, he 
concludes that “parties often contract to permit hearsay testimony in arbitration” or waive other 
formal rules of evidence.106  In short, he finds, overall, that arbitration clauses generally provide 
more “bespoke procedural clauses, and that removing such contracts from the overall sample 
depressed rates at which bespoke procedure occurred.”107 
In 2015, Professor Mark Weidemaier extended Professor Hoffman’s work by collecting and 
hand coding a data set of 402 material contracts that were attached as exhibits to corporate SEC 
filings between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2012.108  He examined these contracts for a 
broad range of procedural terms, and by considering changes over time, he was able to make 
some inferences about behavioral shifts caused by disruptive events or alterations in party 
attitudes.109  Professor Weidemaier’s findings provide additional details about how parties 
customize procedure.   
Perhaps most significantly, he finds that parties do routinely engage in several forms of 
customization.  In particular, in 76.1% of his sample, parties included an arbitration or forum 
selection clause, accordingly incorporating bundles of procedures.110  Parties also routinely 
 
104 Importantly, as discussed in note 96, supra, Professor Hoffman does not focus on arbitration clauses, arguing that 
they present different issues.  He nevertheless draws several conclusions about the prevalence of procedural 
customization in arbitration.  
105 Id. at 25. 
106 Id. at 32 (noting that he uncovered more than 200 arbitration agreements so doing). 
107 Id. at 39 (speaking particularly about the Credit Card Database but speculating that the finding there implied a more 
general trend). 
108 Weidemaier, supra note 20, at 1906. 
109 See id.  
110 See id. at 1912.  Procedural rules are generally provided by the forum.  This number differs to some degree from 
other empirical studies.  See infra n. 110. 
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included other provisions that chose between groups of procedures or opted out of procedures, 
including jury trial waivers in 15.2% of contracts where arbitration was not chosen,111 carve-ins in 
23.2% of contracts where arbitration was not chosen,112 and attorney fee shifting provisions in a 
significant minority of all contracts.113  Indeed, even in contracts “without arbitration or forum 
selection clauses [] most include at least one other procedural modification” that has the effect of 
selecting or opting out of a set of procedural rules.114 
He also observes, as did Professor Hoffman, that parties engage in more à la carte 
specification of procedural terms in arbitration than they do in public court litigation.115  Parties who 
opt for arbitration commonly contract over the number of arbitrators and their qualifications or 
expertise, arbitration costs, and at least some aspects of the hearing, including, most frequently, 
the location of the hearing.116  A significant minority of parties also contract over standards of 
decision, which regulate the authority an arbitrator has to decide the merits of a dispute, or 
contract over bundles of discovery, pleading, and evidentiary rules.117    
Notwithstanding his findings, Professor Weidemaier concludes that “[w]hat contracts 
almost never do—in either arbitration or litigation—is dictate the particulars of pre-trial and trial 
 
111 Weidemaier, supra note 20, at 1922, tab. 4. 
112 Id. Professor Weidemaier defines a “carve-in” as a provision that sends “narrow questions, such as those involving 
scientific or financial matters, for binding resolution by private experts.”  Id. at 1912.  As Professor Weidemaier notes, 
such provisions are, —at least sometimes, —interpreted by courts as limited scope arbitration provisions.  Compare, 
e.g., Evanston Ins. Co. v. Cogswell Props., LLC, 683 F.3d 684, 693-94 (6th Cir. 2012) (appraisal process did not 
constitute arbitration) and Salt Lake Tribune Pub. Co. v. Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 390 F.3d 684, 689-92 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(same) with Fit Tech, Inc. v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 374 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting a clause providing 
for “final determination” of certain valuation issues by accounting firm constituted arbitration). 
113 Weidemaier, supra note 20, at 1922, tab. 4. 
114 Id. at 1912-13. 
115 See id. at 1929 (“Taking these arbitration-specific clauses into account, parties who agree to arbitrate adopt, on 
average, significantly more additional customized procedures (3.4) than parties who designate a judicial forum as the 
default setting for resolving disputes (0.83).”). 
116 See id. at 1925-30. 
117 See id. at 1929. 
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practice.”118  Instead, parties rely on the procedural rules of the forum that they have chosen to 
specify terms like pleading rules, evidence gathering, burdens of proof, and other similar issues.119  
As Professor Hoffman’s conclusion did, however, Professor Weidemaier’s may overstate 
his own findings.  While it appears from both studies that robust procedural tailoring is 
comparatively rare and parties primarily engage in modular customizations of procedure, parties 
do, sometimes, contract over more fine-grained procedural rules, especially in arbitration.    
3.2.2 Particularized Studies of Specific Procedural Contracting Terms 
Outside of the studies discussed in the previous section, other empirical investigations into 
procedural contracting focus on limited subsets of possible procedural customizations, looking for 
evidence about how frequently parties incorporate specific provisions into their deals. Accordingly, 
their methodologies and conclusions differ.  Nevertheless, in combination, these studies yield a 
general picture of the practice of procedural contracting.  With some exceptions discussed shortly, 
that picture generally reinforces the conclusion that most procedural customization is modular.120        
A good deal of evidence demonstrates that many commercial parties engage coarse forms 
of customization, primarily selecting between or abandoning bundles of procedural rights.121  
Parties, in short, commonly choose where their disputes will be heard and who will resolve them.  
They almost always contract for choice of law clauses,122 regularly include forum selection 
 
118 Id. at 1872; see also id. at 1931 (“Yet, aside from forum selection and choice of law clauses, [procedural contracting] 
rarely happens.”).   
119 See id. 
120 See, e.g., O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 12, at 137 (“[D]espite the robust academic literature on the subject, 
real-world customization is largely absent, although we find some evidence that it is slowly increasing over time.”); 
Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, supra note 17, at 1955-61, 1990-91 (“[Parties do almost] nothing to change the rules of 
procedure that would apply as a matter of default in these fora . . . .”). 
121 See Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, supra note 17, at 1955-61, 1990-91 (describing procedural contracting primarily 
as a choice between litigation and arbitration, supplemented by an election to reserve certain claims or remedies for an 
alternate forum).  
122 See, e.g., Ex Ante Choices, supra note 110, at 1987 tbl.2 (all merger agreements in sample designate governing law); 
see also Hoffman, supra note 12, at 410 (finding over 1,000 contracts each year in text-based search of SEC material 
contracts); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and 
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clauses,123 frequently include clauses choosing arbitration,124 often contract for clauses choosing 
arbitration but providing some sort of “carve-outs” that allow parties to go court in some subset of 
disputes,125 commonly include jury trial waivers,126 and sometimes contract for attorney fee 
provisions.127 
Importantly, however, several of these studies observe that procedural customizations vary 
significantly depending on the transaction type or the category of dispute at issue.128  For instance, 
Professors Erin O’Hara O’Connor and Christopher R. Drahozal have observed that parties in four 
types of transactions – technology contracts, CEO employment contracts, joint-venture contracts, 
 
Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1504 (2009) (finding that all 
contracts studied contained choice of law clauses). 
123 Findings vary from study to study, but the numbers seem to consistently support the conclusion that at least a third of 
commercial contracts include a forum selection clause.  See, e.g., id. at 1504 tbl.11 (finding that 38.9% of a sample of 
commercial contracts included choice of forum clause); Ex Ante Choices, supra note 110, at 1987 (finding that 52.5% of 
a sample of merger agreements included choice of forum clause); see also Hoffman, supra note 12, at 407-08 
(concluding based on text search of SEC filings that “a plurality of contracts choose forum”); Steven M. Davidoff, 
Delaware’s Competitive Reach, 9 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 92 (2012) (finding that 60% of the merger agreements in the sample 
selected Delaware as their choice of forum). 
124 See, e.g., O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 120, at 161 tbl.1 (2012) (finding that 51.5% of a sample of CEO 
employment contracts required arbitration of some or all disputes); Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, supra note 17, at, at 
1973 (finding that 47.5% of a sample of technology contracts included an arbitration clause, with substantial variation 
across contract types); E.g., Matthew C. Jennejohn, Contract Adjudication in a Collaborative Economy, 5 VA. L. & BUS. 
REV. 173, 197 (2010) (“[Parties to collaborative agreements] resort to arbitration far more often than commercial parties 
resolving disputes relating to more traditional types of commercial contracts.”).  
125 For example, O’Hara O’Connor et al. found such carve-outs in nearly half of a sample of CEO employment contracts. 
O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 17, at 167-68. Likewise, Drahozal and O’Hara O’Connor found routine use of carve-
outs in arbitration clauses in samples of joint venture, technology, and franchise agreements. Drahozal & O’Hara 
O’Connor, supra note 17, at 21-31. 
126 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Do Juries Add Value?: Evidence from an Empirical Study of Jury Trial Waiver 
Clauses in Large Corporate Contracts, (2006) CORNESS L. FAC. PUB. paper 67, at 3 (finding about 20% of 2,800 
commercial contracts contained jury trial waivers, although also finding substantial variance across contract type, ranging 
from 1.9% to 64.5%).  
127 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical 
Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 350-52 (2013) (finding that 37.1% of the contracts in their 
sample adopted the American rule, while 36.4% adopted the English rule).  
128 Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller and Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of 
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 MICH. J.L. REFORM 871 (2008) (reviewing literature 
finding rates of arbitration clause utilization varies widely with contract type); Drahozal & Ware, supra note 84, at 457-67, 
470-72 (contesting Eisenberg’s results and further arguing for differences between kinds of markets); Christopher R. 
Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittlock, Franchising, Arbitration, and the Future of the Class Action, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 
275, 278 (2009). 
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and franchise contracts – use arbitration clauses with very particular carve-outs.129 These parties 
seek to protect their information and intellectual property rights through public courts rather than 
through arbitration.130  Specifically, they find that parties frequently opt to have claims related to 
their noncompete, confidentiality, and non-solicitation clauses, as well as their trademark, 
copyright, patent rights, and trade secrets resolved in courts.131    
Moreover, some customizations that seem generic or coarsely modular may, in 
combination, reflect more precise tailoring than previous studies suggested.  For example, one 
recent and important paper, by Darius Palia and Robert Scott, collects evidence indicating that 
sophisticated parties often pair jury trial waivers with forum and choice of law clauses selecting 
New York.132  In isolation, each mechanism would appear to be merely a coarse modular 
refinement of procedure that could easily be lumped in with other routine but minor customizations.  
The paper concludes, however, that sophisticated parties are more carefully refining their contracts 
in order “to reduce the back end costs of litigation, especially the costs of contract interpretation 
disputes.”133  Essentially, the hypothesis is that this combination of modular procedural alterations 
allows parties to lock the content of their contracts by selecting a jurisdiction that uses textualist 
contract interpretation rules and avoiding the uncertainty associated with lay factfinders.134  These 
provisions, in other words, are not mere boilerplate that appears in standard M&A templates.  Nor 
are these provisions merely macro-level choices about bundles of procedure.  Parties, instead, 
 
129 See Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Christopher R. Drahozal, The Essential Role of Courts for Supporting Innovation, 92 TEX. 
L. REV. 2177, 2185 (2014). 
130 See id. at 2181. 
131 Id. 
132 See, e.g., Darius Palia and Robert E. Scott, Ex Ante Choice of Jury Waiver Clauses in Mergers, 17 AM. LAW AND ECON. 
REV. 566, 586 (2015). 
133 Id. at 585. 
134 Id. at 586. 
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seem to be evaluating their transaction-specific needs and tailoring their agreements to meet those 
needs by carefully selecting bundles of rules and procedures. 
  In short, particularized studies of procedural customization demonstrate that parties 
regularly customize procedure through selection or omission of bundles of pre-fabricated 
procedures.  But this does not exhaust the waterfront of customization.  Instead, at least some of 
the time, some parties are making more concerted modular changes than previously recognized, 
thoughtfully pairing various procedural regimes with substantive provisions in order to maximize 
gains from trade. 
3.2.3 Recent Evidence Demonstrating Highly-Customized Procedural Contracting 
Finally, some of the time, parties engage in robust and highly customized procedural 
contracting.  Parties often use more granular, if still modular, claim-by-claim selection of 
procedures.  But particularly in alliance agreements where parties pool their specific capabilities in 
order to mutually exploit strategic interdependency, they also regularly create intricate procedural 
regimes.  These regimes distribute dispute resolution among various decision makers, some 
private and some public, and provide feedback loops that generate additional information, bolster 
trust, and minimize the discursive space within which ongoing disputes can fester. 
 The segregation of disputes into various categories allows parties to direct different types of 
disputes to different tribunals with different sets of rules and levels of expertise.135  This resembles 
the coarser sorts of customization that earlier empirical literature identified, through the use of 
forum selection clauses or arbitration clauses, but it takes place at a higher degree of resolution.136  
 
135 See, e.g., Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, supra note 17, at 1966-69 (analyzing the use of bifurcated dispute resolution 
provisions in a variety of agreement types).  Professors Drahozal and O’Hara provide a foundational starting point for the 
phenomena of “carve-outs.”   
136 See, e.g., Jennejohn, supra note 17, at 362 (showing that in a sample set of 146 agreements, over one-third 
bifurcated or trifurcated dispute resolution between different adjudicators).   
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This sort of granular customization seems to increase as deals become more complex and 
collaborative.137 
 At some point, when the outcome of a collaboration becomes impossible to specify ex 
ante, parties layer in informal escalation procedures, often requiring that disagreements be 
addressed by higher levels of management when subordinates become deadlocked.  More formal 
modes of dispute resolution function as a backstop if an impasse cannot be overcome.138   As 
Professor Stipanowich noted nearly twenty years ago,  
As lawyers and contracting parties have become more familiar with various 
strategies for out-of-court resolution of disputes, they have explored the possibilities 
of combining two or more approaches in multi-step dispute resolution programs. 
Such stepped ‘filtering systems’—increasingly visible in construction, commercial 
and employment contracts as well as the voluntary system employed by e-Bay for 
resolution of thousands of buyer/seller disputes—begin with informal negotiation 
and, if necessary, proceed to mediation; arbitration or litigation remains a last 
resort. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it is a rare dispute that survives the initial 
steps of such programs.139  
 
This staged dispute resolution process not only helps resolve conflicts, but it also generates 
information and fosters ongoing engagement.140   
Professors Cathy Hwang and Matthew Jennejohn have observed a similar distributed 
dispute resolution process in merger and acquisition agreements.141  They note that pre-closing 
disputes are often sent to specialized courts in Delaware, where injunctive relief is readily 
available.142  Post-closing disputes are frequently bifurcated, with routine contract-based disputes 
being sent to state or federal courts but contingent consideration disputes – disputes arising out of 
 
137 See id. 
138 See id. 
139 Thomas Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 831, 853 (2001). 
140 See infra 110. 
141 Cathy Hwang & Matthew Jennejohn, Deal Structure, 113 NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 279, 328-29 (2018). 
142 Id. at 328. 
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a purchase price adjustment or an earn out, for instance – being sent to arbitration, often before 
accountants.143 
 Professor Andrew Verstein has also documented a related phenomenon in the context of 
construction disputes, where he observes the functioning of dispute resolution boards in 
construction contracts.144  Dispute boards are panels of neutral experts selected by the parties and 
convened at the start of a construction project.145  These boards allow parties to delegate ex post 
specification of terms to decision makers who are more experienced than generalized courts while 
preserving the possibility of escalating a dispute that is not satisfactorily resolved by the board to 
an arbitrator.146  While a board’s decision does not become binding as an adjudication, it provides 
transactional stability to parties by resolving uncertainty on a rolling basis, thereby generating 
ongoing information and the ingredients for trust. 
 The critical point is that, at least sometimes, parties create highly tailored enforcement 
systems.  These systems often involve the modular selection of bundles of procedures to apply to 
different categories of disputes.  These systems are frequently more granular than some previous 
literature on carve-outs has appreciated.  In addition, these systems layer in multiple opportunities 
for informal exchanges of information and resolution.  Combined, these systems demonstrate that 
parties are making bespoke decisions about where and how their disputes will be resolved.      
3.2.4 Summary 
The totality of empirical evidence currently available demonstrates greater frequency and 
diversity of procedural contracting than early commentators supposed.  While the evidence 
suggests that, most of the time, parties customize procedure by choosing between or opting out 
 
143 Id. 
144 See generally, Andrew Verstein, Ex Tempore Contracting, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1869 (2014).  
145 Id. at 1896. 
146 See id. at 1875. 
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of bundles of procedures, there are several important caveats.  First, parties engage in more 
atomistic, albeit modular, customizations in some situations, for instance assigning some 
categories of disputes to one decision maker and other categories of disputes to another decision 
maker.  Additionally, parties who choose to opt out of the public adjudicatory system and arbitrate 
their disputes often engage in more a la carte customizations.  Finally, in some situations, parties 
design complicated and intricate dispute resolution regimes that blend informal and formal 
enforcement mechanisms to solve disputes, minimize the incidence of them, and generate ongoing 
information and trust.   
 Anticipating Procedural Innovation 
As the previous section shows, parties can and do customize procedure in dramatic ways.  
But the diversity of design decisions we see in practice has, to date, not been mapped into 
predictable patterns.  As a result, some commentators have overlooked the pockets where most 
procedural contracting takes place.   To gain a clearer picture of how transactional designers can 
and do harness the power of procedural customization, I argue that we must recognize the impact 
of the transactional environment on contract design.147   
A growing literature on contract interpretation provides a valuable starting point.  Borrowing 
the typology advanced by Professors Gilson, Sabel, and Scott, such commercial party transactions 
can be usefully segregated into rough quadrants oriented along two axes, uncertainty and scale.148  
The risk of litigation opportunism differs in these four domains.  As a result, rational commercial 
parties should respond to that risk using procedural customization in different but predictable 
ways. 
 
147 Notably, some commentators have begun similar projects.  See, e.g., Drahozal & Ware, supra note 84, at 457–67 
(noting that arbitration clauses are most prevalent in ordinary contracts between businesses but are less likely to be 
found in contracts outside of the ordinary course of business, e.g., loan commitments and merger agreements). 
148 See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 22. 
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The following sections sketch an initial theory about when, how, and why parties will turn to 
procedural customization as the mix of uncertainty and scale changes.  These sections provide the 
starting point for a future, more focused empirical investigation.  But, as these sections conclude, 
the theory seems to map fairly well onto the existing evidence that we have about procedural 
autonomy. 
3.3.1 The Relationship Between Uncertainty and Litigation Opportunism     
As a general matter, uncertainty and litigation opportunism are positively correlated.  
Uncertainty, as used here, refers to the degree of disruption to commercial practices caused by 
unforeseeable technological or market changes.  As is customary in the literature, uncertainty 
should be distinguished from risk.149  The latter can be quantified while the former cannot.   
Contracts are conventionally thought of as regulating rights and obligations.  When uncertainty is 
low, parties, at the time of contracting, are in the position to understand or articulate well-defined 
rights and obligations in every relevant state of the world.  Parties can develop, in other words, a 
shared and reasonably unambiguous understanding of what counts as performance.150  They may 
do this through state contingent contracts that rely on complete and formal specification of 
contract terms with fewer open-ended standards.151  Or, in thicker markets, they may do this 
through relatively stable and shared industry norms.152   
In either case, when uncertainty is low, parties can estimate risks and address them ex 
ante at low cost, minimizing any future work of courts or tribunals should a dispute arise and 
 
149 The conventional distinction between uncertainty and risk applies here.  See, generally e.g., FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, 
UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921) (distinguishing between threats where the likelihood of the peril is nonquantifiable 
(uncertainty) and quantifiable (risk)); see also, e.g., PETER CLARKE, KEYES: THE RISE, FALL, AND RETURN OF THE 20TH CENTURY’S 
MOST INFLUENTIAL ECONOMIST 154–57 (2009).   
150 See Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 24, at 984. 
151 See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 22. 
152 See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 26, at 62-65.  
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should the parties opt to seek formal enforcement.  The parties agree on what performance is 
owed and only face difficulties of proof with respect to whether that performance was actually 
delivered.153  Adjudicators are less mistake-prone and parties less likely to encourage them, 
resulting in less enforcement uncertainty.  In short, the risks of litigation opportunism are minimal. 
As uncertainty rises, however, so too does the risk of a divergence between what an 
adjudicator can verify and what the parties actually intended at the time of contract formation.  
Uncertainty can emerge and grow in long-term contracts, transactions with extremely 
unpredictable outcomes, or contracts in which the parties’ ultimate goal is not clear, such as firms 
collaborating to discover new applications of cutting-edge research.154  With this emergence, both 
task and price specifications become more difficult.  It may be too expensive or even impossible for 
the parties to foresee and then describe appropriately the contractual outcomes for most possible 
future states of the world that might materialize.   At the most extreme levels of uncertainty, in 
contexts where parties are aligning to develop a new product or service, Professors Gilson, Sabel, 
and Scott have demonstrated that parties shift contracting to something that is capable of 
generating actions and setting terms of the exchange rather than specifying outcomes.155 
Greater levels of uncertainty open the door to one or both sides strategically exploiting the 
gap between verifiability and the parties’ original intentions.  In short, as uncertainty rises, so too 
does the risk of litigation opportunism. 
3.3.2 The Relationship Between Scale and Litigation Opportunism 
The relationship between scale and litigation opportunism is more subtle.  In general, 
though, greater scale tends to result in less room for opportunism.  Scale refers to the number of 
 
153 Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 24, at 984. 
154 See generally Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contracting for Innovation, supra note 36.  
155 See generally id. 
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similar parties are engaged in the same category of transaction.156  The more parties that share a 
particular set of contracting goals or challenges, the more likely it is that they or some trade 
association of which they are a part will have created standardized solutions that benefit from 
network and learning effects.157  These informal (or, more precisely, less formal, in the case some 
arbitration) enforcement mechanisms can be far more efficient than traditional public law and state-
run courts at regulating parties’ conduct.158   
As scale decreases, however, standardized solutions to contracting problems become 
more difficult.  With declining scale, parties have to rest more weight on formal contracts and 
formal modes of enforcement because the prerequisites for relational norms are weaker.  
Increasing reliance on contracts and legal enforcement creates more room for litigation 
opportunism. 
3.3.3 Litigation Opportunism in the Four Rough Domains of Commercial Party 
Transactions 
While no hard boundaries exist, the two axes of uncertainty and scale roughly divide the 
world of commercial party transactions into quadrants.  Each of these quadrants has a different 
litigation opportunism risk profile, and thus rational contract designers will harness the power of 
 
156 See  Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 22; Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 24, at 983-85 (distinguishing between 
“well-developed industrial settings and relatively stable competitive environments” and “relationships aimed at innovation” 
which are “subject to pervasive uncertainty”). 
157 Common use of a term or rule can create increasing returns for users.  Brian Arthur is responsible for much of the 
leading work on increasing returns in the context of product markets. See generally W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING 
RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY (1995) (collection of his works).  Network externalities exist where “the 
utility that a user derives from consumption of a good increases with the number of other agents consuming the good.”  
Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 483 (1998).  A 
distinction can be drawn between learning effects and network effects.  See Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner, 
Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VIR. L. REV. 713, 717 
(1997).  Learning effects arise when a firm adopts a contract term that has been commonly used in the past, regardless 
of whether other firms will continue using it in the future.  See, e.g., id. at 718-23.  
158 See, e.g., Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private 




procedural customization differently in each.  At the simplest, because procedural contracting is 
most effective at addressing litigation opportunism, when the risks of such opportunism are low, 
we would expect to see little procedural customization, and what customization takes place should 
be simple.  Conversely, when the risks of litigation opportunism are higher, we would expect to see 
more and more tailored procedural customization. 
3.3.3.1 Low Uncertainty, High Scale – Very Low Risk of Litigation Opportunism   
The most typical transactions in our economy involve contracts where many similar parties 
engage in routine transactions that may involve risk but typically involve little uncertainty.  These 
sorts of contracts commonly relate to commodities or routine sales of simple goods.159  In these 
environments, parties have little use for formal, written contracts, and even less use for formal 
enforcement of the contracts that exist.160  As a result, the risks of litigation opportunism are quite 
low, and rational contract designers will not invest in many procedural customizations. 
More concretely, in contexts of low-uncertainty and high-scale, written contracts are 
standardized documents, which often get relegated to the drawer once drafted by the legal 
department and then rarely consulted to resolve disputes.161  The transacting parties operate within 
large, well-developed industrial settings and relatively stable competitive environments.  This allows 
them to appeal to established informal norms for interpreting and adjusting their behavior rather 
than courts.162  Stewart Macaulay famously described this process in 1963: 
 
159 See, e.g., CHRISTIN BÜHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 136 (1996).  
160 See, e.g., O’Hara O’Connor & Drahozal, supra note 129, at 2177 (“In most commercial exchange, formal legal 
principles and court systems play a surprisingly small role for transacting parties.”).  
161 See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 26, at 61; Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 24, at 992-95. 
162 Informal modes of enforcement can be quite effective in many circumstances.  As Professor Macaulay discussed 
nearly thirty years ago, lived commercial practice often depends on non-legal relationship governance: 
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Most problems are avoided without resort to detailed planning or legal sanctions because 
usually there is little room for honest misunderstandings or good faith differences of opinion about 
the nature and quality of a seller’s performance. Although the parties fail to cover all foreseeable 
contingencies, they will exercise care to see that both understand the primary obligation on each 
side. Either products are standardized with an accepted description or specifications are written 
calling for production to certain tolerances or results. Those who write and read specifications are 
experienced professionals who will know the customs of their industry and those of the industries 
with which they deal. Consequently, these customs can fill gaps in the express agreements of the 
parties.163 
Professors Gillian Hadfield and Iva Bozovic conducted a similar updated survey study in 
2016 that confirms the same conclusions, at least for parties in contexts of low-uncertainty and 
high-scale.164  These parties were engaged in the sale or manufacturing of standardized products 
with characteristics that are relatively easy to specify, such as candies, brake systems, motorcycle 
wheels, plastic bags, and undergarments.165  Professors Hadfield and Bozovic found that these 
parties “paid little attention to formal contract terms” and “did not see courts as a significant means 
 
Contract planning and contract law, at best, stand at the margin of important long-term continuing 
business relations. Business people often do not plan, exhibit great care in drafting contracts, pay much 
attention to those that lawyers carefully draft, or honor a legal approach to business relationships. There 
are business cultures defining the risks assumed in bargains, and what should be done when things go 
wrong. People perform disadvantageous contracts today because often this gains credit that they can 
draw on in the future. People often renegotiate deals that have turned out badly for one or both sides. 
They recognize a range of excuses much broader than those accepted by most legal systems.  
Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465, 467-68 (1985); see also, e.g., Russell J. 
Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1, 5 (1992) (suggesting that “it is a delusion to 
assume that commercial conduct is primarily controlled by what is ‘legal’”); James J. White, Contract Law in Modern 
Commercial Transactions, An Artifact of Twentieth Century Business Life?, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 1-2 (1982) (conducting 
an empirical study of chemical and pharmaceutical companies and offering the “thesis that contract law is a much less 
significant determinant of commercial behavior in complex transactions than the typical law student, contracts professor, 
or lawyer dares believe”).  
163 See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 26, at 62-63. 
164 See Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 24, at 992-95. 
165 Id. at 992. 
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of enforcing contractual obligation.”166  Instead, as Macaulay found, these businesses looked to 
industry and relational norms to adapt to contingencies and respond to the behavior of their 
contracting partners.167 
 Even when uncertainty rises slightly, if the scale is great enough and the community of 
transactors is relatively insular, the community can opt out of public courts and into trade-
association-run private legal systems – often arbitration – to resolve disputes.168  Accordingly to 
Professor Bernstein, these sorts of systems may exist in “over fifty industries, including diamonds, 
grain, feed, independent films, printing, binding, peanuts, rice, cotton, burlap, rubber, hay and 
tea.”169 
These specialist arbitral institutions, however, are often geared towards bolstering informal 
modes of enforcement.  They supply expert decision makers who rely predominately on codified 
industry trade rules rather than publicly created rules (or industry norms or usages of trade).170  
Moreover, the parties rarely turn to public court enforcement of the awards of these tribunals, 
depending instead on extralegal sanctions, such as the threat of expulsion from the industry 
 
166 Id. at 992, 994. 
167 Id. at 993; see also, e.g., Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploratory 
Essay, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 319, 341 (1999) (noting prepayment and security as methods for insuring against 
nonperformance); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 58 (citing mediation as 
an alternative mechanism to resolve disputes); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support 
Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519–20 (1983) (arguing that hostage taking is “widely used to effect credible 
commitments”). 
168 See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and 
Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1745–54 (2001) [hereinafter, Bernstein, Private Commercial Law]; Lisa Bernstein, 
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
1765, 1771–77 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond 
Industry, 21 J. LEG. STUD. 115, 119–30 (1992) [hereinafter, Bernstein, Merchant Law]. 
169 Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 108 (Peter 
Newman ed., 1998). 
170 Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 168, at 1777-82; Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: 
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1731-34 (2001); Lisa Bernstein, 




association.171  Thus, even if parties occasionally need external enforcement help, they usually 
avoid the most formal sorts of enforcement in courts.172  
 Because formal legal enforcement is largely irrelevant to contracts in this low-uncertainty, 
high-scale domain, the risks of litigation opportunism are low or non-existent.  To the extent that 
parties might strategically game post-dispute informal enforcement, customized rules of procedure 
will not be helpful.  When uncertainty begins to creep up, parties might deploy a few coarse, 
modular customizations of procedure to opt out of courts and into arbitration or to otherwise 
simplify choice of forum and choice of law issues for the few occasions when courts might be 
used. 
 It is worth noting that this prediction may explain, or help to explain, the “procedural dog 
that hasn’t barked” problem.173  At a glance, all of the existing studies of procedural contracting 
suggest that the practice is rare, at least outside of coarse, modular customizations.174  This finding 
makes sense if the vast majority of contracts in the world fall within the low-uncertainty, high-scale 
domain.  A random sampling would include a majority of contracts in this domain and thus reveal 
that procedural customizations are rare and minor.  But this conclusion derives from transaction 
type not contract design.  Simply put, in this domain, written contracts are not that important for 
 
171 See, e.g., Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 168, at 1777-82 (“In most industries, however, it is rarely necessary 
for a party to seek judicial enforcement of an award. Merchant tribunals are able to place their own pressures on the 
parties to comply promptly with their decisions.”); Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 168, at 1737-38 
(observing that it “is rarely necessary” to seek enforcement of awards in court; instead threat of expulsion is “usually 
sufficient to induce merchants to promptly comply with arbitration decisions unless they are bankrupt or in severe 
financial distress”). 
172 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Private Ordering and International Commercial Arbitration, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1031, 
1032 (2009) (recognizing that private ordering is not dichotomous and hybrid choices between purely formal adjudication 
in public courts and completely private adjudication in industry trade arbitrations is possible).  For instance, Eric A. 
Feldman has described dispute resolution among Japanese merchants participating in the tuna auction at the Tokyo 
Central Wholesale Market.  See, generally, Eric A. Feldman, The Tuna Court: Law and Norms in the World’s Premier Fish 
Market, 94 CAL. L. REV. 313 (2006).  Unlike the merchants studied by Professor Bernstein, the Tokyo tuna merchants 
resolve disputes in a government-sponsored, albeit highly specialized, court.  See id.   
173 See infra Part II. 
174 See infra Part II. 
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any purpose, so contract design, including procedural customization, is not of paramount 
significance.   
This story would explain Professor Weidemaier’s conclusions, for instance.  Nearly 56% of 
the data set in Professor Weidemaier’s seminal study involve manufacturing/supply agreements, 
many or most of which very likely fall within the low-uncertainty, high-scope domain.175  Another 
22% are distribution agreements, at least some of which also likely fall within this domain.  
Accordingly, his conclusion that few parties customize procedure may be accurate, but this 
reflects only the reasonable practices of parties in the largest commercial party contracting domain 
where lawyers and contract design play a minimal role.  It does not necessarily reflect the value of 
procedural contracting in other domains.   
3.3.3.2 Low Uncertainty, Low Scale – Slightly More Risk of Litigation Opportunism  
As scale declines but uncertainty stays low, parties are not able to benefit from as many 
standardized solutions because their contracting needs are somewhat unique.  This happens in 
markets where there are relatively few participants, but the subject matter stays uncomplicated.  
The low degree of uncertainty allows parties to create state-contingent, bespoke contracts.176  
Effectively, parties provide within the contract their own clarity about the terms of performance, 
limiting the need for adjudicators to look beyond the four-corners of the document.177  Because the 
substantive terms are relatively unambiguous, adjudicators are less likely to make mistakes, which, 
in turn, reduces the space within which litigation opportunism can fester.  As a result, parties are 
unlikely to invest significant time or energy in procedural customizations.   
 
175 Weidemaier, supra note 20, at 1907. 
176 Scott, supra note 32, at 31. 
177 Id.; see also, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 952-55 (2010). 
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Depending on the precise degree of uncertainty present, we might anticipate slightly more 
customization than in the low-uncertainty, high-scale quadrant, however, because at the margins, 
more formal enforcement may be necessary.  Parties cannot depend as comprehensively on 
relational norms or industry-particular informal enforcement mechanisms, such as trade arbitration 
tribunals, as they can in higher-scale markets.  Although the work of any formal adjudication on the 
merits should be reasonably uncomplicated, parties might still be able to game litigation based on 
mechanics of a lawsuit, such as choice of forum or choice of law.  Accordingly, we might expect to 
see more parties to employ a few coarse, modular customizations of procedure aimed at 
simplifying these basic mechanics.   
This prediction seems to map onto the existing evidence.  For instance, Professor Scott 
discusses examples of licenses of patented electronic software as falling within this low-
uncertainty, low-scale domain.178  As he points out, such contracts can provide clear directions to 
a court of the context within which the specified uses of the licensed intellectual property are to be 
interpreted.179  This can happen through some combination of definitional clauses, purpose or 
“whereas” clauses, and appended examples provisions.180  Professor Scott does not explicitly look 
at the dispute resolution provisions in the two contracts he references, but both examples contain 
modular procedural customization, consistent with what the transactional space would suggest is 
appropriate. 
 
178 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 32, at 23 (citing to a Fountain Manufacturing Agreement Between Apple Computer Inc., 
and SCI Systems, Inc. (May 31, 1996) http://contracts.onecle.com /apple/scis.mfg.1996.05.31.shtml 
[http://perma.cc/YD36-B6BS] [hereinafter, Fountain Manufacturing Agreement]; and a Data Management Outsourcing 
Agreement Between Allstate Insurance Company and Acxiom Corporation, (March 19, 1999), 
http://contracts.onecle.com/acxiom/allstate.outsource.1999.03.19.sht ml [http://perma.cc/NAZ6-LDEA] [hereinafter, 
Data Management Outsourcing Agreement]).  Technically, Professor Scott labels these as presenting a “moderate” 
degree of uncertainty, but for purposes of the four-quadrant typology used in this Article, these contracts would fall in the 





In the 1996 Fountain Manufacturing Agreement Between Apple Computer Inc., and SCI 
Systems, Inc., the parties simply agreed to a forum – the Norther District of California – and a 
choice of law – California law.181  Similarly, in the 1999 Data Management Outsourcing Agreement 
Between Allstate Insurance Company and Acxiom Corporation, the parties agreed to an intricate 
series of informal dispute resolution escalation procedures.182  But these procedures merely aimed 
at bolstering informal enforcement, providing for resolution of “disputes arising in the ordinary 
course of the parties performance under this Agreement . . . by those directly involved.”183 Failing 
that, the contract provided for a staged escalation, keeping dispute resolution informal and trying 
to steer it out of courts.184  In the unlikely event that formal enforcement might be needed, the 
parties simply selected a forum and choice of law: federal or state court in Cook County Illinois and 
Illinois law.185  To effectuate this choice of forum, the parties also waived any personal jurisdiction 
arguments.186 
As uncertainty edges even higher, we see some parties segment their potential future 
disputes, carving out a handful of types of disputes for resolution in courts and other types for 
resolution in arbitration.  For instance, as Part II noted, Professors O’Hara O’Connor and Drahozal 
studied at least three categories of contracts that would fit squarely within this domain – 
technology contracts, CEO employment contracts, and franchise contracts.187  These three 
categories of contracts address somewhat unique issues for the contracting parties, but those 
issues largely involve risk, though uncertainty can creep into the calculus for some issues.  These 
 
181 Fountain Manufacturing Agreement, supra note 178, at ¶ 22.12. 
182 Data Management Outsourcing Agreement, supra note 178, at ¶21.1. 
183 Id. at ¶ 21.2. 
184 Id. at ¶ 21.3. 
185 Id. at ¶ 24.9. 
186 Id. 
187 See infra 156. 
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contracts tend to provide for generic arbitration for most fights, with little customization of 
arbitration procedures.  This makes sense for the low-uncertainty issues at stake.  But these 
contracts also carefully select carve-outs for certain categories of disputes, particularly disputes 
about information or intellectual property rights, where marginally greater degrees of uncertainty 
might be present.188  Professors O’Hara O’Connor and Drahozal suggest that these carve-outs 
exist for a number of reasons, including that these subcategories of disputes may have stakes that 
are sufficiently high to increase the harm of litigation opportunism, even if the probability of its 
occurrence remains low, and justify additional procedural customization.189  
In short, in contexts of low uncertainty and low scale, parties can usually address the risk of 
litigation opportunism through the use of state-contingent contracts.  Although parties might need 
to turn to formal enforcement occasionally, they can supply courts or general arbitration tribunals 
with sufficiently specified substantive terms to make adjudication of the substantive terms straight-
forward.  To the extent that some residual risk of litigation opportunism exists, it tends to relate to 
mechanics of lawsuits – such as concerns over where the lawsuits will be filed or what law will be 
applied – so we can observe parties making modular customizations focusing on who will decide 
the dispute and what law will be used.  As uncertainty edges slightly higher, some parties address 
increasing the hazard of litigation opportunism by making more granular, but still modular, carve-
outs for differing categories of disputes. 
 
188 See O’Hara O’Connor & Drahozal, supra note 129, at 2182. 
189 Id. (“The high stakes in at least some of the cases (such as trademark disputes for franchisors) also are important. 
Parties often prefer to have courts resolve ‘bet-the-company’ cases because the availability of appellate review reduces 
the risk of aberrational decisions.”).  
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3.3.3.3 High Uncertainty, High Scale – Moderate Risk of Litigation Opportunism 
In contexts of high uncertainty but high scale, parties are more likely to encounter 
unanticipated contingencies than those conducted in a stable environment.190  And parties struggle 
to identify obligations for each of those contingencies.  Accordingly, the primary substantive tool 
that designers turn to in this environment is the increasing use of standards that take advantage of 
a decision maker’s hindsight and thus allow for more flexibility in the specification of rights and 
obligations.191  This drafting technique necessarily injects the possibility of ambiguity about what 
counts as performance and breach and thus increases the potential for harmful litigation 
opportunism. 
But in high scale contexts, the parties can ameliorate that risk by looking to established 
industry norms, which help resolve that ambiguity ex post.  Because many contracting parties face 
the same or similar challenges, they can pool resources to come up with collective understandings.  
Even if these understandings would be difficult for general courts or adjudicators to verify, in high-
scale contexts, parties can turn to decision makers with an industry-rich understanding sufficient to 
convert observable phenomena into enforceable outcomes.192  These decision makers may be part 
of specialized arbitration tribunals or specialized courts.  For instance, Professor Scott has argued 
that parties can turn to courts that see a sufficiently large number of similar disputes to allow them 
to develop experience and expertise.193  Examples of such courts are Delaware Chancery courts 
for corporate matters or the Santa Clara County Superior Court for industrial disputes arising in 
Silicon Valley.194   
 
190 See Michael J. Leiblein, The Choice of Organizational Governance Form and Performance: Predictions from 
Transaction Cost, Resource-Based, and Real Options Theories, 29 J. MANAG. 937–961 (2003).  
191 See, e.g., Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 22. 
192 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 32, at 32. 
193 Scott, supra note 32, at 33-34. 
194 See id. 
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In terms of procedural customization, this means that parties in high uncertainty but high scale 
environments are usually able to combat litigation opportunism effectively through simple modular 
customizations of procedure that opt into these specialized tribunals.  Parties are unlikely to need 
or want much additional customization, since a primary advantage of these specialized decision 
makers is their ability to leverage hindsight to achieve more accurate outcomes.  Parties would run 
the risk, with complex procedural customization, of hamstringing these specialized adjudicators 
and undercutting their ability to extract value from vague standards included in the substantive 
terms of the contract. 
Alternatively, if sufficient interdependencies exist, parties in high-scale contexts may be able 
to forego most formal enforcement altogether.  For example, Professor Lisa Bernstien has explored 
the ways that mid-western original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”) and their suppliers use long 
and detailed contracts to establish space for extra-legal modes of enforcement.195  Effectively, 
these contracts are “artfully designed to create a framework for growing relational social capital 
and leveraging network governance.”196   
In one sense, OEM contracts are relatively predictable, as they often involve the supply of discrete 
and already-existing goods.197  But the long-term nature of these contracts, the fact that buyers 
expect strict compliance regarding quality, the need for on time delivery, and a host of logistics-
related requirements, including the interdependency of buyers on multiple suppliers, creates high 
degrees of uncertainty.198  Professor Bernstien concludes that transacting parties have been able 
 
195 See Bernstein, supra note 53, at 562. 
196 Id. at 564-65. 
197 Professor Bernstien notes that many OEM relationships, in the modern world, also involve elements of innovation.  In 
fact, “tapping supplier innovation . . . is the second-highest [procurement] priority, and includes actively attracting and 
developing the most innovative suppliers to help generate new ideas.” Id. at 610 n.155 (quotation omitted).  To the extent 
that OEM relationships spin into contracts for innovation, they may more aptly be considered collaborative innovation 
contracts and fall within the high-uncertainty, low-scale domain discussed in the following section. 
198 See id. at 578. 
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to confront this uncertainty with only minimal reliance on the legal system, in large part because the 
network in which they function serves as a contract governance mechanism.199  Effectively, parties 
can learn the pattern of past alliances and connections in the deal-relevant network, and this 
results in “opportunism [being] mitigated by a counterparty’s reputation among [and position in 
relation to] potential future contracting partners, not just through its reputation with preexisting 
partners.”200  As a result, although there are high levels of uncertainty, parties are able to avoid 
most litigation or dispute opportunism through informal enforcement processes.  They, therefore, 
do not need to turn to much procedural customization.201  
In short, in high-uncertainty, high-scale environments, parties can primarily rely on industry-
provided solutions, including specialized decision makers or network governance that enhances 
informal enforcement mechanisms, to confront litigation opportunism.  The procedural 
customization that exists tends to direct disputes to specialized decision makers through choice of 
forum clauses, including arbitration clauses.  In circumstances where there might be various 
categories of disputes that could benefit from differential treatment, parties might use more 
atomistic carve-outs to modify their dispute resolution processes.  Finally, in arbitration, we might 
expect to see parties provide some tailoring, especially around qualifications or expertise for 
decision makers. 
 
199 See id. at 563. 
200 David T. Robinson & Toby E. Stuart, Network Effects in the Governance of Strategic Alliances, 23 J. L. ECON. ORG. 
242, 244 (2006). 
201 For instance, in the Harley-Davidson Master Supply Agreement (2015), Purchase Order Terms and Conditions Module 
(one of the contracts that Professor Bernstien evaluates in some detail), Harley-Davidson does minimal procedural 
customization, and all of it is modular in nature.  Harley-Davidson selects Wisconsin law (and opts out of the Convention 
on the International Sale of Goods), see ¶ 21(b), and selects Milwaukee County Circuit Court for the State of Wisconsin 
or the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin as the forum, see ¶ 21(d).  The only other 
customizations bolster the choice of forum.  For instance, Harley-Davidson includes a waiver of objections to personal 
jurisdiction.  Id.  
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3.3.3.4 High Uncertainty, Low Scale – High Risks of Litigation Opportunism   
Parties are most likely to benefit from, and thus most likely to seek, bespoke procedural 
systems in innovation-oriented contracts, where uncertainty is high and scale is low.202  These 
environments include co- or join-development contracts, research and development 
collaborations, OEM contracts that include going improvement and development provisions, or 
new services innovations.203  In such environments, parties cannot hope to specify all or even a 
meaningful set of the future states of the world in which the contract will have to be performed and 
the actions to be taken in each of those states.  Moreover, the changes caused by persistent 
innovation, and the limited number of market actors, undermine the capacity for any market or 
industry to settle on shared understandings.  As a result, frequent, and sometimes even good-faith, 
disagreements occur about what constitutes proper performance or an appropriate response to 
conditions that arise ex post. 
This pervasive uncertainty means that parties often contract to provide a framework for their 
collaboration rather than to guarantee a particular outcome.  In these contracts for innovation, 
formal enforcement plays an important, but focused role.  For instance, Professors Hadfield and 
Bozovic describe formal enforcement mechanisms as “scaffolding” for informal enforcement 
norms.204  Professors Gilson, Sabel, and Scott argue for the imposition of “low-powered” sanctions 
in the event of a breach of the formal aspects of a collaborative contract.205 Low-powered 
enforcement imposes formal remedies for “red-faced” violations of the agreement to provide a 
 
202 A distinction should be made between contracts for innovation and contracts about innovation.  Some contracts, in 
other words, provide the framework within which innovation takes place, while other contracts are more conventional 
and address the protection, transfer, licensing, or other use of extra-contractual innovations.   
203 See Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 24, at 992-95. 
204 Id.  
205 See, e.g., Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Braiding, supra note 36, at 1427. 
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prioritized opportunity, but does not impose sanctions for a failure to reach particular outcomes.206  
Both approaches view trust as emerging endogenously from the parties’ relationship, with formal 
enforcement provisions playing a limited but critical role by requiring certain information sharing.  
Professor Bozovic and Hadfield postulate that trust grows as the parties proceed with the 
relationship and as they continually refer back to the constituting documents of that relationship in 
order to evaluate one another’s performance.  Professors Gilson, Sabel, and Scott contend that 
informal constraints become effective as the collaboration progresses and relevant metrics of 
performance become more observable.  Additionally, the continuing revelation of information and 
ongoing relationship increases switching costs, making it more likely that the parties will informally 
solve problems in order to maintain the collaboration.   
The critical point is that in collaborative contracts, legal enforcement should, or does, take a 
back seat, but it remains foundational to the functioning of the alliance.  Default procedural rules 
are frequently an ill fit for the parties’ objectives, given the unique needs of both sanctioning some 
specific behavior but also encouraging the development of informal norms.   Because of the limited 
number of parties with similar needs, generalist courts struggle to supply accurate ex post 
specification of substantive terms, and open-ended public procedural rules, which give 
tremendous discretion to judges, magnify this shortcoming.207  Procedure, in other words, amplifies 
worries that formal enforcement will crowd out the development of essential informal norms.  It 
makes sense, then, that parties confronting the dilemmas of contracting in environments of high 
 
206 See id. at 1417. 
207 See, e.g., See Blair, supra note 16, at 800 (“[T]he reformers opted to entrust judges with broad discretiondis- cretion 
to put the rules of procedure into action in individual cases.”); Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity 
Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181 (2005) (noting 
how the Rules retrieved equity as a source of procedural discretion); Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and 
Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429 (2003) (arguing for broad use of equitable discretion). 
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uncertainty and low scale would turn to bespoke procedural regimes to help them resolve their 
disputes reliably and at an acceptable cost.208   
  This, in fact, is precisely what we see in practice.  As Part II(C) observes, parties to alliance 
agreements regularly create intricate procedural regimes.   These multi-tiered and complex dispute 
resolution regimes are highly-customized to augment and reinforce other substantive governance 
mechanisms without crowding out the growth of informal norms.209  
For instance, in a recent alliance agreement between Frequency Therapeutics, Inc. and Astellas 
Pharma, Inc., the parties established a framework for the development, manufacture, and 
commercialization of a new regenerative therapy for hearing loss.210  Their dispute resolution 
system distributes different conflicts to different parties and decision makers. Most common 
disputes regarding details of the collaboration are first sent to a Joint Steering Committee 
(“JSC”).211  If a routine disagreement cannot be solved by the JSC, it gets escalated to the 
executive officers who attempt to resolve it informally.212  Failing such informal resolution, a 
standard dispute gets sent to binding arbitration using a simplified baseball procedure with very 
constrained opportunities for evidence gathering and production.213   In contrast, more serious 
disputes about alleged material breaches, failures of payments, or the validity of the agreement do 
not go through the JSC at all.  The executive officers may attempt to resolve such disputes 
informally, but failing that, these disputes get sent to conventional arbitration before a three-
 
208 See generally Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contracting for Innovation, supra note 36 (advancing a similar argument with 
respect to the design of substantive terms).        
209 Jennejohn, supra note 17, at 362 (2016) (“Establishing a constellation of enforcement institutions appears to be a 
common strategy among collaborations.”).   
210 See License and Collaboration Agreement By and Between Frequency Therapeutics, Inc. and Astellas Pharma, Inc. 
(2019) [hereinafter, License and Collaboration Agreement], Preamble, ¶1.95; see also, e.g., Astellas Pharma and 
Frequency Therapeutics collaborate on hearing loss therapy, Comment, July 29, 2019, Medical Device Network, 
https://www.medicaldevice-network.com/comment/fx-322-hearing-loss-therapy/.   
211 See License and Collaboration Agreement, supra note 210, at ¶3.02(f).   
212 Id. ¶ 3.10. 
213 Id. ¶ 16.01(d). 
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arbitrator tribunal under the rules and auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce.214  If 
these more serious disputes involve scientific or technical matters, the arbitrators need to have 
industry expertise.215  Disputes involving intellectual property rights do not go through the JSC.  
Executive Officers presumably may attempt to resolve such disputes, but failing that, these 
disputes get sent to a court or patent office of a country where the patent was issued or a patent 
application was filed.216  Finally, either party may go to a U.S. court to seek injunctive relief in order 
to protect other intellectual property rights.217  
In short, the Frequency Therapeutics, Inc. and Astellas Pharma, Inc. alliance agreement 
provides for an intricate system of informal and formal dispute resolution that sorts potential fights 
into different categories and then filters them through individuated layers of dispute resolution.  The 
system encourages the resolution of routine disagreements informally, providing multiple 
opportunities for such a resolution.  This fosters trust by focusing on communication and 
information sharing, reinforcing the substantive goals of the collaboration.  In the somewhat unlikely 
event that such routine disputes are not informally resolved, the simplified baseball arbitration 
procedure helps assure that the cooperative venture is not derailed by costly and time-consuming 
post-dispute opportunism related to minor disagreements.  The agreement also recognizes, 
however, that there could be other more serious disputes, so it creates a different pathway for their 
resolution, directing them to decision makers who have relative expertise or injunctive powers.       
  A similar example can be seen in a collaboration agreement between Vir Biotechnology, 
Inc. and Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Inc. for the therapeutic for the treatment of chronic hepatitis 
 
214 Id. ¶ 16.01(c). 
215 Id. 
216 Id. ¶ 16.01(e). 
217 Id. ¶ 16.01(c).   
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B.218  The Vir Biotechnology, Inc./Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Inc. collaboration agreement similarly 
distributes common disputes through a JSC, to executive officers.  The agreement then trifurcates 
where disputes next go for resolution.  It sends a few common categories of disputes to expedited 
baseball arbitration.219  Notably, this expedited process does not allow for discovery and relies on 
the parties to appoint representative experts, who, in turn, select a neutral expert to serve as the 
arbitrator.  The parties have no direct contact with the neutral expert but the neutral may consult 
with the party appointed experts.220  It then allows parties to choose between litigating in a court of 
competent jurisdiction or arbitrating other more serious disputes.221  
Like the Frequency Therapeutics alliance agreement, then, the Vir Biotechnology agreement sorts 
potential disputes into different categories.  This has the particular benefit, in the case of the Vir 
Biotechnology agreement, of sending most minor disputes through an expedited baseball 
arbitration.  By removing most discovery and presentation of evidence and streamlining the 
adjudication, the parties to the Vir Biotechnology agreement have cabined most post-dispute 
litigation opportunism while still allowing for the streamlined resolution of nettlesome 
disagreements. 
In short, in contexts of high uncertainty but low scale, parties already invest more in drafting 
complicated substantive contracts that are designed to foster and develop trust over time.  Careful 
and thoughtful procedural customizations are used to make sure that enforcement mechanisms 
 
218 See Collaboration and License Agreement By and Among Vir Biotechnology, Inc. and Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(2019); Vir Biotechnology and Alnylam Pharmaceuticals Initiate Phase 1/2 Study of VIR-2218, 
http://investors.alnylam.com/news-releases/news-release-details/vir-biotechnology-and-alnylam-pharmaceuticals-
initiate-phase-12 (last visited August 28, 2019).   
219 See id. ¶13.03.   
220 See id.  
221 See id. ¶¶ 13.01, 13.02. 
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support the substantive goals of the parties without crowding out the development of informal, 
relational norms.222      
 Conclusion 
Despite a vast contract theory literature, we are only just scratching the surface of 
understanding how parties design their contracts in the real world.223  This is particularly true of 
procedural customizations.    Contrary to some early commentator’s estimates, parties sometimes 
engage in a diverse range of procedural customization.  The challenge has been identifying and 
explaining the patterns of ex ante procedural contracting. 
This Article has argued that the first step towards understanding the ways that transactional 
designers harness the potential of procedural autonomy is to recognize that procedural 
customization functions best to offset litigation opportunism.  By systematically considering the 
way that various forms of procedural customization function to limit or eliminate litigation 
opportunism, this Article provides an important advance in helping identify the circumstances when 
customizations of procedure can be valuable as additional governance tools.   
This Article then advances a typology of procedural innovation by considering underlying key 
attributes of a transaction, namely the degree of environmental and behavioral uncertainty present 
and the frequency with which other similar parties contract in the same domain.           
In environments of low uncertainty but high scale, parties have little need for formal, detailed 
contracts, structuring their relationships instead through relational norms.  Because written 
contracts do modest work and parties place little reliance on formal enforcement, contract 
designers need not invest much in procedural customizations.  At most, designers in this domain 
might make a few coarse, modular customizations aimed at simplifying choice of forum and law 
 
222 Need citation  
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decisions, in the rare event business solutions break down and the parties turn to courts or 
arbitrators.  As scale drops, parties in low uncertainty environments can no longer rely on 
standardized solutions, but they can draft substantively state-contingent contracts at reasonably 
low costs.  This keeps the risk of litigation opportunism in check.  Accordingly, there is still little 
need for precise procedural tailoring.  Parties can, instead, mostly rely on the default rules of 
procedure.  To the extent that any customization makes cost-effective sense, that customization 
tends to be coarse and simple, aimed at streamlining adjudication and curbing extreme litigation 
abuses. 
When uncertainty increases, parties in a high-scale market tend to be able to address 
future contingencies and their inherent risks by choosing decision makers with specialized 
expertise or relying network governance – an interconnected web of relationships with similarly 
situated parties.  In these high-uncertainty but high-scale environments, parties rely on more 
detailed and transactionally-particularized contracts but engage in relatively limited procedural 
customization.  To the extent that such customization exists, it tends to be modular, often opting 
out of courts and into arbitration, at least for some categories of disputes.  Given the importance of 
decision-maker expertise, however, parties more frequently tweak the details of the arbitral 
process, including arbitrator expertise, in order to assure that a decision-maker has relevant 
industry expertise and sensitivity to the parties’ circumstances.  Parties also sometimes make more 
atomistic carve-outs for certain categories of disputes. 
In contrast, as uncertainty rises but scale declines – as the business environment becomes 
more innovative – parties cannot confront increasing exchange hazards through common industry 
norms, but they also struggle to specify obligations and rights ex ante.  Parties rely more heavily on 
lawyers and contracts to supply substantive obligations, but those obligations are often framed 
vaguely, opening the door to litigation opportunism.  To confront that opportunism, parties invest 
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greater tailoring of the procedural mechanisms that reinforce, maintain, and decide the integrity of 
those obligations.  The degree of that tailoring roughly correlates to the degree of uncertainty and 
scale at issue. 
While rough, conclusions predicted by this four-quadrant typology seem to correspond 
with most of the empirical data we have about procedural contracting.  That said, perhaps the 
most significant advance this Article makes is in providing a roadmap for future, more 
particularized, empirical work to test the key hypothesis that procedural innovation will vary in 
relation to the mix of uncertainty and market scale of a given commercial transaction.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
